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CONTENTS

Contents of 'FOREIGN MILITARY REVIEW,' February 1980
(ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Feb 80) 1

Nuclear Weapons: Soviet Review of U.S. Employment Plans
(D. Georgiyev; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Feb 80) 3

Nuclear Mines: Soviet Review of NATO Employment Plans
(V. Kosov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Feb 80) 8

Research and Development: Soviet Review of U.S. Program
(A. Starkov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Feb 80) 12

Ground Radar: Soviet Review of U.S. Developments
(A. Tikhomirov, A. Orlov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Feb 80) 13

Air Force: Soviet Review of U.S. Capabilities
(V. Aleksandrov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Feb 80) .. 15

Air-to-Air Missiles: Soviet Review of NATO Capabilities
(B. Semenov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Feb 80) 18

Light Transport Aircraft: Soviet Review of Foreign Developments
(Yu. Smirnov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Feb 80) 19

Naval Mine Warfare: Soviet Review of NATO Methods
(V. Yankovskiy; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Feb 80) ... 21

Naval Aircraft: Soviet Review of U.S. Modernization Program
(I. Kutsev; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Feb 80) 28

Contents of 'FOREIGN MILITARY REVIEW,' June 1980
(ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Jun 80) 29

Nuclear Warfare: Soviet Review of NATO Strategy
(R. Simonyan; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Jun 80) ... 31

U.S. Mechanized Division: Comments on Offensive Tactics
(I. Khramov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Jun 80) 40

Camouflage, Deception: Soviet Review of Western Resources
(L. Sergeyev; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Jun 80) ... 42

NATO: Soviet Review of Aviation Support Role
(N. Dmitriyev; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Jun 80) .. 43

Radar: Soviet Review of Western Development
(I. Aleksandrov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Jun 80). 46

U.S. Navy: Soviet Comments on Forces in Indian Ocean
(I. Karemov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Jun 80) 48

NATO Navy: Soviet Review of Amphibious Landing Defense
(A. Rumyantsev; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Jun 80) . 53

Naval Units: Training and Related Activities
(KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, various dates) 55

Officer Technical Training, by Ye. Vedrashko
On a Small ASW Ship, by V. Baltak
Staff Officers Criticized, by V. Korneychuk
Activities of Political Officers, by V. Sabaneyev
Submarine Training Results, by I. Mravtsev
Cruiser Commander's Background, by L. Buchinskiy
Criticism: Follow-Up Report
Leningrad Naval Library, by V. Kukel'skiy
Northern Fleet Commander on Training, by V. Chernavin
On the Submarine 'Leninets', by S. Bystrov
Criticism: Follow-Up Report
Follow-Up Report on Criticism
On a Large ASW Ship, by A. Kuz'min
Submarine Crew Training, by N. Remizov
Submarine Commander on Training, by V. Naumov
Criticism: Follow-Up Report

Editor's Mailbag: Monthly Mail Reviewed
(KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, various dates) 88

Mail Received in March
Mail Received in April
Mail Received in May
Mail Received in June

Airborne Troops: Combat Training Activities
(KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 4 Apr, 15 Jul 80) 95

Regiment Shortcomings Noted, by A. Oliynik
Development of Raid Operations, by K. Kurochkin

Missile and Radar Units: Training Activities
(KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, various dates) 103

Communications Problems, by A. Bezotosov
Battalion Night Launches, by A. Nemets
Radiotechnical Regiment Training, by N. Gritskov
Missile Unit Economy Measures, by V. Fedoseyev
Electric Power Personnel Praised, by A. Grishin
Training Test Results, by G. Mikhaylov
Training in Outstanding Unit, by A. Korkin
Outstanding Battalion Training, by V. Parfenov

Motorized Rifle Units: Training Activities
(KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, various dates) 124

Company Training Criticized, by A. Lapynin
Regiment Air Defense Training, by I. Kushelev
Regiment Training Results, by V. Parfenov
Criticism: Follow-Up Report
Training Aids Described, by N. Panyukov
Battalion Training Results, by R. Dukov
Division Training Results, by A. Gaponov
Helicopter Support Described, by Yu. Romanov

Combat Engineers: Diver Training Described
(V. Rodin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 Apr 80) 139

Officers' Command Training: Methods Described
(Tasutov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 16 Apr 80) 141

NATO: Soviet Comments on Field Artillery
(V. Miryanin, V. Talanov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 16 Apr 80) 144

Artillery: Battalion Training Described
(V. Saranchev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 Apr 80) 147

Motor Vehicles: Unsafe Conditions Criticized
(V. Porfenyuk; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 Apr 80) 149

NCO Training: Problems Discussed
(G. Patrushev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 7 May 80) 151

Military Engineers: Tasks and Training
(KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 13 May 80) 155

Morale Problem: Garrison Commander Criticized
(N. Bukharin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 13 May 80) 158

Officers' Technical Training: General Pavlovskiy's Comments
(I. Pavlovskiy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 15 May 80) 162

Motorized Rifle Units: Training Activities
(KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 13, 27, 28 May 80) 168

Company Mountain Training, by G. Artemenko
Regiment Shortcomings Analyzed, by A. Yurkin
Helicopter Fire Support, by V. Sekhin

Military Uniforms: Dress Regulations
(S. Petrov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 20 May 80) 175

Commander Criticism: Investigation Results
(A. Bedzhanyan; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 May 80) 180

Far East M.D.: Training Problems Discussed
(V. Novikov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 May 80) 183

DOSAAF Chief Comments on Training Results
(A. Pokryshkin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 May 80) 187

Military Service: Educational Role Discussed
(A. Timorin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 29 May 80) 191

Military Schools: Combat Training Results Reviewed
(V. Makarov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 30 May 80) 197

Propaganda Unit: Afghanistan Leaflet Described
(KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 30 May 80) 200

CONTENTS OF 'FOREIGN MILITARY REVIEW', FEBRUARY 1980

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 80 signed to press 7 Feb 80 pp 1-2

[Full-text translated articles published in this issue of the JPRS report are indicated with an asterisk (*); excerpted translations are indicated with a double asterisk (**).]

[Text] CONTENTS Page

GENERAL MILITARY PROBLEMS

"U.S. Military Policy in the Asia-Pacific Zone" - P. Kochukov...... 3
"The Moral Make-up of Japanese Servicemen" - V. Moskvin............ 8
"Bundeswehr Development Program" - S. Volin........................ 14
"Hong Kong (Status, Elements of the Infrastructure, and Relations with China)" - Yu. Dmitriyev.......................... 16
"Expenditures for the Purchase of Weapons for the Bundeswehr" - V. Gorokhov.. 20

THE GROUND FORCES

*"Nuclear Weapons Employment by a U.S. Army Corps" - D. Georgiyev... 21
"Antitank Defense of the FRG Motorized Infantry Division " - N. Anishchenko.. 26
*"Nuclear Mines" - V. Kosov.. 32
**"Basic Trends and Financing of U.S. Army Research and Development" - A. Starkov.................................... 36
**"American Radar Reconnaissance of Ground Targets" - A. Tikhomirov and A. Orlov................................... 42
"New 155mm Towed Howitzer" - V. Miryanin........................... 47
"American M13 Chemical Defense Package" - P. Mogutov............... 50

THE AIR FORCE

Page

**"The United States Air Force" - V. Aleksandrov........................ 51
**"Air-to-Air Missiles" - B. Semenov....................................... 57
**"Light Transport Aircraft" - Yu. Smirnov................................ 63
"Effective Strength of NATO Air Forces" - V. Sibiryakov............. 67

THE NAVAL FORCES

*"Naval 'Mine Warfare'" - V. Yankovskiy...................................... 69
"NATO Navies at Exercise 'Display Determination-79'" - V. Khomenskiy.. 75
**"U.S. Navy Aircraft Modernization" - I. Kutsev.......................... 77
"Radio Communications System Aboard the 'Tarawa' General-Purpose Landing Ship" - A. Chirkov.................................. 82
"French 'Atlantik' Base Patrol Aircraft: - V. Malov.................. 84
"Oceanographic Research Platform" - A. Zakharov......................... 85

INFORMATION, EVENTS, FACTS

"U.S.A.F. Exercise 'Crested Cap'"
"Oman's Navy"
"Improvements in the American Military Command and Control System"
"New West German Aircraft Design"
"American XM2 Infantry Combat Vehicle"
"Upgrading the West German Air Force RF-4E"
"Modernization of U.S. Navy Helicopters"
"The Volger 80mm Antitank Grenade Launcher"
"New NATO Assignments" 87

FOREIGN MILITARY CHRONICLE 93

ARTICLES IN FOREIGN JOURNALS 96

COLORED INSERTS

"American AN/TPQ-37 Radar"
"American F-106A Delta Dart Fighter Interceptor"
"West German Do-28D-Z 'Sky Servant' Light Military Transport"
"Oman Navy's B2 'Al'-Mansur' Missile Patrol Boat"

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS: SOVIET REVIEW OF U.S. EMPLOYMENT PLANS

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 80 signed to press 7 Feb 80 pp 21-26

[Article by Col D. Georgiyev: "Nuclear Weapons Employment by a U.S. Army Corps"]

[Text] Pentagon bosses, inflating the myth of a supposed "Soviet military threat," consistently pursue a course to further build up the combat might of the U.S. armed forces. Here an important role in their militaristic plans falls to the search for and development of new ways to conduct military operations, to deploy modern weapons systems, including neutron weapons, and to compile and refine plans for nuclear weapons employment.

American regulations point out that the army corps, being the highest tactical formation [soyedineniye], can play a fundamental role in ground force operations in a TVD [theater of operations] and conduct combat actions not only as part of a NATO army group, but also independently (in a separate operational sector or away from the main forces).

As American military specialists propose, one of the basic means of routing the enemy in the European theater of war are nuclear weapons, which can be employed in massed and group strikes or strikes against previously-discovered and reconnoitered targets (objectives).

When organizing an offensive, U.S. Army regulations recommend employment of nuclear weapons for strikes against an enemy established defense, his force groupings, fire and nuclear means, command, control, and communications posts, and rear services organs, and also to forestall the approach of reserves and liquidate counterattacking enemy formations (units [chast']), securing one's own flanks, or isolating a particular area of combat actions.

During the defense, they can be employed for the following purposes: to destroy enemy strike groupings ahead of the forward edge of defending units and to strike his reserves and second echelons at the moment the troops deploy and are committed to battle; to rout the enemy penetrating defense; to cover breaches which develop in the defense, to rout counterattacking enemy groupings, to strike fire support means (especially nuclear); to forestall the enemy from seizing advantageous sectors of terrain or his possession of a strategically-important sector; to strike control posts, communications, rear service targets, and create conditions favorable for a subsequent transfer to the offensive.

American regulations also emphasize that supplying nuclear support to ground forces conducting combat actions is a component of the general nuclear weapons employment plan.

The U.S. Army Corps is the basic formation, on the staff of which nuclear planning is accomplished*. From the point of view of American military specialists, as relates to employment of tactical nuclear weapons by the ground forces, this process boils down to determination of procedures, methods, and time nuclear weapons are employed by a corps or by the divisions making up that corps, taking into account restrictions ordered by higher headquarters. During planning, combined nuclear and conventional weapons employment is envisioned to achieve maximum results. The first consideration here is the destructive factors of nuclear weapons. The idea is that approximately two-thirds of all losses result from the shock wave. Radiation is the chief destructive factor for low-yield ammunition. Due to the appearance of nuclear ammunition with an enhanced yield of initial radiation, as well as with an enhanced effect of the shock wave and heat radiation, the computation includes the average indicators of the destructive effect on personnel of ammunition with a yield of up to 10 kilotons used for nuclear support to a corps on the battlefield.

The foreign press reports that a certain amount of nuclear ammunition, most of which forms the so-called corps nuclear "package," with the remainder intended for employment in subsequent combat actions if the enemy is not destroyed after the nuclear "package" is employed, is allocated to its command for accomplishment of the missions assigned to the army corps in the offensive or defensive. The term nuclear "package" was introduced into the U.S. Army in 1976 after a reexamination of views on tactical nuclear weapons employment in the European theater of war and with the start of a program to modernize U.S. nuclear ammunition accumulated in Europe during the postwar period.

As American regulations point out, the army corps nuclear "package" is a component of the nuclear support plan, which the staff develops as a supplement to the corps operations plan. The nuclear "package" includes the following elements (parameters): the required amount of nuclear ammunition of a certain yield and the delivery means; time the strike is to be made and its duration, the area where the weapons are to be employed.

Depending upon the possible conditions of the combat situation, the corps commander can direct the preparation of two or three nuclear "packages," each of which being prepared during peacetime; then they are corrected and refined during staff combat operational preparations, as well as during the entire time from the start of combat actions until the actual employment of the nuclear means. Posing the problem this way allows the corps commander to be ready at any moment to employ the nuclear "package."

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*See ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 7, 1979, pp 21-23 for U.S. Army views on planning nuclear weapons employment.

Divisions are the lowest headquarters preparing nuclear "sub-packages," which subsequently are included as components in the army corps nuclear "package." Also, a separate brigade or a separate armored cavalry regiment attached to the corps sometimes can develop and subsequently also have their own nuclear "sub-packages."

/Nuclear planning in peacetime,/ [printed in bold face] according to U.S. Army views, begins when the corps commander, jointly with his staff and based upon an evaluation of assigned and attached resources, upon the position of his troops and reconnaissance data on the enemy, determines the possible variations of his troops' actions and those of the enemy when conducting offensive and defensive operations which, in his opinion, might require employment of nuclear weapons. The corps commander's concept is embodied in his operations plan, which is disseminated to the commanders of the divisions, separate brigades, and separate armored cavalry regiments. Here the main attention in the offensive is devoted to questions of inflicting significant damage on the enemy and obtaining direct tactical advantages necessary to successfully conduct the operation. On the defensive, main attention is devoted to routing the penetrating enemy or his second echelons capable of developing the success of the offensive.

After this is done, the army corps commander issues subordinate formations and separate units instructions on nuclear planning and the order to develop the nuclear "sub-packages" for each intended variant. Spelled out in each are the various methods of conducting combat actions where nuclear weapons employment is required; the missions which must be accomplished as a result of employing the nuclear "package" against the enemy; the level of permissible accompanying losses, and so forth.

The "packages" and "sub-packages" are developed by fire support coordination centers (TsKOP) on the corresponding staffs, with participation by corps (division) operations divisions (sections) and from other subunit [podrazdeleniye] staffs (Figure 1) [figure not reproduced]. The corps (division) artillery commander supervises the work of these organizations. The corps (division) intelligence division (section) maintains continual contact with TsKOP officers, providing them the required information on possible actions and the most probably directions of enemy movement, on enemy unit deployment on the battlefield, as well as on newly-discovered and located targets and objectives. Divisions in the staff military and civilian directorate prepare data on the number of civilians and refugees in cities and populated points which are to receive nuclear strikes in order to determine and calculate probable accompanying losses.

Division "sub-packages" are forwarded to the corps staff for approval and supplemental targets for destruction are added there. This involves targets at the greatest depth or those ordered struck by higher headquarters. Nuclear ammunition requirements for each variant of combat are combined into two or three "packages," with the amount of nuclear ammunition of a certain yield determined from the largest index for any one of the variants. All possible corps combat actions planned for the identical depth within the boundaries of an occupied area are usually included in a single corps nuclear "package."

All nuclear "packages" prepared by the corps are forwarded to higher headquarters for review and subsequent approval by the U.S. political military leadership. There each is assigned a number (code name) which subsequently is used to transmit execution orders. The nuclear ammunition and delivery means following approval are included in the nuclear support plan and are prescribed to the subordinate divisions. Air Force and Navy nuclear means for support to a corps are also included in the corps "package." However, the right to issue and employ nuclear ammunition remains with the corresponding Air Force and Navy commanders.

/Nuclear planning after combat actions begin./ [Printed in bold face] As already noted above, after combat actions begin nuclear "packages" included in the corps nuclear support plan during peacetime are refined depending upon the unfolding combat situation, as well as for the most effective employment of allocated ammunition and delivery means.

Along with staff officers, the corps commander determines which of the previously-intended (planned) variants the developing combat actions are beginning to follow. At the moment he learns that the accomplishment of the mission assigned to the corps requires employment of nuclear weapons, the nuclear "package" most responsive to the combat situation is selected (Figure 2) [figure not reproduced]. Since the probable situation and the conditions used in peacetime to develop the nuclear "package" never will be analogous to the actual situation, the corps commander issues the order to refine the previously-planned "package" in accordance with the changing real situation. Changes the corps commander can make in the selected "package" are the number and yield of the nuclear ammunition and the time or area of its employment. Depending upon new targets that appear, the destruction, or the refinement of the positions of the selected targets, the sequence (order) of making the strikes against the targets or the duration of an inflicted nuclear strike can be corrected.

The corps commander requests employment of nuclear weapons as a result of evaluating the situation unfolding in the corps area of operations. According to data in the foreign military press, in order to receive permission to employ nuclear weapons, the corps commander must make his request in time, and at least a half day prior to when the nuclear strike is to be made. During the entire requesting process, the nuclear "package" continues to be corrected. After receipt of the decision to employ nuclear weapons from the higher headquarters and evaluation of the unfolding situation, the order is issued to remove the PAL (Permissive Action Link) interlock, friendly troops are notified about the employment of nuclear weapons, the delivery vehicles are given final guidance adjustments, and the nuclear strike is made.

In the event the corps commander receives permission prior to having requested it, his most important act in making his decision is determining the moment and the time to issue the order to make the nuclear strike. During this period all of the commander's instructions and orders reliably and in a timely manner must be disseminated to the staffs of the formations and units participating in execution of the battle plan prepared by the corps commander. No less important also are careful evaluation of corps capabilities and determination of the time required to deploy the delivery vehicles from alert areas to firing positions and delivery of the nuclear ammunition to them (if required).

Employment of the corresponding nuclear "package" is accomplished under the direct supervision of the corps commander and his staff in the minimum amount of time against those areas where the presence of enemy troops or disposition of targets are known with a high degree of probability, as well as against fixed objectives in the enemy defense. After this comes evaluation of the results of the strike using all corps observation and reconnaissance resources. Combat actions begin anew with employment of conventional means of destruction. However, if necessary, the corps can request additional permission to make separate nuclear strikes against remaining battle-worthy enemy troops.

Development by American strategists of plans for the employment of weapons of mass destruction, including tactical nuclear weapons, clearly demonstrates the aggressive nature of the Pentagon's militaristic designs. The present leadership is applying enormous efforts to modernize the American nuclear missiles based in Western Europe. In numerous exercises the Americans conduct in Western European countries, problems are worked out for significantly strengthening their troop groupings and conducting combat actions with employment of the latest conventional and nuclear weapons against the Warsaw Pact amred forces. Efforts by U.S. militarists to prepare a "limited nuclear war in Europe" obliges our troops to be in constant combat readiness, strictly to monitor their intrigues, and in every way to strengthen the combat brotherhood with the armies of the fraternal countries.

CAPTIONS

1. p 23 Figure 1. Basic organizations and responsible individuals participating in development of the nuclear "package."

2. p 25 Figure 2. Army corps commander's sequence of operations when issuing a request for and the order to employ nuclear weapons.

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NUCLEAR MINES: SOVIET REVIEW OF NATO EMPLOYMENT PLANS

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[Article by Col-Engr V. Kosov, candidate of technical sciences: "Nuclear Mines"]

[Text] In recent years the foreign press has devoted quite a bit of attention to various aspects of employing nuclear mines*, including to creation of zones of destruction and zones of radioactively contaminated terrain and to destroying people and enemy equipment.

The first nuclear mine models that came into the U.S. Army inventory in the early 1960's meant development of ways to employ them in combat. Special teams to store and maintain them were also established.

Evaluating the effectiveness of nuclear charges, American military specialists consider that their obstructive effect depends upon creation, as a result of underground or surface explosions, of large craters (Figure 1), rubble (Figure 2) [figures not reproduced], and zones of destruction forming a serious obstacle in the way of troops on the move. For example, an above-ground burst of a 10 kiloton nuclear charge leaves a crater about 90 meters in diameter and about 20 meters deep, according to American specialists. An underground burst of identical yield would leave a considerably larger crater.

The obstructive effect from a surface burst is worse due to the radioactive fallout and from an underground burst due to a great deal of residual radiation around the crater. Since a surface burst is accompanied by radioactive fallout, which contaminates terrain over a large area, foreign specialists recommend being extremely careful when considering employment of such bursts in order not to hinder friendly troop activities. In this connection, underground mine bursts more often will be employed during active combat actions since crater dimensions increase with an increase to a certain limit in the depth to which the mine is placed and the amount of radioactive fallout is significantly reduced.

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*Nuclear land mines are sometimes called atomic demolition munitions (ADM) or nuclear mines.

As the foreign press emphasizes, in an underground nuclear explosion about 95% of the radioactive products are retained in the soil or remain quite near the crater; only 5% becomes fallout. Also, the expanse of the zone of radioactive contamination is signifantly less than during a surface burst (Table 1) [table not reproduced]. In light of the reasons listed, preference should be given when constructing nuclear mine barriers to nuclear mine underground bursts, which also mean very large craters (Table 2) [table not reproduced].

Foreign specialists characterize a crater as an obstacle difficult to overcome. It has steep slopes impassable to tanks and trucks and piles of dirt, while the soil that falls into the crater after the burst greatly hinders the movement of vehicles through it. In a majority of instances, it rapidly fills with ground water, which causes additional difficulties. The crater and the terrain immediately nearby will also have an extraordinarily high level of radioactive contamination (3,000-5,000 rads/hour). This increases the barrier's obstructive effect. One must also consider that the soil thrown out by the burst, as it falls from the cloud formed, can cause injury and put out of action combat equipment in a radius of several hundred meters from the epicenter of the burst. This all exerts a significant psychological effect on personnel.

Based on these facts, the conclusion is made and reported in the foreign military press that obstacles in the form of craters or ditches combined with radioactively contaminated terrain are such that, as a minimum, 2 days would be required for trucks and armored personnel carriers to surmount them. The high radiation level complicates the production of passages through the crater and this requires special earth-moving equipment with armor protection and supplied with hermetically-sealed cabs.

In the opinion of foreign specialists, the maximum effect from using such barriers can be achieved by combining them with natural obstacles. Emphasized also is that mountainous terrain, where two nuclear mines 1 kilometer apart on the opposing slopes can cover choke points, is the most advantageous for this. If a ravine cannot be covered in this manner, the recommendation is to combine bursts on the ravine slopes and on the bottom. It is most preferable to place the charges in wooded regions and those predisposed to slides and cave-ins.

Railroads passing through wooded regions in flat terrain can be covered with craters at cross-overs or in the worst choke points. In addition, trees may also be felled over an area, the size depending upon the yield of the charge.

The obstructive effect is also recommended for water barriers. For instance, narrow and easily surmountable portions of rivers can be widened by destroying the banks. Here the charges are placed in a line passing parallel to the river channel 200-300 meters from the banks. In other cases, flooding can be caused by destroying dams, dikes, and other hydrotechnical structures. Detonations in the river channel allow one to combine the effect of widening the water barrier with destruction of the banks, formation of waves, and pollution of the water.

Foreign military specialists admit the possibility of employing nuclear mines also in flat terrain devoid of natural barriers. In this case, they recommend building ditches several kilometers long in the most probable sectors of enemy movement.

Small yield nuclear mines are recommended, in accordance with the latest requirements for building obstacles established by the NATO military leadership. Based upon computations, the dimensions of an obstacles formed by detonation of a nuclear mine are not proportional to its yield. Thus, increasing the yield by a factor of 10 means increasing the crater only by a factor of 2. Also, the consideration is that the expanse of the radioactive fallout zone given optimum depth of nuclear mine placement should not exceed 3-4 kilometers; otherwise, increasing it beyond this amount to a significant degree complicates mission accomplishment by friendly toops. The technical problem also arises that an underground burst requires the nuclear mine be placed at a depth corresponding to its yield. Great technical difficulties arise when drilling shafts to a depth of 100 meters and more given a diameter of several dozen centimeters; work periods also increase. Therefore, foreign military specialists have recently proposed placing nuclear mines on the terrain at a shallow depth or using missile penetrating warheads for these purposes.

Examining the technical and military aspects of employing nuclear mines, the U.S. Army established quite a number of requirements. In particular, given minimal dimensions, they must weigh no more than 100 kilograms, be sturdy and hermetically-sealed, require no special care and storage, be detonated remotely by wire and radio, as well as with a timer. Foreign specialists consider that the mines should take no more than 10 minutes to prepare for detonation. This includes operations to remove the charges from their carriers and full check-out (adjustment) of the device to receive commands. They should be in special trailors or vehicles to ease their placement. A maximum of 30 minutes is permitted for complete preparation of the nuclear mine and the shaft for an underground burst.

According to foreign press information, nuclear mines will be employed mainly in combination with conventional munitions. Taking the terrain and urbanization of the European countries into consideration, they most often will be employed on highways, bridges, dams, dikes, or for formation of ditches, as well as in mountainous and wooded terrain.

In the late 1960's the NATO bloc developed a plan to build so-called "atomic mined belts" in regions of Central Europe that border on the socialist countries. Construction of special cement-lined shafts to house special charges soon began here. However, in recent years the U.S. Army, preparing to conduct expansive offensive operations, gave up creating solid barriers.

NATO military specialists consider that employment of separate nuclear mines will facilitate splintering enemy combat formations, allow the bloc command to win time, force the enemy to move in the desired direction, organize a stike against his forward units, and ease the localization and destruction of first echelon formations, having cut them off from reserves and rear areas. They thought that activating such barriers might cause numerous casualties among the peaceful population, however they tried to remain silent about this.

All of this convincingly shows the aggressive, adventurist nature of U.S. and NATO military preparations; they are actively preparing to unleash military actions that would employ various means of mass destruction, including nuclear mines.

CAPTIONS

1. p 33. Figure 1. Parameters of a crater formed by detonation of a 1 megaton charge, D_1--visible diameter; D_2--actual diameter, H--depth. drying from L'ARMEE.

2. p 33. Figure 2. Typical tossed dirt distribution. Given a 10-kiloton nuclear charge, the radius (R) is about 100 meters, rubble height up to 10 meters. Drying from L'ARMEE.

3. p 34. Table 1. Relationship of the size of the contaminated zone to the radiation level.

4. p 35. Table 2. Relationship of crater sizes to the yield of the nuclear charges.

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RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: SOVIET REVIEW OF U.S. PROGRAM

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 80 signed to press 7 Feb 80 pp 36-41

[Article by Col A. Starkov: "Basic Trends and Financing of U.S. Army Research and Development"]

[Excerpts] Stepping up the arms race, U.S. militaristic circles are devoting great attention to further improvement in the effectiveness of ground forces nuclear and conventional weapons. The U.S. Department of Defense annually increases appropriations for research and development (NIOKR) [R & D] on creation of new types of weapons and combat equipment for the ground forces (Table 1) [table not reproduced], which in fiscal year [FY] 1980 was more than 8.8% of the Department of the Army [DA] budget. Overall, in the 5-6 year armed forces development program (FY 77-81), the Pentagon plans to spend more than 13.3 billion dollars for these purposes.

During this fiscal year 60.4% of all DA appropriations for [R & D] are intended for development of strategic and operational-tactical weapons systems (Table 2) [table not reproduced] and 39.6% is allocated for [R & D] programs in the area of science and technology, long-range developments, and research into reconnaissance, communications, and command and control, and program support. This article intends to examine questions of financing basic strategic and tactical programs.

Significant annual appropriations allocated for creation of the newest weapons and models demonstrate the growing aggressive essence of American imperialism and its desire to achieve superiority in development and production not only of nuclear weapons and their delivery means, but also armored equipment, aviation and artillery weapons, ammunition, and radioelectronic equipment.

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GROUND RADAR: SOVIET REVIEW OF U.S. DEVELOPMENTS

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[Article by Maj Gen-Arty A. Tikhomirov, candidate of military sciences, and Lt Col-Engr A. Orlov: "American Radar Reconnaissance of Ground Targets"]

[Excerpts] The U.S. Army considers reconnaissance on the field of battle as a vital means of supporting ground forces combat actions and establishes high demands relative to completeness, proficient collection, and transmission of data on the enemy. Here, in the opinion of American specialists, a leading place in tactical reconnaissance falls to technical means, including ground target radar reconnaissance sites. This is explained by the following advantages: capability of the radar site over a short period of time to cover broad sectors of terrain; capability to obtain almost real-time data on a target; effectiveness in using radars regardless of time of day or weather when other reconnaissance instruments cannot operate; relatively high combat readiness and mobility of the sites. These advantages make radars useful for reconnaissance of the field of battle even when they can be detected by the enemy at ranges exceeding the operating range of the radar sites themselves.

Ground target radar reconnaissance sites entered the U.S. Army inventory in the 1950's. They were employed and underwent comprehensive tests during combat actions in Southeast Asia. Their subsequent development is linked to constant improvement of models in the inventory and to creation of new models.

Organizationally, ground target radar reconnaissance sites are part of AIR [artillery instrumented reconnaissance] subunits [podrazdeleniye], battalion reconnaissance subunits, and other troop subunits.

Depending upon how the reconnaissance is conducted and the nature of the missions accomplished, sites are divided into field artillery radars and moving ground target reconnaissance radars.

/Field artillery radars/ [printed in bold face] are intended to fix the firing positions of enemy firing artillery guns, mortars, and unguided rocket launchers, as well as to correct friendly artillery fire. The radar's immediate target is detection of the en route shell or mine. Determination of firing position coordinates during reconnaissance and shell impact point during firing correction is accomplished by fixing the shell in the flight trajectory sector and successful extrapolation of the trajectory to the shell point of origin or point of fall.

/Moving ground target reconnaissance radars/ observe enemy troop and combat equipment movement at the tactical depth and determine coordinates for their destruction. The foreign press reports that more than 50 such radars providing observation to a depth of 20 kilometers from the forward edge might be deployed in the U.S. mechanized division zone.

The effectiveness of reconnoitering moving ground targets greatly depends upon the nature of the terrain in the search zone since target detection requires line of sight to it from the radar site. The effect of the Doppler shift of the radar signal frequency reflected from a moving object is used to find the target. Based on the character of a signal in a sound indicator, an operator can determine the type and quantitative composition of the target (people, vehicles, tanks, and so on).

As follows from foreign press material, U.S. R & D efforts underway to further improve various types of ground target reconnaissance radar sites are directed towards solving the following problems:

--development of a radar site with fully automated processing and transmission of data to troop and fire ASU [automated control systems];

--improving the degree of radar system protection against enemy electronic suppression;

--creation of long-range ground target reconnaissance radar systems aboard aircraft.

As a result of completion of developments presently underway, one can expect, as is emphasized in the foreign press, that in the near future a new generation of ground target reconnaissance radar sites with better characteristics than those now available will come into the U.S. Army inventory.

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AIR FORCE: SOVIET REVIEW OF U.S. CAPABILITIES

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 80 signed to press 7 Feb 80 pp 51-57

[Article by Col V. Aleksandrov: "The United States Air Force"]

[Excerpts] The United States Air Force is tasked to support achievement of the aggressive goals of American imperialism in coordination with the U.S. Army and Navy. It is made up of two elements of the American "strategic triad" --intercontinental ballistic missiles and strategic aviation, as well as tactical, military transport, and other aviation branches.

Overall USAF leadership is embodied in the Secretary of the Air Force--a civilian designated by the President, with the consent of the Senate for a 4-year term. The highest operational leadership organ is the Air Staff headed by the Chief of Staff--a member of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Lew Allen has held this position since 1978.

Presented in this article, written from foreign press materials, are questions of USAF organization, effective strength*, and developmental perspectives, to include the Regular Air Force and the organized reserves (the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard).

As of mid-1979, the USAF had 699,000 service members (563,000 in the Regular Air Force, 43,000 in the reserve, and 93,000 in the national guard) and 248,000 civilians. The USAF had 1,054 ICBM launchers and about 9,000 various aircraft and helicopters.

/USAF development and combat training./ [printed in bold face] The USAF leadership, considering the force one of the vital means for achieving their aggressive aims, continually develops and improves it. Hiding behind the fabrications of a "Soviet military threat," U.S. ruling circles put forth enormous efforts to develop new and improve the combat effectiveness of extant weapons systems, further enhancement of command, control, and communications systems, and maintenance of units at a high degree of combat readiness.

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*For details on USAF effective strength, see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 1, 1980, pp 67-68 -- Ed.

In SAC [Strategic Air Command] these efforts are directed towards creation of the new mobile-based M-X ICBM, equipping Minutemen ICBM's with new MIRV [multiple independently-targetted reentry vehicles] warheads, equipping B-52 strategic bombers with cruise missiles, and continuing to test the advanced B-1 strategic bomber.

During the combat training process, B-52 strategic bombers and KC-135 tankers participate in numerous combined exercises conducted both within the continental United States, as well as overseas. Also participating are Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units attached to SAC.

Large-scale upgrading of units with the newest F-15 and F-16 fighters and A-10 fighter bombers is underway in Tactical Air Command [TAC] in accordance with the long-range development program. The overall totals of aircraft to be purchased and assigned to the Regular Air Force and to the reserve components are 729 F-15, 1,388 F-16, and 733 A-10. The E-3A AWACS long-range radar and command and control aircraft continue to enter the USAF inventory.

The USAF development plan envisions strengthening TAC in the radioelectronic combat [EW] arena. Thus, F-4G fighters (the Wild Weasel program) specially modified for suppression of ground-based air defenses are entering USAF units. The intention in the future is to form two EW squadrons equipped with the EF-111 (40 aircraft have been ordered) adapted for EW suppression of air defenses in the European theater of war scenario.

The USAF aircraft fleet modernization program is underway along with a complex of measures aimed at keeping units in a high degree of combat readiness. Judging by foreign press reports, a 6-year program is in progress in the U.S.A. to maintain a high level of squadron combat readiness as they upgrade to the new equipment. It is called "Ready Team" and envisages a reduction in training periods for flying and technical personnel, their centralized training in special schools and training centers, as well as measures to maintain combat readiness of aviation groupings (especially those overseas) as individual units upgrade, and so on.

Integrated combat and operational training programs envisioning conduct of as many exercises as possible has been developed for TAC crews and units. The following problems are worked out through these programs: crew and unit tactical training under conditions simulating combat to the maximum (Red Flag); organization of command and control and of coordination (Blue Flag); detailed study of the possible theater of operations (Green Flag); training of flight crews and personnel from maintenance and other services for actions under maximum combat intensity (Black Flag); training of young pilots and bringing them up to the level of experienced personnel (Gold Flag and Gray Flag), and so forth.

As the foreign press notes, significant efforts are directed towards improving military transport capabilities to support deployment of troops and equipment; ways to modernize existing aircraft and develop new models are now under study. Other measures are also in progress to further improve USAF combat might.

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AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES: SOVIET REVIEW OF NATO CAPABILITIES

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[Article by Lt Col-Engr B. Semenov: "Air-to-Air Missiles"]

[Excerpts] Militaristic circles in the capitalist countries did not shy away from a quantitative and qualitative buildup of weapons in spite of the demands of public opinion. Important attention here is being devoted to further improvement in guided missiles which, according to Western military specialists, in the future also will remain the most promising weapon for aviation. Therefore, work continues overseas to improve extant and create new aviation missiles, including the air-to-air type.

In the opinion of American military specialists, the following are the main prerequisites for further improving air-to-air missiles: creation by a potential enemy of powerful active air defense systems which significantly reduce aircraft survivability; great capabilities for using the latest achievements in radioelectronics in guided missiles and aircraft weapons control systems; expected appearance in the near future of new aircraft aerial target identification systems which eliminate the necessity to visually identify targets. Judging from foreign press materials, special attention in improving and creating air-to-air missiles falls to improving firing accuracy, resistance to jamming, and reliability, as well as to reduction in the cost of the missiles themselves and in maintenance costs.

Americans expect that successfully battling aerial targets under the varied conditions of the combat situation means that aircraft must have short-, medium-, and long-range missiles. Therefore, R & D is underway in the U.S.A. on all types of promising missiles. The European countries, having less economic capability, are as a rule developing short- and medium-range missiles.

Brief characteristics of extant air-to-air missiles are provided and the perspectives of their future development are examined below [not translated].

The NATO military leadership hopes that improvement of extant and development of new air-to-air missiles will broaden the combat capabilities of the tactical aviation of those countries making up this aggressive bloc.

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LIGHT TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT: SOVIET REVIEW OF FOREIGN DEVELOPMENTS

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 80 signed to press 7 Feb 80 pp 63-67

[Article by Yu. Smirnov: "Light Transport Aircraft"]

[Excerpts] In recent years, the military aircraft inventories, including light transport aircraft, have been upgraded in the countries making up the aggressive NATO bloc and in other capitalist states. Judging from foreign press reports, at present there is no clear classification of transport aircraft into light and heavy categories. Based on common standards, in particular the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the category of light aircraft is restricted to a weight of 5,670 kilograms. On the other hand, based on new rules now being discussed, there is a proposal to expand the weight limits of "light transport aircraft" and include therein multiengine aircraft with a maximum takeoff weight of 15,870 kilograms. Steming from this, in this article we examine military transport aircraft with a maximum takeoff weight of about 10 tons.

From the point of view of aerodynamic components, practically all foreign light military transports are built from a classic blueprint and with a high wing. The exception is the Israeli Arava, which is a twin-boom high-wing monoplane with pod fuselage and spread vertical tail.

The tactical and technical characteristics of the main foreign light transport aircraft are presented in the table [not reproduced].

According to foreign press results, the following are the main trends in foreign light military transport aircraft development: development of new aerodynamic profiles, further improvement in stability and controllability, building turboprop engines with ducted propellors and propellors with blades having a profile with supercritical streamlining, and development of a new gear which allows safe landing in a crosswind.

There also have been reports that, June 1979, the first flight of a Sky Servant equipped with an improved wing took place. It was developed by Dornier of West Germany for light transports with a cruise speed of about 500 km/hr. The wing has a profile close to supercritical and a rectangular-trapezoidal plan form. This profile, according to Dornier specialists, ensures little drag at cruise speed, little resistance when climbing with flaps set in takeoff position and, at the same time, makes it possible to obtain great lift with flaps set in the takeoff and landing positions in order to decrease the length of the takeoff and landing roll. The wing shape must ensure good characteristics in flow breakaway and minimal bending moment in the wing root, that is must lead to further improvement in the aircraft's aerodynamic and weight indicators.

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NAVAL MINE WARFARE: SOVIET REVIEW OF NATO METHODS

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[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Yankovskiy: "Naval 'Mine Warfare'"]

[Text] Mines, as analysis of past wars (especially world wars) shows, have always been one of the most important and mass types of naval weapons. Throughout the entire history of combat actions at sea, approximately 1 million have been emplaced, including more than 300,000 in World War I and over 650,000 in World War II. The direct and the hidden losses they caused the belligerants were very significant. During World War II alone, almost 4,000 ships struck mines and sank, while about 8,000 military and other types of vessels were damaged.

Nonetheless, in spite of such notable success in employment of these weapons, interest in them fell in the late 1940's and 1950's. Western military specialists explained this by saying that mines will supposedly play a secondary role in future combat actions at sea due to introduction of nuclear missiles into fleets. The experience in U.S. aggressive wars (Korea and Vietnam) and in those of Israel (against Egypt) refutes these views, and at the present time, great attention is once again being paid to mines. The intensive work done by the NATO countries to improve and create new types of mine and antimine weapons, numerous exercises by national navies and the joint NATO navies where problems of conducting "mine warfare" at sea are worked out, are confirmation of this. Also, there is the fact that, within the North Atlantic bloc, a permanent commission has been established to deal with development of a single tactic for employment of mines and antimine weapons.

"Mine warfare" at sea, as the foreign press notes, is a complex of measures directed towards the use of mines and antimine weapons to destroy and hinder the actions of enemy naval forces, to defend friendly forces, and to create conditions favorable for their actions in various parts of the world ocean.

Mines are considered a very effective, reliable, and relatively cheap means for warfare at sea. They can rapidly and covertly be laid on main sea lines of communications and ASW [antisubmarine warfare] boundaries, in the waters of naval bases and ports, and in the depth of the enemy strategic defense both ahead of time, and during combat actions. They represent a constant threat for fleet forces and exert a powerful moral-psychological effect on personnel.

As is underscored in the foreign press, mines are planned for employment as a navy accomplishes the following basic missions: gaining and maintaining sea supremacy, conducting blockades, destruction of enemy communications, as well as providing cover for friendly inshore railroads and naval bases and ports, and strengthening shore defenses against landings. These problems are actively worked out during numerous exercises by national fleets and the combined NATO navies (Blue Harrier, Olive Noire, Bright Horizon, Top Brass, and others).

Conducting combat to establish sea supremacy presupposes, in the opinion of Western military specialists, active placement of mines for use against enemy naval forces, primarily submarines. Mines are an important component of ASW boundaries. An example is the Greenland-Iceland-Faeroe Island-Great Britain ASW boundary, one of whose basic elements are mine fields, judging from foreign press reports. Mines play a big role in blockades, too. Mining the approaches to ports and bases, straits, narrows, inland waterways, and bays can disrupt the operational deployment of enemy naval forces and localize them in their bases or in restricted areas, with subsequent destruction by aviation and nuclear missiles.

Mines are the traditional naval weapon for destroying enemy ocean, sea, and river communications. Under contemporary conditions, the economy of a majority of states to a significant degree depends upon import of strategic raw materials and the state of the armed forces depends on supply from allies of combat equipment, weapons, and ammunition. The outcome of combat actions in a theater of operations depends upon mass transfer of troops and military cargo, accomplished primarily by maritime transport. In the opinion of foreign military specialists, maritime shipments can be disturbed by mass employment of mines and, in certain situations, will be completely cut off. Thus, in 1972 during the aggressive war in Vietnam, the Americans used mine fields to block the littoral and inland waterways of the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam]. Overall, in 9 months, they laid up to 10,000 mines along the shore and more than 3,000 in the inland waterway. As a result, supplies of aid by sea to the people of Vietnam, who were struggling against the American aggressors, were completely cut off and shipments via rivers and canals were significantly reduced.

Mines can be widely used for defense of friendly naval bases, anchorages, ports, and ocean and sea communications. This is a major weapon for defense against landings on islands or shore sectors. The consideration here is that even creation of a minor threat of mines in the most important sectors can have a strong psychological effect on an enemy. U.S. experience in the Korean War is quite noteworthy. When entering Wonson Bay, ships of the 7th Fleet with a landing party embarked discovered a mine field covering locations accessible to landing parties. It was in the form of individual groups of 5 to 6 mines and had been laid ahead of time from fishing schooners and boats. Although the density was slight, the American ships were forced to withdraw and waited 10 days for minesweepers to remove the danger.

Mines are to be employed in active and in defensive mine fields set up for the long term, as well as in tactical mine fields for a short-term effect on the enemy while conducting individual naval operations.

Active obstacles are set up in enemy-controlled waters and defensive obstacles in friendly waters. Mines can be laid in a variety of ways: individual mines, groups containing up to 10 mines each, or a line in a simple or complex configuration. Several lines or a combination of lines, groups of mines, and individual mines form a mine field in an area.

According to views held by Western military specialists, aviation, surface ships, and submarines, as well as merchant ships, ferries, fishing boats, cutters, and yachts can be employed to lay mines.

The proportion aviation occupies among the vehicles carrying mines continues to increase. Only 70 mines were laid from aircraft during World War I, or about .02 percent of the total. During World War II, this rose to approximately 120,000 (about 18 percent). For some of the belligerants, this proportion was significantly higher. Thus, in 1941-1945, the U.S.A. in combat actions in the Pacific laid 25,000 mines, 85 percent of which done with the aid of aviation.

In the opinion of foreign military specialists, aviation is most effective for setting up active mine fields since it does so in compressed time frames independent of the time of day and the weather. However, in this case they point out as a deficiency the low accuracy of placement. Therefore, aviation as a rule is called upon to mine large expanses of water, with equal distribution of the mines over an area. In their opinion, other deficiencies include lack of covertness, insufficient mine-carrying capacity, and vulnerability to air defenses.

Judging from U.S. experience during the aggressive war in Vietnam, when American aviation was called upon to actively lay mines, mine-laying operations envision creating tactical groupings of mine-laying and support aircraft. The latter includes cover, strike, final reconnaissance, and EW aircraft. The strike aircraft make a preventive strike or a strike against shore objectives simultaneously with the laying of the mines to disorganize enemy air defenses and antimine monitoring systems.

Almost all types of U.S. Navy and NATO combat aircraft and helicopters, as well as strategic and tactical aircraft, can be used to lay mines.

Surface ships historically have been the main mine-carrying vessels. They can carry many mines, place them very accurately, and can defend themselves. In World War I they laid 296,000 mines (96 percent of the total) and more than 520,000 were laid during World War II (about 80 percent). Among their deficiencies listed by foreign military specialists are lack of covertness, plus the requirement to allocate operational cover and organize navigational support.

In the main, surface ships are to be used to lay defensive mine fields; however, fast ships (destroyers, frigates, missile and torpedo patrol boats) can also lay active mine fields. They operate individually or in tactical groups of homogeneous and varied composition.

A significant role in mine laying falls to submarines. Although during World War II they only laid about 8,000 mines (less than 2 percent of the total), the effectiveness of the obstacles was quite high (losses in this case reached some 30 percent of the total losses to mines the fleets of the belligerants suffered).

Under contemporary conditions, nuclear and diesel torpedo submarines of all types can be called upon for these purposes. As a rule, they are used individually or as part of a group (two to three submarines each). As compared to other vehicles, submarines have a number of advantages. They can covertly penetrate to the assigned area, especially to areas where naval bases, ports, and communications centers are located. The capability to remain extended periods of time here permits final reconnaissance and laying of mines in the sectors most dangerous for the enemy. Self-transporting mines can be used for mining narrows, approaches to bases, and shallow channels. The mines can be laid from the torpedo tubes or from attached external devices.

Taking into account the positive and negative qualities of various vehicles when carrying out mine-laying operations, according to foreign military specialists, their selection is made based on the nature of the mine fields, required degree of covertness, the operational situation, the physical, geographic, and hydrometeorological conditions in the proposed area to be mined, and a number of other factors.

At the present time, the U.S. Navy nad its NATO allies have significant reserves of mines of various purpose and design. They were basically produced in the 1940-1960's, many equipped with highly-sensitive influence exploding mechanisms. As far as vehicles are concerned, most mines are standard and will be laid by aviation, surface ships, and submarines.

Based on placement, mines are categorized as moored, ground, and floating and as contact, influence (considered the most effective), and remote controlled.

Ground influence mines are laid in maritime areas with depths to 360 meters and moored mines are laid where the water is up to 1,800 meters deep.

The best influence mine, according to Western military specialists, are the American Captor moored ASW mine developed in the 1960-1970's. It is laid at depths to 800 meters and is a small Mk46 ASW torpedo placed in a container equipped with a special device and anchor. It has a passive sonar with an operating range of up to 1,000 meters used to detect a submarine. A signal is sent to open the container cover and start the torpedo motor. Guidance to the target is provided by an active-passive torpedo homing system with a range of 7,500 meters and a speed of up to 45 knots. The lethal zone in depth is 15-450 meters.

Contact mines mainly are to be employed in defensive mine fields both independently, and along with influence mines. They have galvanic-contact fuzes and electric percussion fuzes which trip when the ship is touched. The mines can be equipped with one or two antenas with electric percussion switches to increase the contact zone. Besides contact fuzes, some models have magneto-sonar influence exploding mechanisms. All contact mines are moored and laid at the assigned depth by the plummet-chain method.

Floating mines are intended for destruction of bridges, hydrotechnical structures, and enemy vessels. They are employed in areas with a stable surface current and primarily on rivers and canals, in the waters of naval bases, and in ports.

Remotely-controlled mines mainly are used in defensive mine fields in approaches to naval bases and ports, in bays and narrows, and as obstacles to landing parties. In the main, they are controlled from shore posts, this involving placing them in combat or in safe condition depending upon the situation.

Development of mines in the navies of the U.S.A. and other capitalist states involves new remotely-controlled mines with autonomous motors capable of classifying targets. Great attention is devoted to creation of mines specialized for targets and increasing their resistance to minesweeping. Foreign specialists also are attempting to reduce the telltale signs of mines and make an effective antisonar covering for them.

Judging from Western press materials, one of the most important U.S. Navy programs is creation of unitized modular influence exploding mechanisms for series-produced aerial bombs. According to the Americans, this will make it possible to avoid stockpiling narrowly-specialized naval mines in a theater of operations and will significantly expand naval "mine warfare" capabilities. Such weapons are proposed for use primarily against surface ships. They will be placed in shallow areas, in approaches to naval bases, in inner and outer harbors, and in rivers.

According to Western press reports, the first phase of this program is completed and Distractor mine-bombs have entered the inventory. They are Mk81 and 82 Snake Eye high-explosive bombs equipped with sensitive small magnetic influence exploding mechanisms. Work is presently in progress on the Quick Strike program, which calls for creation of combined influence exploding mechanisms for installation in Mk82 and Mk 84 series-produced aerial bombs. Carriers will be those aircraft capable of carrying Mk81, 82, and 84 bombs.

/Mine countermeasures/ [emphasis in the original] are a vital component of naval "mine warfare." Based on the views of foreign military specialists, mine countermeasures consist of offensive actions, as well as active and passive measures to battle the mine threat in regions where friendlies are operating.

Offensive actions envision strikes against locations where mine-carrying vehicles are based and where mines are stored, destruction of vehicles on their deployment routes, and their destruction in areas where mines are laid. This mission is accomplished by fleet strike forces and air defense means.

The search for and detection of mine fields, determination of their borders and subsequent destruction, as well as antimine defense of surface ship and submarine formations [soyedineniye] in transit and in regions of combat actions are considered active PMO [mine countermeasures].

Passive measures include mine monitoring, determination of routes and regions safe for friendlies to sail in, reduction in vessel magnetic field and noisiness, and development of recommendations for use of optimal steaming modes in mined areas.

Mine countermeasures ships, helicopter minesweepers, and special diver subunits [podrazdeleniye] are employed to battle mines. Minesweepers are equipped to search for and destroy mines. This equipment includes radar, sonar, optical, and magnetic search devices. Sweeps, minehunter-detonators for ground mines, and explosives are the destruction devices. Sweeps can be contact and influence. The former are used against moored mines and sweep obstructors at depths to 90 meters and the latter for influence mines (electromagnetic and acoustic) against mines with influence exploding mechanisms of various types. Maximum sweep speed is 12 knots, maximum depth 90 meters. Explosives (depth charges, cord charges, land mines, and bombs) are used to cut passages in obstacles and to thin them out.

Minesweepers operate in formations or groups formed for accomplishment of sweep operations. A group contains two to six minesweepers, depending upon the situation and nature of the mine fields.

Great attention is devoted to using helicopter minesweepers to battle the mine threat since they are considered the safest and most maneuverable sweep carriers. Such helicopters sweep rapidly (up to 45-55 kilometers per hour) and are more economical than mine-sweeping ships. Foreign military specialists propose that two helicopter minesweepers in effectiveness are equivalent to a surface vessel. They can deploy the helicopters in transport aircraft to any point on the globe where the strike forces are operating.

As a rule, helicopters operate from helicopter landing ships or dock landing ships. They are equipped with moored-mine and influence sweeps and can sweep both independently (alone or as part of a 2- 3-ship group), and jointly with minesweepers.

Frogmen equipped with small detection and destruction devices are used to search for and destroy mines in the waters of naval bases, ports, in internal waterways, and in shallow regions.

Development of antimine weapons overseas follows the path of improving extant and creating new equipment for detecting and destroying mines. There is a proposal to develop standard sweep systems resistant to explosives and of systems which initiate magnetic and acoustic fields to destroy mines with magnetic and acoustic influence exploding mechanisms. Antimine weapon vehicles are also being improved.

The NATO countries are placing great attention on a single tactic for antimine resource employment. For this purpose, a permanent NATO minesweeper formation in the English Channel area has been established. It consists of four to six minesweepers from the navies of Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the FRG. They undergo intensive combat training and participate in numerous NATO naval exercises (Northern Measure, Ocean Safari, Joint Maritime Cause, and so on). Problems of mine countermeasures support to fleet deployment, amphibious landings, and protection of maritime communications are worked out during these exercises.

Such radio navigational systems (RNS) as Loran, Omega, Shoran, and Tacan, plus others specially set up for mine-sweeping forces, support the actions of the fleets when mines and mine countermeasures are employed. One special RNS is the transportable Raidist, which can be set up on the shore and aboard ship. It has an operating range of 250 miles and a positional accuracy for ships and helicopter minesweepers of plus or minus 5 meters.

The brief information presented above on the views of NATO specialists concerning naval "mine warfare," taken from the Western press, gives witness to the growing role of mines and widespread preparations by the NATO navies to use them in future aggressive wars.

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NAVAL AIRCRAFT: SOVIET REVIEW OF U.S. MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

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[Article by Col-Engr (Res) I. Kutsev: "U.S. Navy Aircraft Modernization"]

[Excerpt] The U.S. Navy is placing great attention on modernization of the carrier and shore-based aircraft that entered the inventory in the 1960's, along with development and acceptance of a new generation of aircraft that are to remain in the inventory until the end of the century.

The extant modernization programs are designed in the main for improvement in aircraft combat capability, increased reliability of all onboard systems, and ensuring the requisite combat readiness. In particular, this is being achieved by the following: installation of more powerful engines making it possible to improve aircraft flying characteristics and increase their takeoff weight; improvements in weapons systems through introduction of new, more effective models; supply of improved onboard radioelectronic equipment permitting effective employment of the aircraft when conducting combat operations day and night in bad weather; introduction of a number of changes in the design of the aircraft or its systems to increase their life cycle and their reliable operation. During these modernization programs, problems of ensuring the high combat readiness of aviation equipment are also being examined not only through increasing their reliability, but also thanks to improved organization, quality technical maintenance, and timely supply of spares.

Presented below, based on foreign press data, is brief information on modernization of the U.S. Navy's aircraft fleet accomplished between 1971-1979.

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CONTENTS OF 'FOREIGN MILITARY REVIEW', JUNE 1980

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, Jun 80 signed to press 6 Jun 80 pp 1-2

[Full-text translated article published in this issue of the JPRS report are indicated with an asterisk (*); excerpted translations are indicated with two asterisks (**); the full-text translation indicated with three asterisks (***) will be published in the JPRS Worldwide Report: Nuclear Development and Proliferation.]

[Text] CONTENTS — Page

GENERAL MILITARY PROBLEMS

*"U.S. and NATO 'Nuclear Strategy'" - R. Simonyan 3
"Development Prospects of Japan's 'Self-Defense Forces'" - A. Simonov 10
"U.S. Military Policy in Developing Countries" - G. Mel'nikov ... 14
***"Development of Nuclear Weapons in Israel" - O. Yul'yev 19
"Thailand (Geography, Economy, Infrastructure, Armed Forces)" - I. Vasin 22

THE GROUND FORCES

**"U.S. Mechanized Division Offensive Operation With River Crossing" - I. Khramov 27
"FRG Airborne Troops" - V. Semenov 31
"Tank Guns and Ammunition" - B. Safonov 35
**"Means of Camouflage and Deception" - L. Sergeyev 39

THE AIR FORCES

**"Coordinated Action Between Air and Ground Forces" - N. Dmitriyev 43
"British Crews at 'Red Flag' Exercise" - V. Kondrat'yev and A. Pavlov 50
**"Below-Horizon Radars" - I. Aleksandrov 52
"Argentine 'Pucara' Aircraft" - I. Karenin 57
"Export Version of F-16 Fighter" - V. Yurtsev 58

THE NAVAL FORCES

*"U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean" - I. Karemov 59
**"Combating Amphibious Landings" - A. Rumyantsev 63
"Passive Jamming Against Antiship Missiles" - F. Voroyskiy 69
"Nigeria's Navy" - V. Rudin 74

INFORMATION, EVENTS, FACTS

"'Sea Strike-80-1' Exercise" 75
"Modernization of Japan's Airfield Network" 75
"New Swedish Light Ground-Attack Aircraft" 75
"West German Missile Patrol Boat, Project Designation 143A" 75
"New U.S. Equipment for Decontaminating Weapons and Combat Equipment" 75
"French 100 mm Naval Gun" 75
"New Designations" 75

FOREIGN MILITARY NEWS ITEMS 79

ARTICLES IN FOREIGN JOURNALS 80

COLORED INSERTS (un-numbered pages)

Off-Loading Combat Equipment and Personnel from CH-53G Transport-Assault Helicopter
Nigerian Small ASW Ship (Corvette), the F84 "Enimiri"
French General-Purpose 100 mm Turret Gun and Mounting
Argentine IA-58A "Pucara" Aircraft

* Material from the foreign press has been used in the preparation of the articles of Soviet authors and the news items.

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NUCLEAR WARFARE: SOVIET REVIEW OF NATO STRATEGY

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, Jun 80 signed to press 6 Jun 80 pp 3-10

[Article by Professor, Doctor of Military Sciences, Maj Gen R. Simonyan: "U.S. and NATO 'Nuclear Strategy'"]

[Text] True to their peace-seeking policy, the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist community are doing everything in their power to improve the international climate and prevent continuation of the arms race.

The aggressive and reactionary forces of imperialism, however, and U.S. imperialism in particular, have no desire to accept détente and peaceful coexistence between countries with differing social systems. Assiduously peddling the false and provocational myth of a "Soviet threat" and "military superiority" of the USSR, they are attempting to prove the unprovable, namely the "aggressiveness" of Soviet military strategy, since in their opinion it pursues the aim of attaining the most decisive goals, proceeds primarily from the possibility of victory, and allegedly places primary emphasis on destroying the U.S. and Western European society -- no more, no less! At the same time Pentagon and NATO officials praise to the skies the "rationality" and even "humanity" of Washington's military strategy, and assert that it is based on the principle of "mutual restraint" elaborated in the United States approximately three decades ago, on ensuring sufficiency but not superiority, on delivery of a "response strike" and not the mounting of "preemptive operations," etc. How do things stand in actual fact?

We know that the so-called "nuclear strategy" was born with the development of nuclear weapons and became the basis of all U.S. and NATO strategy positions in the postwar years. This strategy became modified and experienced several stages in its development as growth and development of offensive nuclear weapons occurred, and especially change in the balance of power in the international arena.

Immediately following World War II Washington, hammering together the aggressive NATO bloc, began openly pursuing a policy of nuclear blackmail toward the Soviet Union, and in the international arena -- a policy of threatened employment of nuclear weapons in the interests of the global aspirations of U.S. imperialism.

Numerous plans to destroy the Soviet Union in a nuclear war, worked out in detail by the Pentagon, serve as graphic evidence of this, in particular Operation "Totality" (1945), drawn up with the personal participation of D. Eisenhower; "Charioteer" and "Fleetwood" (1948), as well as "Drop Shot," drawn up in 1949 by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff on instructions by President Truman. The latter, for example, was based on the idea of mounting massed nuclear strikes, employing 300 atomic bombs, on the industrial and administrative-political centers of the USSR. Immediately following nuclear strikes, the plan called for the armed forces of the United States and its NATO allies to launch a general offensive with the objective of seizing and occupying the territories of the socialist nations of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The aggressive plans of the Pentagon and NATO, however, were doomed to failure. Sober calculations performed by NATO strategists led them to the conclusion that employment of a limited number of atomic bombs by the United States on the territory of the USSR and the other nations of the socialist community would not ensure military defeat of the "potential adversary." Therefore they proceeded to continue building up the might of their nuclear forces.

At the beginning of the 1950's the United States proclaimed a strategy of "massive retaliation," which NATO transformed into a strategy of "shield and sword." The "sword" was embodied by U.S. strategic bombers and nuclear weapons, while the "shield" represented the armed forces of the member nations of this aggressive bloc, deployed in the European theater and in the Eastern Atlantic.

Based on U.S. "nuclear superiority," NATO military strategy, just as U.S. strategy, called for preparing for and waging only an all-out nuclear war against the USSR and the other nations of the socialist community. "The United States should be prepared to deliver a massive nuclear strike where and when it considers this necessary," boastfully declared then secretary of state Dulles. However, the successes of the Soviet Union in development of the economy, science and technology, as well as in developing its own nuclear weapons and means of delivery, took the monopoly away from the Americans and made the Pentagon and NATO strategy untenable. Characterizing the general situation prevailing in the world at that time, that same Dulles stated in a book entitled "War or Peace": "U.S. capability to mount an atomic attack on Russia has now become counterbalanced to a significant degree by the Soviets' capability to mount nuclear attacks on the United States...."

In other words this top State Department official was compelled openly to acknowledge the deterrent role of Soviet weapons. The possibility of a retaliatory nuclear strike forced the Pentagon to revise the main points of its military doctrine and to bring it into conformity with the actual balance of power.

At the beginning of the 1960's the United States developed a strategy of "flexible response," which in 1967, by decision of the NATO Military Planning Committee, was adopted as this bloc's official military strategy. This strategy, as was announced at the time,prescribed "preparation for and conduct of any wars -- world or local, nuclear or conventional, large or small."

The Pentagon and NATO engaged in another burst forward in increasing their nuclear potential, in order to restore their lost "superiority." At the cost of enormous material expenditures, as was reported in the foreign press, the United States increased the arsenal of strategic weapons from 10 to 12-fold. Precisely in the 1960's the United States built and added to its arsenal 1,000 Minuteman and 54 Titan II intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as 656 Polaris missiles carried by 41 nuclear-powered submarines. At that time the U.S. strategic air forces totaled more than 500 bombers.

So-called "forward-based" offensive nuclear weapons, deployed in major regions of the world, particularly in Europe, were being built up as rapidly as possible: aircraft carriers, submarines, aircraft delivery platforms, operational-tactical and tactical missile launchers, and atomic artillery. It was announced in the press that the Pentagon had deployed in Europe more than 7,000 tactical nuclear warheads.

In this situation the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist community were faced with the necessity of taking additional measures to strengthen their security, and once again the schemes of the U.S. strategists to gain nuclear superiority failed to pan out. Then President R. Nixon declared at the very beginning of the 1970's that "the indisputable superiority of the United States in the sense of strategic power has come to an end, replaced by a strategic balance, whereby U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces are now comparable."

Following acknowledgment of nuclear parity between the two powers, Western militarist forces were compelled to revise the basic points of the policy "from a position of strength" and "nuclear superiority." Once again it was necessary to change military doctrine. In 1971 Washington announced adoption of a new U.S. strategy of "realistic deterrence." It formulates modified views on preparation for and conduct of nuclear wars. Depending on the means employed, scale of conduct of combat operations, and targets to be hit, all nuclear conflicts are subdivided into three principal types: a strategic (general) war with unlimited employment of the entire arsenal of offensive nuclear weapons; a war in single theaters, and particularly in Europe, in which the opposing sides employ chiefly operational-tactical nuclear weapons; a limited strategic war or, as it is called in the West, "mini-nuclear war," in the course of which nuclear strikes would be mounted only on military targets.

The strategy of "realistic deterrence," just as in the past, emphatically stresses the power of nuclear forces and weapons. It is based on the concept of "strategic sufficiency." It requires maintaining strategic weapons at a level which is "sufficient" for the United States to be able to implement essentially that same military-political policy of "from a position of strength" and possess the capability of a wide choice of variants of employment of forces and weapons capable of achieving "guaranteed destruction" of an adversary nation or coalition of nations by delivering both a preemptive and retaliatory massive nuclear strike. In the estimate of foreign experts, this concept should answer the following question: what strategic nuclear forces should the United States possess at a given time and in what direction should their development be guided?

We should note that, as the U.S. press has commented, the concept of "strategic sufficiency" is distinguished by indeterminacy and variability. One of the principal authors of this concept -- former U.S. Defense Secretary M. Laird, stated that "the notion of strategic 'sufficiency' is being constantly revised in light of the changing strategic situation." Constituting a most important component of the strategy of "realistic deterrence," this concept replaced the less veiled formula of "gaining superiority." It is not surprising that a U.S. magazine called this substitution of concepts a verbal trick, explaining that the difference between the two terms ("gaining superiority" and "strategic sufficiency") is practically indistinguishable.

And in fact, regardless of what one calls such military-strategy positions, they continue to boil down to continuation of the arms race. In contrast to the 1960's, however, it is being carried out today not so much by quantitative buildup of strategic arms as by qualitative weapons improvement.

For example, replacement of 550 (out of 1,000) single-warhead Minuteman I and II missiles with Minuteman III missiles carrying three MIRV nuclear warheads increased, according to figures in the U.S. press, the total number of nuclear warheads from 1,000 to 2,100. The same can be said about sea-based nuclear missile systems, which are occupying an increasingly important position within the strategic offensive forces. Modernization of these systems was effected by arming 31 nuclear submarines with Poseidon C3 missiles carrying MIRV warheads (carrying 10-14 nuclear warheads each). As a result, the total number of nuclear warheads carried on U.S. nuclear submarines increased more than sevenfold, reaching a total of more than 5,000, while the total number of missile-carrying nuclear submarines remained unchanged (41).

The present U.S. administration, which has made a 180 degree turn from promises made in the last election campaign to achieve an annual reduction in the military budget, has clearly focused its efforts on escalating military preparations.

Graphic confirmation of this is the five-year program of further buildup of U.S. military efforts announced by Carter one day after adoption by NATO, pressured by the U.S. Government, of a decision to deploy new U.S. intermediate-range nuclear missile systems in Western Europe.

Presenting the basics of this program, the U.S. President reported that military appropriations in the 1980-81 fiscal year would total 164.5 billion dollars (this figure exceeds by more than 20 billion dollars the preceding year's appropriations). In succeeding years plans call for a continuous (taking inflation into account) increase in "real" military expenditures by more than 5 percent annually.

In the area of armed forces development, the military program calls for "modernizing" strategic forces and beefing up U.S. forward-based troops in the NATO zone and in the Pacific (as part of joint efforts undertaken with U.S. partners), "modernization" of the Navy, establishment of "quick-reaction forces," designated for operations in any part of the world where the interests of U.S. imperialism are affected, and "maintenance of effective forces," consisting of well-trained personnel.

The programs and practical measures carried out by Washington in the area of development of strategic nuclear forces show that the development of qualitatively new weapons is concealed behind the term "modernization." They include in particular the MX (mobile-based) intercontinental ballistic missile with MIRV multiple warhead (10 warheads each). According to Pentagon plans, 200-300 such missiles will be produced, at a cost of 40-50 billion dollars.

The Trident sea-launched nuclear missile system is another new strategic weapon. By 1985 the nuclear submarines of this system will be armed with Trident 1 missiles, with a range of 8,000 km, and at a later date the Trident 2 (24 missiles with MARV warheads, range 11,000 km). A program has been approved for building 13 Trident submarines, with plans to build as many as 30 such nuclear submarines, at a cost of more than 1.5 billion dollars per submarine. In addition, in the next three years plans call for rearming with Trident 1 missiles 12 nuclear submarines presently carrying Poseidon C3 missiles. Foreign experts believe that implementation of this program will promote increased striking power and survivability for the entire undersea nuclear missile system.

The White House has also announced adoption of the new Mk-12A warhead, the power and accuracy of which are twice that of the present Mk-12 warhead. It will be placed on Minuteman III missiles. As is noted in the foreign press, employment of these warheads will significantly increase missile capabilities to destroy small targets.

U.S.-developed ground, sea and air-launched cruise missiles will add to the list of qualitatively new strategic weapons. According to one U.S. magazine, these missiles are capable of flying to the designated target at a ground-hugging height, which presents practical difficulties in the adversary's attempts to detect such missiles in advance with radar. In the Air Force they will be carried by B-52 strategic bombers. The first squadron is scheduled to be armed with cruise missiles in 1983, and up to 80 percent of all operational B-52 aircraft by 1985. Foreign experts believe that the FB-111 medium bomber can also carry such missiles. Cruise missiles will carry a 200 kiloton warhead. The missile's guidance system will ensure high target accuracy.

The United States is continuing testing of an improved B-1 strategic bomber.

Buildup of the nuclear potential of the United States and its NATO allies is by no means limited to the strategic arms race. It also encompasses forward-based nuclear weapons or, as they are still called, theater nuclear forces, which occupy a prominent place in the organizational structure of U.S. armed forces, alongside strategic and conventional forces.

The arsenal of these forces contains a number of diversified nuclear attack components: numerous atomic artillery, Lance and Pershing 1 operational-tactical missiles, as well as missile-armed tactical aircraft.

At the present time there are about 3,000 such weapons in Europe. In addition, U.S. carriers permanently patrolling in the Mediterranean and Eastern Atlantic carry more than 400 missile-armed aircraft. Also operating in these areas are submarines carrying Poseidon nuclear missiles, and some of these (as many as five submarines, capable of carrying 800-1,000 nuclear warheads) can be employed directly in support of NATO Joint Forces in Europe. Some other NATO member nations also possess offensive nuclear weapons.

The following significant fact also indicates the pace and scale of buildup of U.S. forward-based weapons deployed in Western Europe: the arsenal of these weapons has doubled in the last 10-12 years.

But even this is not enough for U.S. and NATO militarist circles. They have decided to develop and deploy in Western Europe qualitatively new U.S. medium-range nuclear weapons systems. Why? An answer to this question is provided by the Pentagon-elaborated so-called "new concept of defense of Western Europe," also called the "Eurostrategic war" concept.

According to the authors of this new concept, it essentially boils down to establishing for NATO its own deterrent potential, which will allegedly be independent of the United States. This would be a totally new component of NATO Joint Forces in Europe -- "Eurostrategic nuclear forces." These forces, together with theater nuclear forces and conventional forces, would form a new NATO "triad," which in case of war would be placed directly subordinate to the Supreme Commander of NATO Joint Forces in Europe.

The Pentagon supports a similar idea. U.S. Defense Secretary H. Brown asserts, for example, that NATO must have its own new "triad," differing from the U.S. strategic triad.

Continuing this same idea, the Pentagon chief stated at a meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee that SALT II does not prevent extensive employment of U.S. Pershing 2 missiles as well as other types of missiles (including cruise) in Western Europe.

General Haig, former commander in chief of NATO Joint Forces in Europe, expressed himself even more frankly on this subject, stating that since U.S. means of deterrence are losing their superiority over the Russian counterparts and probably in the future will be neutralized by strategic arms limitation agreements, the European theater is becoming increasingly more vulnerable and will need its own deterrent force. This requires no additional comment.

U.S. and NATO militarist circles see in "Eurostrategic nuclear forces" the most effective deterrent today, capable of shifting the balance of power in the European theater in favor of the North Atlantic bloc.

According to the adopted plan, the first generation of "Eurostrategic nuclear forces" is to include 108 Pershing 2 missile launchers and 464 intermediate-range cruise missiles. It has been decided initially to deploy these weapons in Great Britain, the FRG, and Italy.

The strategic nuclear arsenal of the Western European countries, and particularly the British armed forces, will obviously also be included in the "Eurostrategic forces." Implementation of this plan would have the objective not simply of supplementing the approximately 1,200 units of U.S. forward-based weapons already in the theater but of shifting the strategic balance in Europe toward NATO.

Precisely these forces, according to the calculations of the authors of the "new concept," would participate independently in a war against the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact nations, without drawing in U.S. strategic offensive forces. It is emphasized in the foreign press that prior to this time U.S. military doctrine, as well as NATO military strategy, considered U.S. strategic nuclear forces to be the principal means of mounting nuclear strikes against the USSR. Their engagement was contemplated only in an all-out (strategic) nuclear war.

The question of U.S. operational-tactical and tactical offensive nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe was stated differently. According to those same policy views, they were intended for preparing for and conducting a so-called limited nuclear war, which would not extend beyond the boundaries of the European theater. Employment of tactical nuclear weapons only in the combat zone was considered an important condition for preventing a limited nuclear war from escalating into a general war.

Under these conditions U.S. strategic offensive forces were assigned the role of a so-called "nuclear umbrella," under the cover of which the bloc's forces could conduct combat operations employing both conventional and tactical nuclear weapons.

As is noted in the foreign press, a strategic parity has been established between the USSR and the United States. This fact, in the opinion of the authors of the "new concept of defense of Western Europe," makes very questionable the utilization of U.S. strategic offensive forces in case of a regional conflict. It is for this reason, they state, that a general nuclear war should not be viewed as the only variant of attack on the Soviet Union, since the inevitable Soviet response attack would prove disastrous for the United States.

Therefore the United States began seeking a different variant of strategic nuclear war, whereby global objectives could be achieved without the risk of the United States itself being destroyed in such a war. Thus the concept of "Eurostrategic nuclear war" was born. In the course of such a war, according to the scheme of Pentagon and NATO strategists, nuclear strikes against heartland areas in the Soviet Union would originate from Western European soil with Pershing missiles and cruise missiles, not from the United States with intercontinental ballistic missiles and other strategic weapons. The Pentagon figured that in this case response strikes by the Soviet Union would be targeted not at U.S. territory but only at European NATO countries.

Thus, having elaborated and imposed on its NATO partners this "new concept," Washington seeks to restrict strategic nuclear war to Europe and in this manner to avoid a response attack from the United States.

A debate has recently become heated up in NATO circles about the advisability of launching under certain circumstances a preventive strike at military targets in the USSR. In other words, now a new material foundation is being placed under the doctrine of "preventive selective nuclear strikes," which was once advanced by former Pentagon chief Schlesinger.

Foreign military experts usually link development and deployment of "Euromissiles" on the continent with the concept of "advanced lines," which presumes employment of nuclear weapons at the very outbreak of a military conflict. This strategy also aims at securing the advance and deployment of the main NATO Joint Forces in attack positions for shift to a decisive offensive.

The above clearly attests to the fact that NATO strategists are not at all concerned by a "Soviet threat," as they know full well that in actuality no such threat exists or could exist. They needed this myth in order to push through the plan to establish and deploy in Western Europe a new component of NATO Joint Forces -- "Eurostrategic nuclear forces." In other words this is an attempt by militarist circles in the West to bypass the strategic arms race channels which are restricted by the SALT II Treaty and to find new ways which according to their calculations would secure for them nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union.

At the same time, forcing a "new concept" on the European NATO countries and blocking progress in military détente, Washington is seeking to "consolidate" its allies and drive them back into the NATO stall.

As for the concept of "Eurostrategic nuclear war," in the estimation of foreign observers it is essentially of a contradictory nature. On the one hand it stipulates attaining the global aspirations of U.S. imperialism, while on the other it is based on an employment of forces and weapons which, as U.S. strategists figure, will limit it to the European continent, as a result of which the flame of nuclear war will not touch U.S. soil. But is this possible?

The experience of past wars indicates quite clearly that it has never been possible to hold the flame of war within prior-designated boundaries. As soon as a new weapon is employed, even in a tactical zone, it will be immediately employed on a strategic scale as well. Wars are governed by rigid laws. The aggressor initiates an armed conflict in order to bring his victim to his knees and to impose his will, but he bears in mind that in case of defeat he himself will suffer the fate he was planning for his victim. Therefore every country participating in a war, regardless of whether it is attacking or defending, will stop at nothing to achieve victory and will not acknowledge defeat without having employed and without having expended the entire arsenal at its disposal.

Consequently a regional nuclear conflict can develop into a global nuclear war with all the consequences for the aggressors which proceed therefrom.

The authors of the "new concept" are also hoping in vain for military supremacy. Those who seek advantages and superiority, who rattle sabers, should know that they themselves may be severely burned. If the NATO countries, contrary to common sense and with disregard for the good will of the socialist countries, transform Western Europe into a launching pad for U.S. intermediate-range nuclear weapons, they will receive a firm and convincing response from the other side.

We have presented in concise form the history of establishment, the principal stages of development and the present content of U.S. and NATO "nuclear strategy."

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U.S. MECHANIZED DIVISION: COMMENTS ON OFFENSIVE TACTICS

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, Jun 80 signed to press 6 Jun 80 pp 27-31

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences Docent Col I. Khramov: "U.S. Mechanized Division Offensive Operation With River Crossing"]

[Excerpt] Pentagon officials consider Central Europe a suitable bridgehead for potential aggressive actions against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and in their opinion offensive operations constitute the principal means of achieving stated objectives in a future war. It is emphasized in the U.S. military press that in the conduct of combat operations here it is essential to stress combat to seize rivers and that the ability of ground forces to cross such obstacles is an important factor in their combat efficiency.

It is reported, for example, that a division advancing at a rate of 50 km per day may encounter from five to 10 narrow streams and rivers (up to 30 meters wide), one or two medium-width rivers (up to 100 m), and one wide river every three days (more than 100 meters). Crossing these rivers will require thorough planning, special reconnaissance, good organization and control, as well as timely provision to the troops of a sufficient quantity of crossing equipment. For this reason the topic "River-Crossing Operation" has been an important one at numerous exercises and maneuvers held in recent years in the Central European theater. It is noted that special troop tactical and technical training is mandatory for an offensive operation involving crossing rivers.

Depending on the combat situation, the character of the enemy's resistance and the availability of crossing equipment, a river-crossing operation, in the view of U.S. Army officials, can be either hasty or deliberate. The former is considered to be the most effective mode, consisting essentially in a swift troop advance to the river obstacle along a wide frontage, crossing of the river without delay and, gaining a foothold on the far bank, pushing the advance deep. This mode is recommended in the course of attacking and pursuit of the enemy if the advancing [illegible] and combined units have available a large quantity of amphibious equipment and engineer troops have assault boats, ferries and floating bridges.*

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* For a discussion of river-crossing equipment of the NATO nation armies, see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 12, 1978 pp 31-39; No 9, 1975, pp 28-35 -- Ed.

A deliberate river-crossing operation is usually organized following an unsuccessful attempt at a hasty crossing, or with an attack directly from a riverline, or when the adversary has set up a solid defense on a riverline and the river constitutes a major obstacle. In this case detailed planning is carried out, as well as the requisite redeployment of division personnel and equipment, with combat units and crossing equipment moved up to the crossing areas.

According to information in the foreign press, the modern mechanized division possesses a substantial quantity of river-crossing equipment. It is equipped with a bridge train, nine assault boats, six floating bridge structures, four tank bridgelayers, and approximately 700 tracked and wheeled amphibious armored personnel carriers. In addition, a division operating on the main axis of advance may be reinforced with one or two combat engineer battalions and two or three float bridge (self-propelled) companies to perform the most laborious engineer work during the period of a river-crossing operation (as a rule, wide rivers). It may be given the requisite number of transport helicopters to deliver airborne tactical assault forces.

As is noted in U.S. field manuals, the mechanized division as a rule should execute hasty river-crossing operations, slowing the rate of advance as little as possible and with minimal concentration of troops.

Foreign military experts do not consider a river-crossing operation an independent mission. As a rule it is a part of the division's attack mission and, depending on the river's location, may be part of its immediate objective or final objective. In conformity with this, a river-crossing operation plan is drawn up at division headquarters, on the basis of the overall offensive operation plan. U.S. field manuals specify that this document should reflect such items as the division's tactical order of battle, missions of forward and supporting units and subunits, river-crossing frontage, number of crossing points, routes of advance and maneuver, etc.

In the opinion of U.S. military leaders, the division order of battle during an offensive operation which involves a hasty river crossing should not differ from the normal order of battle. As a rule the division is deployed in two echelons, with reinforced subunits designated as advance guard, the principal mission of which is to move swiftly to the river with the objective of seizing crossing sites and advantageous areas along the river.

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CAMOUFLAGE, DECEPTION: SOVIET REVIEW OF WESTERN RESOURCES

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[Article by Lt Col L. Sergeyev: "Means of Camouflage and Deception"]

[Excerpts] In recent years the armies of capitalist nations have been devoting increasing attention to camouflage and concealment of troops and military installations. This is due primarily to the development and adoption of highly-efficient weapons systems and the endeavor to implement with their assistance the principle of hitting targets with the first round fired.

Various means of camouflage, concealment and deception are employed in the armies of capitalist nations to thwart detection of personnel and combat equipment by hostile reconnaissance and intelligence efforts, as well as to thwart delivery of aimed fire at such targets by weapons systems.

Top officials in the armies of capitalist nations are of the opinion that the importance of camouflage, concealement and deception will continue to increase. Promising means of camouflage, concealment and deception, in the opinion of foreign military experts, should provide protection against hostile reconnaissance and intelligence efforts in all bands of the electromagnetic spectrum, under all weather conditions, should be compact, simple to utilize and be capable of being set up in minimal time.

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NATO: SOVIET REVIEW OF AVIATION SUPPORT ROLE

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, Jun 80 signed to press 6 Jun 80 pp 43-50

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences Docent Col (Res) N. Dmitriyev: "Coordinated Action Between Air and Ground Forces"]

[Excerpts] It is emphasized in U.S. and NATO armed forces field manuals and regulations that no single military service or combat arm is capable of achieving success in battle independently. It is noted thereby that in the course of conduct of modern combat operations ground and air forces will be able to accomplish their missions only with close coordination and cooperation, with securement of stable communications and observance of a single, unified plan of action considered essential conditions. In the opinion of foreign military experts, this is especially important in providing close air support.

Close air support is defined in the foreign military press as ground-attack actions by aircraft against enemy targets located in the immediate vicinity of the forward positions of friendly ground troops. It prescribes delivery of airstrikes primarily on targets which cannot be taken out by ground troops weapons and the destruction of which determines the success of offensive or defensive engagements. In this case tactical aircraft attack targets specified by ground force commanders, and the combat operations of these aircraft are closely coordinated with ground troops fire and maneuver. An attack which is faulty in place and time can result in hitting friendly troops and in unjustified aircraft losses. In connection with this the West German journal FLUGWELT has called close air support the most important area of tactical coordination between air and ground forces on the battlefield.

Foreign military experts, having studied the experience of aggressive imperialist wars in Southeast Asia and in the Near East, and having analyzed the results of numerous exercises, concluded that a high degree of effectiveness of coordinated action between air and ground forces is attained with swift air response to the requests of ground troops, prompt concentration of principal efforts in the most important sector during the decisive period of battle, and precise delivery of attacks on tanks, armored personnel carriers and other targets.

Discussing the question of air support response time to ground forces requests, the Swiss journal INTERAVIA stated that response time ranged between 30 and 45 minutes in combat operations in Vietnam and was distributed approximately as follows: [following pages not sent]

An important role in coordinated action between air and ground forces on the battlefield is played by ground troops liaison officers assigned to tactical aviation units and subunits. They inform air unit and subunit commanders on the situation developing on the battlefield, the missions assigned the troops, the decisions of their commanders, as well as coordinating and detailing the procedure of coordinated action between aviation and friendly ground units, and with army aviation subunits.

NATO military experts note that a number of difficulties arise in organizing coordinated action between air and ground forces. This is due to the multinational composition of the bloc's joint forces, the diversity of weapons and combat equipment, situation complexity and rapid situation changes. In addition, difficulties are caused by the "language barrier" and the fact that U.S. radio communications security equipment cannot be utilized by the other NATO member nations, while a portion of the wire communications security equipment of the NATO bloc allies is incompatible with counterpart U.S. equipment. Therefore considerable attention is devoted to mastering the languages of the allies in training of aviation and ground forces personnel of the NATO member nations. Personnel learn to understand orders and instructions, to prepare operational maps and combat documents using a uniform method, to interpret in a uniform manner the semantic meaning of special terms employed in aviation and ground forces, to translate them from one language to another, and to identify both allied and adversary troops quickly and accurately.

As a rule forces are assigned on a national basis at exercises and combined drills to provide close air support to ground troops of differing nationality. Special mutual recognition and target designation signals are utilized to coordinate their actions on the flanks and boundaries. Uniform instructions have been elaborated to designate the status and character of actions of friendly and enemy troops, as well as procedures of aircraft flight above troop dispositions and through air defense coverage zones, as well as mutual information on hostile aircraft. Communications teams providing communications between allied units and subunits are extensively employed.

U.S. and NATO armed forces commanders believe on the whole that in the future, with appropriate reconnaissance systems in Central Europe, the effectiveness of coordinated action between tactical air and ground forces will increase substantially. Essential conditions for this, in the opinion of U.S. and NATO military experts, include joint command leadership which ensures continuous and stable communication between aviation and ground troops, as well as observance of a unified plan in the course of joint actions.

The above confirms once again that NATO military leaders, in their aggressive plans of preparing for war against the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist community, devote considerable attention to continuous development and further improvement of coordinated action between air and ground forces, considering this to be a most important condition for achieving success in the modern engagement and operation. Toward this objective NATO is developing and testing at numerous exercises and joint drill activities various devices and elaborating methods of utilization of these technical means.

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RADAR: SOVIET REVIEW OF WESTERN DEVELOPMENT

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, Jun 80 signed to press 6 Jun 80 pp 52-56

[Article by Engr-Lt Col I. Aleksandrov: "Below-Horizon Radars"]

[Excerpt] Below-horizon radars (ZG RLS) are capable of detecting targets beyond line-of-sight (at a range of from 800 to 12,000 km). In the opinion of foreign experts, with this equipment it is possible to detect air targets throughout their entire range of operating altitudes (from ground-hugging to maximum altitude), moving surface ships, as well as ballistic missiles in the powered segment of flight and during entry into dense layers of atmosphere. The considerable potential of ZG RLS has long attracted the attention of military leaders in a number of capitalist countries, who are counting on achieving military superiority over the socialist nations by developing new weapons and combat equipment.

The operation of ZG RLS is based on the effect of sequential multiple reflection from the ionosphere and the Earth's surface of short (approximately 10-100 m) radio waves, from targets located on their path of propagation, and the disturbances caused by them. The distance from the point of radiation of a wave to the area of its reflection from the Earth or between two adjacent reflections from the Earth is called skip distance. Depending on the angle at which the wave is radiated and the wavelength, this distance ranges from 800 to 4,000 km. The ZG RLS receiver can be sited in the vicinity of the transmitter (oblique-return echo radars) or on the path of propagation of the emitted signal, several thousand kilometers from the transmitter (direct echo radar).

ZG RLS have not co[illegible] widespread employment up to the present time. This is due to the presence of very substantial shortcomings inherent in radars of both types. Foreign experts list the following shortcomings: radar susceptibility to natural and man-made interference, the impossibility of detecting targets at a range of less than 800 km due to the presence of a skip zone, as well as the dependence of their characteristics on the state of the ionosphere. Absorption of radio waves in the lower layers of the ionosphere in the summer during daylight hours greatly reduces the maximum effective range of these radars. A decrease in concentration of electrons during hours of darkness in winter means that passage of radio waves is possible only at low operating frequencies, while their reflection occurs at greater altitudes than normal and at smaller angles. This increases the radar's minimum effective range, but the radius of the blind zone increases.

There also exist factors which additionally complicate obtaining the requisite operating characteristics of a ZG RLS, for example: multibeam propagation, which causes multiple reflection of radio waves from the target or signal fading; sporadic change in length of path of propagation of probing and reflected signals, leading to variance in target coordinate measurements. In spite of these shortcomings, the United States and a number of other capitalist countries have been working for quite some time now on developing radars of this type.

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U.S. NAVY: SOVIET COMMENTS ON FORCES IN INDIAN OCEAN

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, Jun 80 signed to press 6 Jun 80 pp 59-63

[Article by Capt 1st Rank I. Karemov: "U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean"]

[Text] An ever increasing role is being assigned to the Indian Ocean in the Pentagon's plans of aggressive military preparations. This is due primarily to the fact that the countries bordering on the Indian Ocean contain more than one half of the capitalist world's proven oil reserves, two thirds of its uranium, one half of its gold, and almost its entire diamond production. These countries are also the main producers of tin and rubber.

The Indian Ocean occupies an advantageous military-strategic position on the crossroads of important lines of communication between Europe, Asia, Africa and Australia, in the immediate vicinity (in its northwestern part) of the borders of the Soviet Union.

The Indian Ocean carries three fourths of world crude oil and refined petroleum products cargo traffic, as well as many other major raw materials, industrial and agricultural goods. It serves as a link between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. According to figures in the U.S. press, the Persian Gulf region accounts for 70 percent of Western Europe's oil imports, 32 percent of U.S. imports, and 77 percent of Japan's oil imports.

U.S. penetration into the Indian Ocean zone began immediately after World War II, when a permanent naval task force was formed in the Persian Gulf (the U.S. Navy's Middle East Command, subordinate to the commander of U.S. naval forces in Europe), consisting of a headquarters ship and two destroyers or frigates. This force was based at Manama Naval Base (on the Island of Bahrein). From time to time, especially during aggravation of the military-political situation, larger U.S. naval task forces would appear in the Indian Ocean, including carrier task groups.

On numerous occasions ships from the Atlantic Fleet crossed the Indian Ocean to conduct military operations in Indochina. It was precisely under the pretext of providing support for such passage that the United States and Great Britain signed a special agreement in 1966 (extending for a term of 50 years), which granted the Americans the right to build a communications center on the island of Diego Garcia (in the Chagos Islands). Supplementary agreements were signed in 1972 and subsequently in 1976, calling for expansion of existing and construction of new military installations, as well as enabling the United States to utilize this base for U.S. warships and aircraft.* At the present time, according to reports in the foreign press, from three to six Orion shore-based patrol aircraft plus several aerial tankers are based there. In addition there is capability for temporary basing of a carrier task group.

The U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean particularly expanded after Great Britain decided in 1969 to withdraw its armed forces from areas east of Suez. The "zone of responsibility" of the U.S. Seventh Fleet was enlarged: its western boundary was extended to 60° east longitude. Carrier attack and multirole groups, as well as individual warship detachments began periodic patrols in the northwestern part of the Indian Ocean and began partipating actively in annual naval exercises conducted in this region by the then-existing CENTO bloc.

The armed conflict between India and Pakistan (1971) as well as the 1973 Near Eastern crisis served as a pretext for stepping up U.S. military-political activity in the Indian Ocean region. At the end of 1973 the administration in Washington made the decision "to pay regular visits to the Indian Ocean by naval ships and to make the U.S. naval presence here more appreciable than in the past." From October 1973 through December 1978 inclusive ships of the Seventh Fleet, as reported in the foreign press, steamed on 17 occasions into the northern and northwestern parts of the Indian Ocean, including nine such voyages by carrier attack and multipurpose groups.

1979 was the year of overthrow of the bloody regime of the Shah in Iran and the Afghan revolution, which proclaimed establishment of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and 1980 has been characterized by an even sharper buildup of the U.S. naval presence in this region.

Using as camouflage the threadbare thesis of "Soviet military threat" and under the phony pretext of "containment of the Soviet Union," which is being accused of aspirations of seizing the oilfields of the Near and Middle East and advancing to the Indian Ocean, U.S. President Carter proclaimed a policy of establishing control of the Persian Gulf region, declared to be a "sphere of vital U.S. interests" where, as he states, "the stakes are the foundations of U.S. economic and political well-being."

The Carter Administration does not conceal the fact that Washington's heightened interest in this region is due to its strategic position as well

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* For more detailed information on the Diego Garcia military base, see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 1, 1979, pp 84-86 -- Ed.

-- the fact that the countries of this region possess natural resources which the United States seeks to utilize in its own interests.

The development of events in this part of the world serves as confirmation of the aggressive intentions of U.S. ruling circles.

In the spring of 1979, on orders by President Carter, two carrier groups were dispatched to the Indian Ocean (the multirole carriers "Midway" and "Constellation"), while in October 1979 U.S. naval strength in the Middle East was increased from three to five ships. At the end of 1979 the aircraft carrier "Kitty Hawk" relieved the carrier "Constellation," which returned to the Western Pacific, and in January 1980 it was relieved by the nuclear-powered carrier "Chester W. Nimitz," which steamed from the Mediterranean around Africa to the Arabian Sea in a two-week voyage. In February of this year the carrier "Midway" was relieved by the carrier "Coral Sea," and in March an amphibious group consisting of five amphibious assault ships, carrying the 31st Expeditionary Battalion, which totaled 1,800 Marines (of the 3d Regiment, 3d Marine Division), arrived in the Arabian Sea.

Thus U.S. leaders have concentrated in the Persian Gulf area and adjacent waters an unprecedented fleet for this area, including two multipurpose carrier groups and one amphibious group with an expeditionary force on board. As reported by the foreign press, as of the end of March 1980 the force totals 31 ships, 26 of which are in the Arabian Sea and five in the Persian Gulf (see table) [Table not translated]. Total displacement is 512,000 tons, with crew strength in excess of 20,000 men.*

Judging from materials in the Western press, this naval force would perform the following missions: mount strikes against sea and land targets by carrier-based aircraft, with both conventional and nuclear weapons; provision of close air and naval gun support of ground forces engaged in coastal areas; conduct of amphibious landing operations; organization of a blockade of the Persian Gulf area; mining of the Strait of Ormuz; engagement of enemy surface ships and submarines; control of sea lines of communication; exerting pressure on the countries in this region with a show of military force. This force is also being extensively utilized at the present time to exert pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran.

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* According to latest reports in the foreign press, the carrier groups were relieved in mid-May. The nuclear-powered carrier "Chester W. Nimitz" was replaced by a carrier of the same class, the "Dwight D. Eisenhower," and the carrier "Coral Sea" was replaced by the carrier "Constellation." At the present time the force totals approximately 30 ships -- Ed.



Zones within range of carrier-based aircraft with carrier operations in the Gulf of Oman (the light dashed lines indicate distances from carriers in nautical miles, and the heavy solid lines -- operational range of aircraft)

Key:

1. Iraq
2. USSR
3. Iran
4. Afghanistan
5. Pakistan
6. Saudi Arabia
7. Persian Gulf
8. Gulf of Oman
9. A-6E Intruder
10. F-14 Tomcat
11. A-18 Hornet
12. Teheran
13. Kuwait
14. Karachi
15. Kabul
16. Herat
17. Qum
18. Abadan
19. Isfahan
20. Shiraz
21. Bandar Abbas
22. Zahidan
23. Meshed

A carrier task force formed of the two carrier task groups comprises the main naval striking force in the Indian Ocean. As is reported by the foreign press, the group consists of a multipurpose carrier, two or three guided missile cruisers, three or four destroyers or frigates (including guided missile ships). Each carrier carries an air wing: 100 fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft on board the nuclear-powered carrier "Chester W. Nimitz" and 80 on the carrier "Coral Sea," organized into squadrons and detachments. The Western press notes that these carriers can accommodate fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft of the following types: 12 A-6E Intruder medium attack aircraft, 28 A-7E Corsair-2 light attack aircraft, 24 F-14A Tomcat fighters (on the carrier "Chester W. Nimitz") or F-4J Phantom-2 aircraft ("Coral Sea"), four E-2C Hawkeye early warning aircraft, three RF-8G Crusader reconnaissance aircraft, four EA-6B Prowler electronic countermeasures aircraft ("Chester W. Nimitz") or EA-3B "Sky Warrior" aircraft) ("Coral Sea"), 10 S-3A Viking ASW aircraft, and eight SH-3 Sea King ASW helicopters (both on the "Chester W. Nimitz"), plus four KA-6D Intruder tankers. A total of 80 aircraft carry nuclear weapons.

According to calculations by U.S. military experts, carrier-based aircraft are capable of attacking targets situated up to 1,800 km (approximately 1,000 nautical miles) from their carrier. This means that Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and other countries of the region are within their operational radius (if the carriers are stationed in the Gulf of Oman) (see figure). They are also targeted at the southern areas of the Soviet Union.

Judging from materials in the foreign press, the United States intends to keep this potent naval force for an indefinite time in the Persian Gulf area and western part of the Indian Ocean, and in order to ensure a high degree of combat readiness of the ships of this force, the United States intends, in addition to the naval base already in operation on the island of Diego Garcia, to establish bases in other countries, primarily Kenya, Somalia, and Oman.

The unprecedented buildup of U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean constitutes convincing evidence of the hegemonist aspirations of U.S. imperialist circles, directed against peace, détente and international cooperation, against the socialist countries, the national liberation movement and progressive social changes, at plundering the natural resources of the countries of this region and defense of the most despotic and reactionary regimes.

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NATO NAVY: SOVIET REVIEW OF AMPHIBIOUS LANDING DEFENSE

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, Jun 80 signed to press 6 Jun 80 pp 63-68

[Article by Rear Adm. A. Rumyantsev: "Combating Amphibious Landings"]

[Excerpt] U.S. military-political leaders and their allies in the aggressive NATO bloc, preparing to carry out their expansionist plans, are stepping up armed forces combat training, in the course of which considerable attention is being focused, alongside working on offensive combat operations, on "active defense"* and combating enemy amphibious landing operations.

It has been reported in the Western press that the most probable amphibious landing operation areas will be the Baltic and Black Sea straits and certain areas on the northern and southern flanks of the bloc. It was emphasized that work on problems of amphibious landing defense occupies an important place in the operational and combat training of the armed forces of the NATO countries, especially the FRG, Denmark, Norway, Turkey, and Greece. It is stated in the press that numerous NATO Joint Forces exercises are evidence of this ("Botany Bay" in the area of the Baltic straits, "Dawn Patrol" and "Deep Furrow" in the Southern European Theater, "Bar Frost" in Northern Norway, and others).

The purpose of this article is to acquaint the reader with the views of foreign military experts on combating enemy amphibious landing operations, based on the experience of World War II and troop training in the postwar period. It is believed that combat against amphibious landing operations constitutes an aggregate of combat operations of combined units and units of the various armed forces branches, conducted to thwart an amphibious landing operation, and if this mission was not accomplished, to wipe out the assault force as it comes ashore. Achievement of this objective presupposes: extensive conduct of reconnaissance of assault force troops and amphibious landing equipment concentration areas; destroying landing forces and equipment in these areas as well as at equipment and troop embarkation points; engagement of assault detachments and covering forces en route to the objective area; engagement in the objective area; annihilation of amphibious assault troops which have succeeded in reaching shore. These missions would involve strategic and tactical air combined units and units, carrier forces, submarines, warship and patrol boat strike groups, minelayers, shore missile and artillery batteries, and ground troops (see diagram) [not included].

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* For material on "active defense" see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 1, 1980, page 31 -- Ed.

Gaining and holding sea and air supremacy, which is to be achieved by means of vigorous actions by the various fleet forces, tactical aviation, and antiaircraft weapons of ground troops defending the shore, are considered to be an essential condition for the success of antiamphibious operations.

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NAVAL UNITS: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Officer Technical Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Capt-Lt Ye. Vedrashko, minesweeper captain: "Not an Integral Unit"]

[Text] Maj V. Shipitsin, motorized rifle battalion commander, raised some interesting and burning questions in his letter "Ot tekhniki--maksimum vozmozhnogo" ["Get the Maximum Possible From Equipment"]. In my view, he is absolutely correct in saying that a creative approach to officer technical training and the search for optimal ways to improve its quality and effectiveness are required. But, I think some of his comments are debatable. I agree that a commander, even if he knows equipment inside and out, will not be successful unless he can properly organize its use by subordinates in combat. But, neither will the commander who can command, but who avoids practical work with the equipment, who doesn't "get his hands dirty."

Here is a specific example to back this up. Our ship put out to sea once to stream sweeps. At first all went well. Lt V. Kovalev, who commanded the sweep crew, overall skillfully organized things, deployed the people correctly, took everything into account so that the equipment's combat capabilities would be used to the maximum. Then there was a hitch--an instrument showed that the amount of electrical current in the sweep did not meet the norm. The sweep electrician, a young seaman, got flustered. So did Kovalev. He knew nothing about electrical equipment. As it turned out later, there was a simple explanation for the strange instrument readings, but more shameful, the quality of mission accomplishment did not turn out to be as high as it could have been.

Comprehensive knowledge of all equipment and possession of firm practical skills in operating and repairing it should be, in my opinion, a matter of honor for every officer, for every commander. Such knowledge is often a vital necessity for us, naval personnel, due to the specifics of shipboard service. A ship sails on a long cruise and remains away from home base for many months. It is natural that, after a certain amount of time, equipment needs preventive maintenance and repair. One cannot await outside help in this event, whether you want to or not, an officer must rely on his own devices, his own practical skills. He must be prepared to independently solve technical problems regardless of complexity.

Unfortunately, the fleet still has assigned officers who, if it can be put this way, are accustomed only to taking from the equipment. When the equipment acts up, they rush to call the shore-based repair service. But, in combat, you can't bring in a specialist from a repair shop... In order to get the maximum possible from the equipment, you must give it the maximum as well--the maximum concern and attention.

Capt 3rd Rank A. Glebov, department commander and master of military classification, is an example for us ship captains in this regard. This officer has a broad tactical outlook and the ability to organize combat creatively, without triteness. And, at the same time, he has a master's knowledge of the majority of shipboard specialities. I have often been amazed at the profound knowledge of the crux of technical questions that the department commander can introduce into the affairs of the ship's engineering subunit [podrazdeleniye] (BCh-5). If he gives any advice to Engr-Lt G. Mednikov, the BCh-5 young commander, you can be sure that this is the advice of a knowledgeable person, this is a recommendation on an engineering level. But, Glebov himself is not a trained engineering officer. He has never served in an engineering department. But, specific knowledge about the equipment expands the commander's outlook and lets him more profoundly see its capabilities in combat, make creative, innovative decisions, and search for new tactical procedures.

I personally strive to follow the department commander's example. I try, along with pure command training, with the study of the ship's overall combat capabilities, to supplement my practical experience in maintaining individual instruments, aggregates, and devices. I try to improve my repair skills. It goes without saying that this requires additional time and effort, but this is all paid back 10 fold.

Stressing practice in an officer's technical training means apportionment of time. Unfortunately, we often seem to stress theory. Various lectures and seminars on the equipment and weapons are often organized. It is only occasionally that officers get practical lessons directly at battle stations or at different pieces of equipment.

In my view, the practical slant in school programs is insufficient. Graduates come to a ship, as a rule, well trained in a theoretical regard, but sometimes encounter difficulties in solving practical problems involving equipment operation or repair. For instance, take our young navigator Lt A. Kuz'min. He orients himself quite freely in the theory of navigation and in the fundamentals of navigational affairs. But, this is not enough. His area of responsibility includes radio-technical and communications gear (the subunits are combined on our minesweeper). Unfortunately, Kuz'min did not pay the requisite attention to acquiring practical skills in using this equipment when he was in school. It took great efforts on his part to eliminate shortcomings in his technical training.

There is no doubt that an officer's theoretical training, so to speak, is the foundation for his proficiency as a commander. The modern officer overall must be erudite, highly educated, and have profound scientific knowledge of the most diverse branches of military affairs. But, all the same, it is evident that, so to speak, he is not yet an integral unit.

A modern ship is a complicated complex of the most diverse equipment. In order to command it in a qualified manner, one must have more than just an idea about this equipment, one must know more than just the theory behind it. A good captain, as the ideal, must be capable of both standing watch as well as any machinist's mate, and operating a gyrocompass or radar position. He must be able to "listen to the sea" at a sonar position and control the fire of an artillery mount, turret, or battery. It is possible that a ship's captain will never actually be called upon to do this in combat, but he in detail must know what each battle station is doing in any situation. He must know this based on his own experience, not in some abstract way. Only then will he be able also to fully demonstrate his art as a captain. Only then can he get the maximum possible from the equipment.

On a Small ASW Ship

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by Capt 3rd Rank V. Baltak, Red Banner Pacific Fleet: "Guarantee of Reliability"]

[Text] The small ASW ship (MPK) put out to sea at night. The night greeted the sailors cordially. Black rain-swollen clouds completely covered the sky. The waves beat against the ship, spraying the decks and superstructure...

This was the situation that miserable night several months ago when Capt-Lt V. Gavrikov for the first time after being assigned as captain of the MPK went out on his own to accomplish a combat training mission. And, the sea taught him a serious lesson that night during the search for the "enemy" submarine.

The night before the commander of one department unexpectedly fell ill. In Gavrikov's opinion, there was no one else aboard to reliably replace this officer, so he himself decided to do it personally. But, this was not the best solution. The deteriorating weather and unexpected changes in the tactical situation required that each individual, and the captain particularly, work to his utmost. Gavrikov simply had no chance to work with that subunit. As a result, the overall evaluation was lower than anticipated.

This fact and the critique he received after the exercise and during the party meeting taught the officer a great deal. One cannot set about accomplishing combat training missions if crew interoperability is not what it should be. The USSR Navy Shipboard Regulations clearly define the procedure for the substitution of officers and other responsible personnel. A ship's combat readiness greatly depends upon how the regulation is implemented.

Gavrikov studied his error and began to emphasize the training of troops capable at a moment's notice to replace their immediate supervisor in combat.

Let's say that the captain is holding a tactical skull session with the officers. He always invites the warrant officers, too. He calls in the department commanders for a practical lesson in the class room and orders that team petty officers attend, too. Thus, the ship's warrant officers have become full participants in all training measures taken with the officers.

True, it did not go all that smoothly at the start. Thus, for instance, WO G. Borisov initially did not fully comprehend the importance of combat substitute training. He thought that he was meeting his immediate responsibilities normally and that nothing else concerned him. He had to be reminded of the Shipboard Regulations.

Socialist competition also played a large role here. This appeared in the personal pledges of many officers and warrant officers: "Master the responsibilities of one level higher than those assigned."

The crew became stronger and more coordinated and the harmony in the sailor's actions improved from cruise to cruise, from exercise to exercise. Everyone accomplished combat training missions and practice sessions more confidently and with higher quality. Then came the next scheduled test.

...The ship reached the assigned area. The ASW troops began to search. At that very moment, an unexpected input was received: The umpire had "put out of action" almost all department commanders. There often had been inputs requiring replacement of this or that officer during past exercises. This was the first time that a significant number of subunit commanders on the ship had to be replaced. However, such a situation certainly could occur in combat.

The weight of the exercise battle fell on the team petty officers. And, they did not collapse. WO V. Shapovalov, who replaced the chief of the radiotechnical service, quickly and skillfully organized the work of the sonarmen. Under his supervision they detected the submarine in time and established a firm contact with it. Sensing the danger, the "enemy" began to make frenzied attempts to break off the pursuit. That MPK had to maneuver vigorously. Much depended here on the troops in the engineering department. WO V. Yakobchuk operated just as well as the real BCh-5 commander would have. The ship continually maintained its way. Moreover, Yakobchuk demonstrated outstanding proficiency and tactical aptitude. During the exercise's difficult minutes, he succeeded in selecting the optimal engine operating mode that guaranteed conditions most favorable for the sonarmen.

The mine specialists were to cap the battle. WO G. Borisov's voice was filled with emotion when he gave the order to prepare to fire. This was the first he had commanded a department in such an important exercise. But, the concluding "Volley!" resounded with victorious conviction.

The sailors received a rightful high rating. They operated reliably during the exercise. The guarantee of this reliability is the constant attention to training combat substitutes carried on aboard the ship.

Staff Officers Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Korneychuk: "With a Flag Commander's Representative On Board"]

[Text] Violations of military discipline by several sailors in their last year of service took place during a long cruise. The sailors were assigned to the department commanded by Capt 3rd Rank A. Besedin. The unit [chast'] staff was amazed when it learned about this. Staff officer Engr-Capt 3rd Rank S. Bokov was aboard the ship and he had made only cheerful reports. He had said that the crew was orderly and was accomplishing missions successfully.

Soon the unit commander and chief of staff visited the ship. They began their inspection by talking to Bokov. The specialists who had misbehaved were from the department where Bokov was assigned as inspector [napravlenets]. It turned out that engineering officer Bokov considered that his job was to ensure that the equipment operated during the cruise. Thus, he was not interested in anything else that happened.

The staff and the political department had their work cut out for them with this crew and they had to take the necessary measures to clear things up. But, that is not the topic before us. Today we are discussing the place and role of the flag specialist, the staff officer aboard a ship on a cruise, his work style during cruises.

Ships often and for long periods of time are separated from base. The volume of missions accomplished and combat training intensity increase each year. Equipment and weapons are being improved. On cruises sailors acquire skills in employing them in combat. In addition, ship captains and subunit commanders are getting younger. They need advice, aid, and supervision. These and other special features also dictate the necessity for one or several flag specialists being aboard ships operating on a broad operational expanse.

Aboard ship they are fully empowered representatives of the staff. They must be distinguished by their high demandingness and for their intolerance to simplification and weakness, irregularities in evaluations, and formalism in competition. They are tasked to skillfully make officers and warrant officers highly qualified specialists.

Staff officers participate in the indoctrination of sailors and help commanders develop high political, moral, and psychological qualities in the troops' character. They do not restrict their activities only to the department to which they are assigned as inspectors. They are interested in the overall state of affairs aboard the ship.

Staff officers keep a sharp eye out for successes and shortcomings and maintain high criteria in evaluations. They are well informed about progressive know-how accumulated aboard the best ships in the unit and in the fleet. They can equate and objectively evaluate results achieved by a specific crew. Finally, a flag specialist has more overall experience and more experience on long cruises than do a group commander, a department commander, or sometimes even the ship's captain. This gives the flag specialist the moral right to be more demanding of ship's officers.

That is as it should be. But, unfortunately, there are times when one encounters a different kind of mission in a staff officer's work. One errs due to lack of experience, another due to the inability to pick out the main points, a third because he is accustomed to doing things the old way and is incapable of being other than a "narrow" specialist. Let's return to the example cited at the start of this article.

As it turned out, Engr-Capt 3rd Rank S. Bokov arrived aboard ship without a carefully developed plan. At the staff they assumed he would do so after orienting himself aboard the ship. But, the officer did not demonstrate initiative and therefore worked without any system. He mainly duplicated what the department commander did, helped him do preventive maintenance on the equipment. He did accomplish quite a bit, but not always what the situation and his position called for. Thus, the limited output and the errors in the most important area--indoctrination of the sailors.

Why does a staff officer go to a ship? What is his main task? What must he bring back from the cruise? The unit staff should be concerned about this. It should be a case where the staff officer clearly knows his program and is prepared to work aboard the ship with full responsibility: long before putting out to sea he should in detail study the situation aboard the ship, clearly know the missions assigned to the crew in the stages of the cruise and for the overall cruise period, determine his role and place in their accomplishment, examine beforehand what know-how is lacking aboard the ship, how to introduce it, and so on.

That is what many staff officers do. Prior to the cruise, they become immmersed in the state of affairs on the crew, its successes and deficiencies, and how the sailors accomplished previous missions. As a rule, they participate in the check trips that always precede long cruises. That is, they familiarize themselves with the people at work. This all allows them to work productively from the first mile of the cruise on, at full bore, in strict accordance with a carefully thought out plan.

In my view, a flag specialist's cruise plan must as a minimum consist of three parts: work in the specialty, party-political work, and participation in the military and moral indoctrination of the sailors. It is important for the unit commander and political department chief to approve the plan.

The staff officers' report upon returning from sea is a special topic. Here is what is done in several units. This is the approximate dialogue between the chief of staff and an officer returning from a cruise:

"How was the cruise?"

"Normal."

"What is the situation on the crew, what is their mood?"

"The situation is normal and the crew is in a military mood..."

If there were any mistakes made during the cruise aboard a ship on which a staff officer is located, it is his responsibility to write an explanatory note and he remains answerable at the staff officer meeting.

That is, the evaluation of a staff officer's activities during such a cruise depends only on whether everything is in order aboard the ship or whether shortcomings come to light. But, what about the initiative the staff officer demonstrated, the fact that he accomplished nothing during the cruise, which overall went well? Unfortunately, some unit commanders, chiefs of staff, and political department chiefs do not take that into account in detail. One would think that there is a need to evaluate a staff officer's work comprehensively, taking into account his accomplishment of the cruise plans, the initiative shown, and so forth. That approach would stimulate their activities.

A staff officer's results on a cruise greatly depend on his professional training and special skills. Practice shows that an officer insufficiently trained in his specialty to the required degree cannot grasp progressive tactical procedures, find correct solutions during the cruise, give the captain qualified recommendations, and fully use equipment capabilities.

Command and control became difficult on one cruise due to poor communications and this noticeably reduced the dynamism of the training battle. In this situation, staff officer Capt 3rd Rank V. Tel'pov was unable quickly and fully to evaluate the situation and put existing communications channels to use. The reason was the staff officer's shallow special knowledge. For the same reason, he does not always train communications department commanders in a methodologically correct manner and enrich them with progressive know-how in using technical equipment. From this comes triteness in the use of the rich capabilities of modern equipment, which due to its specifications is capable under any conditions of ensuring reliable and flexible command and control in naval combat.

The staff, through its representatives aboard ships, assists commanders in organizing competition and in achieving the maximum return from each mile of the cruise, from each training hour. This work is more effective, the greater the proficiency and competence of staff officers, the greater their creative aggressiveness in the propaganda of progressive know-how, in their intolerence to formalism.

Mine specialist Capt 3rd Rank V. Kuz'min works at sea in an interesting and knowledgeable manner. As a rule, he attends meetings where sailors make socialist pledges for the cruise, advises subunit commanders on how to determine milestones, how best to organize competition between troops and between combat shifts. On a cruise Vladimir Ivanovich attends each critique, helps subunit commanders in a principled way evaluate training and competition and identify laggers in time.

Officer Kuz'min does a great deal with young subunit commanders and eagerly passes on his rich experiences to them. Thus, things did not go too well initially for Capt-Lt V. Zhagorin, commander of the mine and torpedo department on one ship. Kuz'min participated in dozens of cruises with him and helped the young officer set up competition. Kuz'min spurred him on in the battle for the best subunit. In just 6 months, the officer acquired independence and now is one of the leading department commanders.

Staff officers are called upon not only to accumulate progressive know-how born through competition, but also to actively disseminate it. They feed the staff ideas for consideration, they continually make proposals on improving combat training, they recommend ways to raise the intensity of the training process and the viability of competition for high-quality mission accomplishment at sea.

That is not always the case, unfortunately. An officer returning from a long cruise is eagerly awaited by the staff, from him they await valuable proposals deserving of immediate consideration and his report to the fleet staff. But, he, it turns out, didn't note anything reportable. An approximate report, approximate evaluations of the work of the ship's officers during the cruise. Nothing bothered him, nothing affected him. He agreed with everything he saw and was satisfied with it all.

In such instances, information on innovations and on interesting tactical and other procedures is provided to the staff only by the ship's captain. This fact elicits thought. It means, first, that some staff officers lack the ability to recognize an innovation given birth to on long cruises. Second, they do not have close contact with ship's captains during the cruise.

...A ship departs on a cruise. A senior officer with a suitcase in his hand climbs on board. The captain, the officer of the day, petty officers, and sailors greet him. They are glad to see him. Do not let them down, flag specialist!

Activities of Political Officers

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Vice Adm V. Sabaneyev, member of the Military Council, chief of the Political Directorate, Red Banner Pacific Fleet: "Competing, Grow Morally"]

[Text] This unit for several years in a row now ranks among those on the right flank of socialist competition in our fleet. Here you immediately notice careful order, the efficiency of the people, good equipment maintenance. What is the secret of this collective's success? Perhaps sailors and petty officers are specially assigned here? Or, only experienced officers make up the command staff?

Not at all. All of this is the same as in other fleets. It is simply that training and indoctrinational problems are solved here in a considered and steadfast manner. Profound consideration, orderliness, and a businesslike approach are the traits of the work style which greatly determine end results.

The following opinion can be heard in another military collective when the question of the spiritual effect of competition on people arises: the main thing is to set up a businesslike rivalry on the specific combat training indicators, then some sort of trace in the person's spirit in and of itself will remain.

In and of itself--we cannot be satisfied with that. Competition's indoctrinational capabilities must be developed by its organizers. This is the very understanding of the question in the unit where officer B. Pekedov is a political worker and it is the subject of our discussion. I would like to dwell in more detail on this aspect of competition supervision.

The successes of the personnel in the unit I cited in the main are the result of the ability of supervisors to solve all problems of combat readiness, discipline, and competition in close contact with peoples' moral indoctrination. Here is an example. Things at one time had deteriorated aboard the ship where Capt-Lt P. Kudryavtsev is party organization secretary. They began to look into this and also to turn to know-how in competition organization. At first glance, it seemed as if everything had been done: the pledges made were high, they were discussed at meetings, competition progress was examined, but results were far from what was anticipated.

The political department, along with staff flag specialists, carefully examined why this happened. Here is what they found. Competition organizers were unable to "motivate" participants, they didn't play the "moral keys." The solution to the problem had been found. Based upon party organ recommendations and assistance, work began aboard the ship to inculcate the troops with a feeling of responsibility for the pledges made, for the honor of the ship. Also recommended was careful evaluation during critiques of the moral aspect of labor, conduct, and mutual relations: how did you act during a difficult period for the crew, how did you look upon the overall failure, how did you help your comrade, were you indifferent to the misfortune of a co-worker...

The situation aboard the ship changed. It became a progressive ship and this in turn strengthened the crew's pride in the collective's success, their desire to hold onto their position. Thus, there was a dual benefit--both for combat training results and for the peoples' moral growth.

The fact that the political department achieved broad visibility for the competition between crews also began to have important significance. This noticeably increased peoples' interest in their ship's affairs and all became very concerned about how the ship looks against the background of other ships. From this, naturally, collectivism became stronger and personal labor is organically combined with the overall cause.

Young people lacking sufficient social, labor, and life's experience are entering the military. Therefore, it is very important to expand their concept of socialist competition, its nature, of how it facilitates things, and how it enriches the individual. Such explanatory work is always underway in the unit. Leninist readings of the leader's works "Velikiy pochin" ["Great Initiative"] and "Kak organizovat' sorevnovaniye?" ["How is Competition Organized?"] are conducted with high intensity. And, an evening debate by sailors from one crew on the theme "You--for the competition, the competition for you" met with great interest.

Unfortunately, there also are examples in our fleet whereby the competition theme in essence is excluded from the sphere of agitational and propaganda work. This, of course, is incorrect.

It can be said that moral output is within everything linked to competition. Take just this example. It is one thing to inspire sailors to achieve high goals, to give them the opportunity to demonstrate their initiative, to think everything through, to weigh things, to discuss them creatively. And, it is something else when pledges are made hastily, formally. Or, let's say, this aspect. The subunit zeroed in on clearly reduced indicators; in so doing the commander ensured an easy win at the finish. Moreover, the people clearly sense the falsity of similar situations, it can give birth in their souls to an answering indifference and hypocrisy: well then, we will fill in the blanks... Formalism automatically affects morale and reflects upon the collective's moral atmosphere.

Something similar happened on the ship commanded by officer A. Karpov. Political department workers were sent there, they carefully looked into the mistakes made when organizing competition, and they aided the ship's party organization. The situation was corrected. This case again reminded the political organ of the importance of not allowing the indoctrinational aspect of competition to escape its scrutiny and of looking at this problem in its most diverse manifestations.

Collective leaders now when developing pledges, orienting people, go no further than evaluations of combat training, the figures for the economics of materials, and so on. As regards pledges "with a moral slant," then they anticipate exhaustive instructions, if not standard developments. But, this would mean the demise of the vital struggle for the best in a person, depriving the struggle of its individualization, of the variety of directions which also should correspond to a personality's most diverse demands. Is it not because sometimes individual pledges are just like two drops of water, that competition organizers do not strive really differentiate their work? But, really, not strive for what? Apparently, for the reason that here the sphere of creativity is opened up and it is always more difficult to work creatively--it requires profoundly knowing both people and the methodology of vitalizing competition's indoctrinational capabilities. Yes, it is necessary also to demonstrate bravery in making unique decisions. That is why one often encounters a paradox: in essence, competition is vital creativity and some of its organizers count on standards. This is simpler for them. But, one cannot reconcile oneself with such a desire for "simplicity."

Competition's moral force undoubtedly also is mutually linked with the situation in which pledges are made and results summed up. I once attended a meeting where sailor's personal achievements were discussed. Everything here was jargon, down to earth, as if a statistical report was being read. But, it might have been better to create a situation of intensity when one ponders the age of our young sailors and petty officers, the role of the emotional factor when working with young people. To speak in this manner about military labor, about people, in order to stir the zealous with a good word, to wound the laggers' pride. To emphasize the moral beauty to those who give their all, helping a comrade, who suffer for the collective.

It goes without saying that we are not discussing pomposity, ostentatious fuss, but creating a good mood, so that the "start" and "finish" of rivalry, each word about sailors' labor, has the maximum indoctrinational effect.

We have a fine tradition in our fleet of making pledges in a ceremonial atmosphere. A "combat christening" ceremony is organized on long cruises and this also is linked with a report on the higher pledges achieved and accepted. There is a desire born to adopt even greater milestones and the ritual of transferring battle stations to the new replacements with the slogan "combat readiness does not transfer to the reserves." Prizes named for glorious sailors--heroes from the Great Patriotic War--have been established on several ships. Competition has also been enriched in other ways linked to the 35th anniversary of the Victory.

A movement for a worthy greeting for the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birthday is widely underway in our collectives.

Thus, pledges made have even greater moral force, they are accepted as a high moral duty, and the ordinary gives birth to great civil feelings.

Competition becoming a true school of indoctrination greatly depends on political organs and party organizations. Their task is to affirm the view in units and aboard ships, among commanders, political workers, and all communists of competition as that very vital force that does not tolerate triteness, that does not mechanically affect the results of military labor, but primarily affects peoples' consciousness and feelings and, through them, results.

The political department of the unit where officer Pekedov serves is on the proper path in this respect. At his initiative, for example, a scientific and practical conference was organized at which the effective use of competition's indoctrinational capabilities was discussed. Good feedback came from commanders, political workers, and party organization secretaries also on a seminar entitled "Moral Aspects of Competition, Its Role in Indoctrination of Sailors and In Cohesion of Collectives." A demonstration summing-up session was held on one ship to show the specific mechanism for influencing the morals of the competitors. Similar measures noticeably expand supervisors' methodological arsenal.

"Comprehensively develop social competition...," it states in the CPSU Central Committee decree on further improving ideological and political-indoctrinational work. Along with others, for us this means steadfastly improving its indoctrinational functions. Successful accomplishment of this mission will help personnel achieve new successes in combat training and further strengthen the indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Submarine Training Results

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by Engr-Sr Lt I. Mravtsev, secretary of a submarine Komsomol organization: "On the True Course"]

[Text] We returned victorious to our home base. We achieved our first success in a duel with an "enemy" surface ship and the second in a duel with a submarine.

Summing up exercise results, the captain pointed out the careful, confident activities of the torpedomen. Among those who excelled were WO V. Gar'kush and young Smn M. Gorbachenko. A communist and a Komsomol member. An experienced specialist and his ward. As the captain underscored, the reason for the success was the amalgamation of experience and youth. Subunit commanders and the party and Komsomol organizations should always remember this.

The submarine's Komsomol organization does a great deal of work in this regard, mobilizing Komsomol members for a worthy greeting to the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth and the 35th anniversary of the Victory.

Making socialist pledges for this training year, we, following the example of the initiators of the composition in the Soviet Navy--the crew of the BPK [large ASW ship] "Petropavlovsk"--placed special attention on the quest for reserves to improve combat readiness, for a growth in the sailors' political consciousness, and for the confirmation in the collective of a communist attitude toward military labor. The crew's Communists gave us a lot of support in this regard. The party organization itself had the idea of setting up aboard ship sponsorship of young sailors by experienced specialists. The first within the crew to do so was the aforementioned WO V. Gar'kush, who in a short time helped Smn M. Gorbachenko and other young torpedomen to become skilled specialists. Komsomol members Engr-Sr Lt V. Peshcherikov, Sr Smn S. Luchinin, and others followed the Communist's example.

The Komsomol committee listens to reports by its best specialists during its meetings in order to generalize the experience of their work and to make this the property of the entire young aktiv. This is primarily for young commanders, the majority of which being members of subunit Komsomol bureaus.

The activists, for example, derived many useful things from the work know-how of Engr-Sr Lt V. Peshcherikov with Engr-Lt V. Khugol'. Khugol' has been aboard the ship for just a short time and things did not go well for him at first. Possessing good theoretical knowledge, he at times was unable to put it into practice and did not always maintain contact with subordinates. If some of the experienced petty officers offered assistance, the group commander refused it. Peshcherikov helped Khugol' learn to correctly plan the work day and to concentrate his attention on the main points, as well as to trust the petty officers to accomplish missions in those cases where an officer's interference is not obligatory.

The Komsomol activists do not restrict themselves only to propaganda of progressive know-how. At Komsomol committee and bureau meetings they hear accounts by Komsomol members concerning their professional growth and their participation in the collective's social life. This approach turned out to be very effective, as is clearly apparent in the example of Capt-Lt S. Safonov and Lt V. Silkin. These officers considered that they need not be concerned about whether sailors mastered related and secondary specialties. In a friendly manner and with good intentions the officers were made to understand that a commander cannot limit himself only to his direct responsibilities, but that he must be for subordinates an example both in professional growth and in readiness where necessary to replace a co-worker. Komsomol member Engr-Sr Lt M. Zhukov succeeded in faultlessly coping with the main task and successfully passed the tests allowing him to carry out the responsibilities at a level higher than his assigned job.

The discussion at the Komsomol committee meeting helped S. Safonov and V. Silkin. Now they demonstrate more concern for improving combat proficiency and in mastery of related specialties.

The past months of the training year affirm the correctness of the course taken by the submarine's Komsomol organization. This also is backed up by the fact that Komsomol members accomplish all combat training missions with high ratings.

Cruiser Commander's Background

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Capt 2d Rank L. Buchinskiy: "The Flame of Those Campfires"]

[Text] Long blue shadows fell from the bronze trunks of the pines onto the barely noticeable path. The father walking ahead halted and took a breath. "My wound pains me."

Long ago he had promised to show his son the partisan dugout, the pine under which the child had been born in 1943, the chance had never come before. But, finally, here they were

"The dugout has disappeared," the father sighed. "But the pine tree? Yes, there it is over there," he softly stroked the rough bark with his knotted palm.

They sat by a campfire the father had built with ancient efficiency, drank tea from a small bowl, and talked. When the campfire blazed up and sparks flew everywhere, Mikhail moved back and stared with concentration first into the fire, then at his father. Suddenly it seemed to him that the flame of these partisan campfires singed him. Maybe due to the fact that he writes poems and that image, given birth to here involuntarily, already occupied his imagination.

Mikhail was moved. His father, who looked at him furtively, noted this. The scar on his son's right cheek was from a shrapnel wound during his childhood and, at that moment, it seemed to him deeper than it was in reality. "Well, you lived through it, and look at the type of person you became. The captain of a cruiser!"

Capt 2d Rank M. Kulak was assigned as captain of the cruiser "Leningrad" a little more than a year ago. Despite his youth, he was already seasoned by the sea and by service as an officer. He began as a group commander on the cruiser "Mikail Kutuzov," headed a department on the destroyer "Plamennyy," and commanded the destroyer "Naporistyy" and the large ASW ship "Soobrazitel'nyy."

The crew of the "Leningrad" greeted with approval the news of the assignment of "their own" executive officer as captain. Nor did Mikhail Georgiyevich hide his satisfaction. He knew the ship well.

In August 1971 Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, along with the leaders of fraternal communist and workers' parties, visited the "Leningrad." Every sailor begins his service by reading the cruiser's history. Mikhail Georgiyevich also again with emotion read the note in the distinguished visitors book--replacements had joined the crew and he was preparing to chat with them.

"Dear friends, sailors of the ASW cruiser "Leningrad!"

"We sincerely greet you and, through you, all sailors, petty officers, officers, and admirals of the glorious Red Banner Black Sea Fleet.

"Familiarization with you and with the modern combat equipment which you are skillfully mastering for us was new confirmation that the Soviet Navy is a stable and reliable component of the mighty shield which protects the peaceful labor of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist fraternity."

Putting the book down, the young commander ruminated over these words and more sharply than before, when he served as executive officer, he understood how much these words encompassed.

He shared the staff's point of view that the crew "guarantees mission accomplishment." This, of course, is good. But, can we be content with this? Some people make a living on past deeds. That is no good...

He put forth all his skill in the training engagement with the submarine. An ASW officer since he was a lieutenant, Kulak had never experienced such satisfaction from the search as was now the case. Certainly none of the other ships on which he had served earlier had such varied equipment. The scale of the work imbued Mikhail Georgiyevich with inspiration and energy.

But, the attack for which he had so energetically prepared did not come off. Capt-Lt V. Dolgin, commander of BCh-3 who had appeared on the bridge, reported the delay carelessly.

"That's strange. There is a delay, but there are not guilty parties," Kulak took measured steps along the bridge. "Did you yourself check the equipment prior to the attack?"

"The team leader made the check."

It turned out that the team leader in turn was counting on the section commander.

The commander with concern discussed this episode at a meeting of the officers and at the party meeting. The meeting supported him. Then Volgin was offended...

Over the years he had taken things one at a time. Only when he had finished one thing did he turn to the next. Now he placed supervision and checking on execution as his foundation. Issuing dozens of orders each day, the commander thought about each one, required a careful briefing on what had been done, looked into the quality, looked to see what initiative had been demonstrated.

He possibly was a bit more demanding on Volgin than on the others and he alarmed him more often. Volgin overcame the shame. He then expressed the desire to again accomplish the lesson.

"I will give the inputs unannounced just as if you had no knowledge of them beforehand," said the unit commander to Kulak, when the latter reported Volgin's suggestion. "I alone and personally will check you."

He kept his word. But, Volgin did not panic. By the way, the entire crew, thus the commander also, received the highest rating.

But, not all high ratings are identical. Let's say that the missilemen accomplished preparatory fire. Department commander Capt 2d Rank V. Marchenko evaluated it as excellent. Kulak approved this evaluation with the utmost reluctance. He himself by specialty is a missileman and could not help but notice several deficiencies. But, he assumed that the high rating would inspire the sailors prior to the firing for record. However, Marchenko and the other sailors in BCh-2 looked upon the high rating not as an advance, but as regular faultless achievement. There was nothing said in the critique about the deficiencies and there was bragging in the combat leaflets.

Soon the missilemen had to accomplish the firing for record. The combat practice session was accomplished but, during it, Marchenko and his subordinates made grave errors and then tried to justify them as being caused by the features of the equipment. Capt 2d Rank Kulak was really sorry then that he had approved the high rating for the first firing. The lesson was evident: it is no simple matter to develop a psychology of self confidence and it is not easy to develop in each individual a sense of dissatisfaction with what has been accomplished. But, there is no movement forward without this...

For a long time there has not been such strict critiques as the one following the firing for record. And, as before Kulak does not permit himself to let down when the discussion concerns evaluations and he completely rejected the practice of "advances." Capt 2d Rank V. Marchenko lived through the difficult lesson.

Then came a long cruise in the Mediterranean Sea. ...Helicopters returned to the deck after searching for the "enemy."

"They are making good landings," aviation officer N. Akif'yev noted.

"But I am still interested in what they are bringing back," Mikhail Georgiyevich Kulak smiled fixedly. "Let's analyze what causes a difference in the data collected by those aboard the helicopters and by the shipboard sonarmen."

The analysis moved them to change the training methodology for aviators and sonarmen. The search for submerged targets became more effective. However, the cruiser captain went further.

"Not all the helicopter pilots operate in the air with the same care," he pointed out to Akif'yev, "but, you evaluate their work in the standard way."

"I would like to, but there is no flight recorder data," Akif'yev answered. "The sea is not an airfield."

"Let's try to use the ship's radar for this."

They tried and it worked. But, Kulak was attracted by a new idea. He ruminated over how to expand the coverage of one station. Along with Capt-Lt S. Ivashchenko, a fine electronics specialist, they conducted an analysis, made computations, then made some tests. The idea which had recently seemed unrealistic found confirmation through practice.

Later on, after the cruise, I listened to a chat between Kulak and Ivashchenko.

"You have the gift of a researcher, Stanislav Grigor'yevich. The fleet needs such officers very much," said Kulak, as he promoted Ivashchenko.

When the door closed behind the officers, a telephone rang in the cabin. Mikhail Georgiyevich became excited:

"That makes 33 officers that you've taken from the cruiser in a year. A promotion is naturally a good thing. I understand this. But what am I supposed to do?"

He replaced the phone and moved about the cabin:

"That was the unit commander. He became angry: One shouldn't throw up one's hands. One should be proud. The teacher is graded by the results achieved by his students."

Later I heard the captain's tale about the cruise in the Mediterranean and visibly imagined how he searched and found what still needed to be improved on the ship, and he did this enthusiastically, with the efficiency of a person confident that he is right, with the enthusiasm of a communist, not always pondering, more correctly almost without pondering how they would evaluate his first independent long cruise. He simply lived his own natural life, the one with which he had become accustomed throughout the years. It was up to others to evaluate, to compare, who decided that the cruise went well and the cruiser "Leningrad" is the best among the ships of that type in the fleet.

Soon after the cruise the father came to visit the officer. They walked for a long time through the city, then stopped by the memorial. The father and son silently looked at the tall, unfading petal of the Eternal Flame and thought about the fact that everything that they did and are doing in their lives are reflected in this unquenchable flame that never dies.

Criticism: Follow-Up Report

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Apr 80 p 2

[Unattributed: "Our Ship is Insignificant"]

[Text] A report with the above headline by Capt 2d Rank L. Buchinskiy, concerning shortcomings in the organization of officer competition on ship "X," was printed on 24 November 1979.

According to a report from the chief of the political department to the editorial board, the article was discussed with officers from the political department and the unit staff, with ship captains and political workers, as well as by the party meeting aboard the ship about which the article was written. Measures have been taken to increase the visibility of the competition and objectivity when summing up its results. The captain of the ship Capt 3rd Rank O. Shashkov and political worker Capt 3rd Rank I. Kovalenko have been censured for lack of demandingness in questions of competition organization.

Lt V. Kozulin, who failed to accomplish socialist pledges in full value, had a hearing before the Komsomol committee. The first course mission by the ship was accomplished with a good evaluation.

Publishing this response, the editorial board considers it necessary to point out that it arrived late and only after many reminders addressed to the fleet political directorate. One would assume that the fleet political directorate and staff will express its reproach to the responsible persons who did not react in a timely manner to criticism in the press.

Leningrad Naval Library

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Apr 80 p 4

[Article by Capt 1st Rank (Res) V. Kukel'skiy: "The Oldest Naval Library"]

[Text] The Central Naval Library should be added to the list of well-known naval institutions for which Leningrad is so renowned. The beautiful building of the Inzhenernyy Zamok, where it is located, is known to all who are involved with the navy for naval science.

The TsVMB (Central Naval Library), 175 years old, helps the fleet. Not just naval books are preserved here. Here they propagandize everything good and progressive, assisting in accomplishing the mission of increasing combat readiness and the ideological-political, military, and moral indoctrination of sailors. Great attention is paid to bibliographic development of the Leninist ideological-theoretical military heritage and to the decisions and documents of the CPSU.

The high ceilings in the Inzhenernyy Zamok, the beautiful ash shelves to hold the books by Gambs, the comfortable reader hall, naval attributes... In the galleries of shelves ancient volumes in leather bindings are visible through the windows. You preserve such a large volume reverently. The most modern books on various aspects of naval knowledge, the latest scientific and technical innovations, fundamental works on military indoctrination, psychology, and pedagogy are in other halls.

There were 134 works, of which only 37 in Russian, in the library's initial fund. Soon it was significantly enlarged through purchase of the scientific libraries from individuals. Some 31,000 volumes of various books were acquired for 15,000 rubles. After 40 years the library was transferred to the Hydrographic Department. Prior to 1917, with short intervals, it remained under this department.

Despite the fact the library was sufficiently known, strict rules "protected" the books from shipboard officers. This led to many a paradox. Capt 1st Rank A. Mozhayskiy, the designer of the world's first airplane, was unable without special permission to have access to his own albums which were stored on the library's shelves. Many thousands of volumes in essence were intended for a small group of admirals and officers.

Great October blew away the doors of the oldest naval library. Red sailors, participants in the Civil War and the revolution, appeared in the readers' halls.

The command decided to evacuate library workers early in the Great Patriotic War due to the direct threat to Leningrad. They reached Ul'yanovsk, where several VMF [Navy] rear service units and institutions were located. The libary retained its ties with the fleet. Various reports were prepared for the operating fleets and flotillas and for the central institutions, bibliographic work was done, and reference books and instructions were published jointly with Voyenmorizdat [Naval Publishing House].

The entire invaluable fund remained in blockaded Leningrad under the supervision of scientific worker S. Kazais. It was preserved.

The transfer of the library in 1957 to the Inzhenernyy Zamok coincided with the remarkable changes that took place in our Soviet Navy. The navy became a nuclear missile, ocean navy. The Central Naval Library became the conduit of new ideas in the fleet and assists in the mastery of the most complicated equipment and in the indoctrination of personnel. A scientifically-substantiated thematic plan for supporting the book funds was compiled for this purpose and such thematic listings as "Fleet, Missile and Artillery Equipment" and "Radioelectronics in the VMF" serve the same purposes.

Visitors with interest familiarized themselves with naval book exhibits. Just recently two exhibits were held dedicated to volumes from the 1920's, including editions of the works of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin which were published during our lifetime.

The TsVMB helps naval institutions. Developed within its walls are methods aids for all naval libraries right down to the ship level. The most experienced TsVMB workers systematically travel to the fleets.

The small editorial and publishing section is operating successfully. The number of readers also is growing. More and more naval officers are using the library's services even though many serve far from Leningrad. Approximately 1,000,000 books from the library's fund are at their service.

The Central Naval Library has begun the 176th year of its "cruise."

Northern Fleet Commander on Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Adm V. Chernavin, commander of the Red Banner Northern Fleet: "The Report Following A Cruise"]

[Text] Capt 2d Rank V. Pichurin, ship captain, presented a report on his activities upon return from a long ocean cruise. From the report it followed that, overall, the ship had successfully accomplished the cruise missions. Also, the captain had reasons to self-critically analyze his decisions and the work of the ship's battle crew during one cruise episode, when improper actions were taken that almost neutralized efforts made to remain covert.

Unfortunately, the young captain did not demonstrate the ability of self-criticism. The account reeked of self-satisfaction. It was clear that the ocean school's lessons were not fully contemplated. Prior to reaching my desk, the report had gone through channels, where conclusions could have and should have been made on the areas where the author turned out to be lacking. However, conclusions made by the corresponding levels had a breath of tranquillity about them. Apparently, there was a reluctance to place too much attention on the shortcomings of what, overall, was a successful cruise. But, this lack of demandingness itself is a manifestation of something besides a lack of self-criticism on the part of one ship captain.

The 25th CPSU Congress generated a requirement in the command and control field for a Leninist style of work in all links which assume high demandingness upon oneself and upon others and excludes self-satisfaction. The party requirement fully and completely is applicable to the activities of military cadres. The captain, being responsible for all political and military matters, is obliged to accomplish this mission, depending upon staffs and services and ensuring that any manifestations of formalism, any attempts to go against the interests of the cause, are evaluated by the party.

Stemming from this, it is easy to guess the subsequent fate of the report about the cruise. A conclusion was made based upon it that riveted attention on the indecisive actions of the captain, his far from complete use of the equipment available to him. This cruise, commented upon in detail by the fleet staff, was studied in the units by ship captains. Analysis of accounts by other ship captains, who subsequently found themselves in circumstances similar to those encountered by Capt 2d Rank Pichurin, showed that all of this work had a positive effect.

Just as no two ocean cruises are identical, no two reports by ship captains following a cruise are identical. If you take everything in totality, the picture of ship activities on the world ocean will be presented fully, almost exhaustively. Based on this information, the fleet staff and commander can analyze each cruise in isolation, identify problems requiring greater attention, bring things to light, and see that leading know-how is disseminated.

But, the usefulness factor of any briefing depends upon how fully each of the parties--the one giving the briefing and the one analyzing its content--understand their tasks.

It is logical to look at this first from the standpoint of the compiler. Accounts of experimental cruises and initial cruises by ships of new types and designs are a special group. The information contained therein is often unique. It suffices to recall such cruises as those of the first nuclear submarines under the Polar icecap or the round-the-world cruise by a detachment of Soviet nuclear vessels in 1966. Vital information was obtained on navigational conditions in new expanses of the ocean, navigational gear was tested, and answers were obtained on questions of supporting crew activities.

The significance of such cruises is so great that, as a rule, ship captains brief the results directly to the fleet commander or to the comander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy. All the same, a personal briefing cannot replace a weighed and thoughtful written account. It is no exageration to say that these accounts mark the boundaries of yesterday's daily activities of fleet forces and will become the documents for the chronicles of its history. I want to underscore that such reports form the beginning of new tactics, which ship captains and the fleet commander must assimilate and ponder.

In this regard, the account given by Capt 1st Rank V. Pykov, captain of the ASW cruiser "Kiev" when he returned from his first independent cruise, pleased me greatly.

The quest for ways to better accomplish training missions, which continues aboard "Kiev," manifests itself in the formulas of evaluations, recommendations, and proposals, which arise there at the various levels of the command and control of fleet resources. Along with this, I note that this exploration aboard "Kiev" is of interest not only to ships of this class. In certain spheres, it operates to further improve surface ship and carrier-based aviation combat training on a fleet-wide scale.

Let's say that, for a long time, there has been the problem of how to support ships located far from port and from well-equipped ranges and targets, without which a certain amount of simulation is inevitable when carrying out practice firing sessions. On a long cruise, those aboard "Kiev" built and operated an orginal towed target simple in construction, compact, and cheap. It is of certain interest for use by the majority of surface ships on ocean cruises.

The "descendents," rather than the lead ships of new types and designs, make up the greater share of the ships in any fleet. Their commanders were not destined for the glory of the discoverers and pathfinders. What is then left--copying proven models? I am deeply convinced that this is not the answer. To be more accurate, that is the fate of captains who obviously avoid exploration and creativity. To paraphrase a famous saying, one could say that there is always a place in life for exploration, innovation, and initiative. The problem is to demonstrate these qualities through deeds, to seek and explore, sometimes taking a calculated risk. And, this effort in scope is no less important than mastery of the most modern ships. Experience shows that what is required is great labor by the crew to develop fully the combat capabilities even of series-produced vessels. And, you consider that combat readiness of formations and of the fleet as a whole consists of the combat readiness in the main of series-produced vessels, then it will become clear that it is difficult to overestimate the creative work of the personnel aboard all the fleet's ships.

It is not so rare to find, being prepared and bouncing around through channels, reports written by ship captains, so to speak, without a hitch, not even containing a grain of new information, not elevating any problems at all, not proposing any new decisions. How do you explain this? In a majority of instances, a captain preparing such an account presents grounds for critical analysis and thought.

One would think that the reasons are to be found primarily in the style of working with ship captains in units and formations. Since the atmosphere which exists and is maintained there is favorable for ship captains to express their opinions on important, sometimes controversial, problems of combat training and socialist competition, a diluted account only can emerge as an exception. Much more often the accounts contain valuable know-how, which requires immediate analysis and the most rapid dissemination. This is fully applicable, let's say, to the know-how of the nuclear vessel "60 let Velikogo Oktyabrya," the initiator of socialist competition in the Soviet Navy during the last training year. It is characteristic of the nuclear missile-equipped ship's captain, Rear Adm V. Naumov, to seek effective ways to train the ship's battle crew and to organize competition creatively for the crew. His account of the autonomous cruise, accomplished with an excellent rating by the crew, contained his conclusions and recommendations on these and on other equally important problems. Such know-how needs reasoned implementation.

Strictly speaking, already we are talking about the second part of the problem presented above. Specifically, about the command and control organs' understanding of their specific tasks. What is our know-how and what unsolved problems remain in this area?

Any long cruise and the corresponding future report on its results begin with fundamental cruise preparations. No ship can put out to sea unless the staffs at various levels, including the fleet staff, are firmly convinced that the crew is prepared to accomplish the assigned missions.

This is how it has been everywhere for a long time. However, until relatively recently, the check on a captain's preparedness for an independent cruise was made predominately by unit and formation staffs. Several years ago, the decision was made more fully to employ for these purposes the know-how of fleet staff officers, who possess, as a rule, higher qualifications. Now, this has become the norm: prior to the cruise, the ship captain visits the fleet staff, where he works with officers from different sections and directorates.

What does this accomplish? The ship captain has no remaining unclear areas concerning navigation, communications, organization of combat training on the cruise, and the goals and missions of his cruise. In turn, the fleet staff has a sufficiently complete idea of the given captain's level of preparedness. Also, the requisite understanding of command and control emerges.

A simple example will demonstrate how important this mutual understanding is for reliable command and control. A submarine captain was sent a radio message. During the next scheduled message exchange, the ship captain reported his vessel's coordinates. It became clear after they were plotted that the message had been dispatched prematurely. The reason for the error was discovered immediately. One fleet staff officer had not considered the latest correction in the vessel's movements. The ship captain understood this and, through his report, provided an opportunity for the error to be corrected. It goes without saying that this is an isolated example. But, a very detailed critique was held on this by the fleet staff with conclusions made for the future.

What reserves do we possess to further increase the effectiveness of ocean cruises? It is very important to study reports and accounts with captains. In some places, such documents are put in safes, do not see the light of day for months, and are of no use. But, they are valuable property which must be continually "operative."

A person would think that one approach could be avoidance of triteness in pre-cruise instructions. When one is sure that a captain has assimilated the guidance and regulatory documents, there is reason to go further. Perhaps the captain has the concept of an original tactical procedure, which he has not yet had a chance to test or has not yet decided to test? Maybe there are proposals to improve battle crew training? There can be many questions. It is desirable for them to be discussed, rather than subsumed within captains' fears that higher headquarters would not understand... They will understand! And, if there is a reason and a capability, higher headquarters will approve a test at sea and everything that has a rational foundation.

Initiative must come from both parties. Then a ship captain, upon return from a long cruise, will have both interesting material and the drive to see that the section on conclusions and proposals does not simply boil down to a recitation of the positive results of the cruise, but will be constructive, creative, and will contain elements for development in subsequent cruises.

On the Submarine 'Leninets'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Capt 3rd Rank S. Bystrov: "The Nuclear Vessel 'Leninets'"]

[Text] The dark water behind the nuclear submarine's sail foamed like white surf. The "Leninets"--a nuclear missile submarine well known in the fleet--put out to sea.

A photo already touched by time hangs in the crew's barracks. At a table are Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev and Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin; tight rows of sailors stand next to it. (The photo was taken when party and governmental leaders visited ships of the Red Banner Northern Fleet).

Now aboard the ship only veteran WO Yevgeniy Gurin knows about this visit first-hand, rather than from books and newspapers. At that time, the draftee decided to link his life to the motherland's powerful nuclear fleet. A pleasant cruise awaited the ship aboard which he remained. It was not easy, but the crew grew and matured year after year.

The crew considers the day the ship was awarded the name "Leninets" as its second birth. The ship's personnel then had achieved great successes in socialist competition, had catapulted the submarine into the ranks of the fleet's best, and had won the Testimonial for the Leninist jubilee. Many submariners had received awards for great successes in combat and political training and the captain, Capt 1st Rank Berezovskiy, became a Hero of the Soviet Union.

The achievements of the "Leninist" crew in combat training during peacetime placed the ship on an equal footing with L-class submarines like "Leninets"--renowned for the selfless struggle against the enemy during the Great Patriot War. On 24 September 1942 the L-20, the lead boat in a new series of the "Leninets" class, joined the inventory. In just several months, the crew achieved its first victories over the enemy. On 1 February 1943 the L-20, with Capt 3rd Rank V. Tamman as its captain, with one torpedo volley sunk the transport "Ditmarshen" [phonetic] and a patrol boat.

"Our submarine was awarded Lenin's name," PO2 Udovikhin and Sr Smn Komarov wrote in January 1944 in the North Sea sailors' newspaper, "And with pride we call ourselves the troops from the 'Leninets'... The entire fleet knows how 13 of our comrades in a compartment flooded with icy water for more than 10 hours defended the life of the personnel and the ship. The pressure was unbelievably great, but the submariners held it off, they did not give up...."

The sailors aboard "Leninets" are distinguished by this same pride in the name of their ship and by their readiness to accomplish their missions for the motherland.

Now, on the eve of the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birthday, the crew is at a new high. The last missile firings, the last long cruise, the last mission at sea accomplished by "Leninets" were evaluated as excellent.

During the period the nuclear vessel has borne the name of Lenin, the crew has experienced a gradual turnover. But, those who have come in to replace the veterans have been imbued with a sense of responsibility for the ship's honor and name. Lt Slesarev, for example, in the initial years did so well that he was soon assigned as a department commander. (The first commander of this department was awarded the Order of Lenin for combat training successes). Officer Slesarev, a master of military affairs, is now one of the unit's best specialists.

For Capt 2d Rank Miropol'skiy, the new deputy for political affairs, this was the first time on a long cruise aboard "Leninets." But, he fitted in well quickly with the crew and the ship, with its present and with its past. Now, Miropol'skiy with great enthusiasm studies the ship's history and strives to generalize everything good that has been achieved by its sailors.

On the last cruise, the submarine crew, at the initiative of the combat shift headed by Officer Slesarev, took up the "True to Lenin's Behests" shock watch. The submariners strived to use as effectively as possible the time on the cruise to improve the ship's combat readiness and achieve new competition successes. A contest of the month was held at sea on ship survivability. The contest ended with a damage control relay race. It was held by compartments and elicited great interest. The victors were sailors from the compartment headed by communist officer Spiridonov and the entire crew celebrated.

Competition for the right to be designated the followers of specialists from the war years was held aboard the ship during cruises. The competition always was vigorous and of high competitive incandescence. This time, Capt 2d Rank Miropol'skiy recommended inclusion of the names of the best specialists from the post-war years along with the front-line heroes. This would include such individuals as Cavalier of the Order of the Red Star enginemen Sr Smn Zadorozhnyy and "Leninets" former boatswain mate WO Pogorel'tsev. The submariners enthusiastically accepted this proposal. The continuity of the generations of "Leninets" sailors found practical embodiment, which facilitated strengthening of traditions and development of a sense of pride in one's ship. On 21 April, the decorative flags brightly and festively will be raised above the nuclear ship's impressively calm hull with its powerful lines, built according to the laws for conquering the sea. At that ceremonial moment, "Leninets" again will report its readiness to carry out any of the motherland's orders. For its entire life since the flag of the Soviet Navy was raised aboard her, the ship has had a single, lofty goal--to preserve the peace and security of its native land, of our people, who are confidently building communism under the banner and in the name of Il'ich.

Criticism: Follow-Up Report

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Apr 80 p 2

[Unattributed: "Coordinates of Glory"]

[Text] Rear Adm I. Petrov's article "Koordinaty slavy" ["Coordinates of Glory"] printed on 10 Feburary told of an inattentive approach to organization of the reception for the large guided-missile ship "Smelyy" after a long cruise.

According to Capt 2d Rank I. Remizov's report to the editorial board, the incident described actually occurred. The question of the moral-political and psychological training of personnel, one form of which is the ritual of seeing off and greeting ships, was discussed by the unit staff's party organization. A new ritual is being developed by the political department. At the present time, the unit commander, the chief of the political department, fleet veterans, and women's council representatives meet all ships following a long cruise.

Follow-Up Report on Criticism

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Apr 80 p 2

[Unattributed: "The Fruits of Lack of Control"]

[Text] On 6 March, correspondence with the above headline from Capt 2d Rank A. Zivdnev reported deficiencies in use of training facilities in one Pacific Fleet unit.

As Rear Adm V. Korban reported to the editorial board, the low utilization rate of training rooms is a consequence of the command's lack of demandingness on staff officers and ship captains, for which the unit chief of staff has been disciplined.

An expanded meeting of the staff and political department party bureau has been held. An exchange of know-how in conducting lessons using simulators has been organized and demonstrative measures with group leaders have been planned. The schedule for training room utilization has been put in order and the listing of lesson and practice training themes has been corrected.

On a Large ASW Ship

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Capt 3rd Rank A. Kuz'min, captain of the large ASW ship "Petropavlovsk," Red Banner Pacific Fleet: "Based on Actual Indicators"]

[Text] The large ASW ship "Petropavlovsk" was working out the combat training mission on the ocean and searched for an "enemy" submarine. It was stormy, the hydrology aided the submariners, and the "enemy" intensively employed means of countermeasures. But, the sonarmen led by Sr Lt G. Rushenko [illegible] used the capabilities of the shipboard equipment. That made it [illegible] to detect the underwater target in time.

Based on the data from the sonarmen, mine specialists and torpedo men commanded by Capt-Lt V. Kalinin inflicted an invincible combination strike on the submarine.

"Petropavlovsk"--initiator of socialist competition in the Soviet Navy--deserved an excellent rating for that exercise. Soon, the artillery men and missilemen excelled in accomplishing fire missions. The crew kept its word--preparing a worthy greeting for the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birthday, to pass ship training missions first time through with no ratings below "good," to accomplish practice fire sessions at the "good" and "excellent" level, and to creatively organize combat training and competition.

A creative approach to tasks became the norm for a majority of subunits. The important thing was for personnel initiative to be directed towards achievement of the highest combat training results. Life itself requires creative decisions from us and this finds embodiment in lessons, practical training, and exercises. On the eve of the long cruise, from which "Petropavlovsk" recently returned having undergone the ocean's test successfully, the crew had received young sailors as replacements. They had to be brought up to speed in the shortest possible time and had to be taught how to maintain equipment and weapons. And, this mission was accomplished successfully. An exchange of know-how was skillfully organized in the departments. Supplemental practical training was conducted with the novices. Masters of military affairs demonstrated the most effective inspection and adjustment methods right on the equipment.

Every sailor gave his all during the cruise. The engineering department commanded by Engr-Capt 3rd Rank V. Korneyev won first place during the critiques more than the others did. Vigilantly standing underway watches, accident-free equipment operation, conservation of engine life and POL--these competition trends became the subunit's foundation. And, this had its fruits. CPO P. Kotserev, who detected a malfunction and with the help of his comrades quickly and with high quality repaired it, for example, demonstrated vigilance on watch. There were other such examples, but the point here is not the number of examples. Figures are more eloquent than any words about the results of Capt 3rd Rank Korneyev's efforts. The department developed about 10 innovative proposals and saved about 1,000 rubles worth of fuel by the time of the Leninist jubilee. It is characteristic that full interoperability has been achieved here at half of the battle stations. Also indicative is the fact that there are no problems of combat substitution in the engineering department: many officers ahead of schedule received permission to fulfill the responsibilities of the position one level higher than that regularly assigned.

Interoperability also is being developed in other subunits. Recent artillery firing is a good example in this regard. The fire control officer was put out of action according to the input and WO Y. Trotskiy fired at the aerial target. The evaluation was "excellent."

We can continue to enumerate the successes and achievements with which "Petropavlovsk" greeted the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birthday and the 35th anniversary of the Great Victory. The overwhelming majority of crew members worked in a shock fashion and deserved high praise. But, it would be an exaggeration to say that all without exception understood the measure of their responsibility, that the crew did not avoid certain problems and difficulties, which to a known degree, held back our forward movement.

Let's say that earlier there were instances of inflated evaluations. Now, when a commander gives a subordinate a high mark, we check it exhaustively to ensure there are no irregularities. Communist Capt-Lt V. Karpenko, for instance, was called upon to explain to the party bureau some instances of inflating his subordinates' training evaluations.

The level of actual combat readiness of a subunit, of a ship as a whole, is the main criterion of the effectiveness of our efforts and the goal of our creative exploration. We strive to improve the quality of the combat training process, improving lesson and practical training organization and how they are conducted. As the last cruise demonstrates, the difficulty factor of a majority of planned forms of training grew as compared to last training year. Accomplishment of daytime norms at night, in protective clothing, and understrength--this is all worked out during practical training. And, the main thing is the know-how gained here then is used at sea, in the most complex situation when cruise difficulties must be overcome.

But, once again: even here there are large reserves which must be employed to guarantee full accomplishment of pledges this training year. The level of officer and warrant officer methodological readiness, especially that of the young ones, still lags behind the level of readiness of the best commanders. And, this leads to competition slackness during lessons and to other shortcomings in training process quality.

We accomplished our winter training period pledges. Already today, more than 70 percent of the personnel are working at the first- and second-class specialist level, every fifth warrant officer and officer maintains equipment at the level of a master of military affairs, and one-half of the sailors are mastering second and related specialties. During the summer training period, we will strive to develop our successes and avoid shortcomings.

Submarine Crew Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by Capt 1st Rank N. Remizov, Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet: "Submariners Attack"]

[Text] Escorting the submarine past the sweeps had just begun when an air raid signal was sounded.

"Emergency dive!" the captain ordered.

The crew had to make the long trip at periscope depth to the area where the missile launch was to take place. There were "mines" everywhere. Only the narrow channel, swept by the minesweepers ahead, was free of them. Special care on the part of each submariner is the order of the day. The captain is especially attentive. The navigator, Capt-Lt G. Luk'yanchev, concentrated on his adjustments to the plotted course. The combat information center crew headed by the executive officer Capt-Lt Ye. Azeyev carefully prepares data on the situation. Each recognizes that even the slightest error, an insignificant deviation from the course, in this situation can lead to destruction in the training battle. That is why the troops strive to accomplish each operation as acurately as possible, with high quality.

After the dive, master of military qualifications Engr-Capt 2d Rank Yu. Povarov trimmed the sub excellently. Another master--WO L. Shadrin, who operated the planes with a jeweler's accuracy--assisted him well in this difficult task. It seemed that the sailors had done all that they could. But, they critically evaluate their work, they seek unused reserves. And, this is the result: the ship's trim can be improved. Povarov so reports to the captain. The more precise the trim, the more reliable control of the ship, the more accurate the course maintained.

The crew is made up of many young sailors at sea for the first time. A ceremonial initiation of them as submariners is held prior to the cruise. The novices were told about the submarine's traditions and they were presented memorial identification cards. Now, regardless of how tense the exercise situation, the captain did not forget about the young sailors. Over the intercom he congratulated them on their first dive. He expressed the hope that the novices would hold up and that they would labor on a level equal to the experienced sailors. You should have seen the joyful faces of Smn M. Tolkovinskiy, N. Tsulita, and others at that moment.

The more difficult the situation at sea, the more aggressively, the more purposefully one must work with people--this became the immutable law in the collective. Competition between combat shifts is an item of special attention for the captain and the political worker. Based upon the results of the regular watch, each is evaluated. Information is passed via the intercom on who is ahead at the moment and how the pledges made for the cruise period are being accomplished.

But, the escort past the sweeps is completed. Now comes the most intense moment. Missilemen Capt-Lt V. Glotov, Lt Yu. Sinitsa, and WO A. Ufayev stand frozen at the panels in the instrument compartment. Rapidly and carefully they carry out the final preparation of the missiles for firing.

Launch success greatly depends upon the proficiency of the navigator and his subordinates, on how accurately they determine the ship's position and the other data input into the missile onboard systems. Capt-Lt G. Luk'yanchev and Lt A. A. Chernyshev proficiently calculate the submerged missile carrier's position.

...Pre-launch preparations have been completed. The command "Launch!" resounds. Seconds pass and the instruments show that the firing was a success.

It is already dusk at sea when the submarine returned to base. But, the workday was not over yet. An exercise critique was held after the submarine was moored. The flag specialist who had accompanied the submariners gave a high evaluation to their proficiency, implored them not to be content with their achievements, and reminded them of Lenin's demand to go immeasurably farther, to achieve much more. And, the discussion at the critique did not involve successes, but rather unused reserves. The sailors stated that both the covertness and the accuracy of the cruise could be improved, equipment and weapons could be employed more effectively. And, I involuntarily thought that this dissatisfaction with what had been achieved, this exacting approach to their military labor and their success, was yet another manifestation of the sailors' high responsibility towards the reliable defense of the motherland.

Submarine Commander on Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Rear Adm V. Naumov, captain of the nuclear missile submarine "60 let Velikogo Oktyabrya": "The Attack's United Breath"]

[Text] When the officer of the deck repeats the command "Missile Attack" I have just given via the ship's intercom, just like the entire crew I experience the identical feelings that engulf Soviet soldiers, regardless of their branch of troops, just prior to an attack. This is a feeling of combat enthusiasm, the powerful internal mobilization of forces, this readiness to give one's all to achieve success. And, there is one more feeling very important for every individual, especially for commanders, which carries confidence in victory--the sensation of unity of ideas and actions of all who participate in a missile attack.

There is nothing more vulnerable for a commander than, at the moment of decisive actions, to feel some sort of irregularity, to detect an incongruity, to lose trust in even a single individual.

This seemingly purely psychological concept of the "spiritual unit of the attack" is a result of training and the great, comprehensive indoctrinational work with personnel which is characteristic both for all the Armed Forces and for nuclear submariners. Young people recently out of school, who have only heard about a reactor, missiles, and remote control, are called upon to serve aboard nuclear boats. But, soon they will become direct participants in the most responsible action aboard the ship--the missile attack. And, one can indubitably state that faultless coordination within the crew at that most critical and responsible moment depends upon how effectively indoctrination of the young sailors and their training as military professionals were conducted, to what degree for them the ship became a school of life, a school of combat.

As I became an established nuclear missile submarine captain, the problem of crew teamwork, primarily the teamwork of the ship's battle crew (KBR), was a problem that continually plagued me. I also strived to direct the attention of my closest advisers to this very problem--the matter most important for us missile submariners. The first training attack demonstrated that we operated in the correct manner. It is possible to translate this spirit but, at that very time, the most important, if you will, indicator of a ship's combat readiness--the stability of its successes--began to bother me.

The readiness of a crew for successful combat actions in any situation is determined by its level of training and by high moral-political qualities. But, this readiness cannot have a final character, i.e., personnel achieve a particular level and become inaccessible. A rival in competition and moreover in combat will always strive to surpass, to achieve a higher level of perfection. Therefore, even when it seems that all capabilities for improving proficiency have been exhausted, all the same there still is room for exploration.

This episode occurred on one of our cruises. Lt V. Volin was subjected to sharp criticism by his comrades. Why? It seems that not long before, having demonstrated that he was a capable and skilled specialist, he had been promoted. Now he was accused of laxity and a lackadaisical attitude towards service and social matters. It turns out that Volin had overestimated his initial success. Now he could do anything, everything was accessible to him, the road to being department commander was open to him, interest in further serious and intense labor was gone.

What is unusual about all that? A young man's characteristic overestimation of his personal qualities. What lieutenant doesn't want to be a big wheel? But, the fact is that mistakes by lieutenants are notable for being patently evident and they are not difficult to correct. And, when one encounters the new, the unexplored mistakes--it is not simply novices that stumble and make "lieutenant" mistakes. That is why we should not chalk Volin's errors up to age. They also manifest themselves in more mature people who find themselves in special circumstances. For example, when past successes keep one from seeing new goals, when the inability to bring to light capabilities for further growth in proficiency destroys interest in steady daily labor. One should always be aware of this. It is professionally important for all who have been entrusted with weapons for defense of the motherland to prevent lapses in all links, to mobilize oneself to show initiative for a creative search for unused capabilities, to strive to look ahead to the attack that is yet to come.

For several years our crew continually has successfully accomplished combat training missions. Practically speaking, accomplishing missile firings with an excellent rating has become the norm for our personnel. Our ship was admitted to the competitive missile firings for the Navy prize and it won. I must say straight out that such a success can show mastery at a level which it will be difficult to surpass. But, it was right then that the crew, and primarily its officer backbone, decided to achieve not only quantitative indicators. Life, the desire not to stand still, set a new goal--to achieve qualitative changes in the ship's combat readiness: a reduction in the period of time required to get the submarine combat ready.

This problem has its characteristic features for a nuclear missile submarine. Its solution requires practical training very close in nature to actual firings. However, when operating with simulators, where one can model situations that can't be recreated in actuality, one suddenly encounters weak points, lack of preparedness for the numerous complex loads and the valuable time required to hone tactical proficiency sometimes is expended to develop primary practical skills that are lacking. It is only then that many specialists get a graphic idea of their skill and this arouses in them concern for the state of their combat readiness and that of the subunits.

How do you arouse this concern that the shortcomings and errors will become actual fact?

The know-how of other ships interested us primarily because one cannot say something new without having studied everything instructive and progressive already given birth to and assimilated.

The merits of every ship today are collective merits based upon the progressive achievements of many crews of formations, and of the fleet. The collection, the implementation, within oneself of everything that makes others strong allowed us to strengthen, to develop success. After the Navy prize firing competition we, first, studied our rival's strong and weak points and, second, gathered up all the nuggets and assimilated the combat training forms and methods of neighboring collectives.

Striving to qualitatively improve the ship's combat readiness, we strived not simply to increase the number of masters of military affairs and of first-class specialists, but to expand the horizons of their professional erudition. To know, to be able to do more than the functional responsibilities require provided a theme for new practical training and renewed sailors' interest in it. Also, we began more widely to use the interoperability of related specialties during lessons and practical training, especially among officers on the KBR. It goes without saying that achievement of improvement in interoperability on a large scale is not realistic, but the mutual understanding among various specialists as a result of such practical training improved significantly. And, the fact that we again were successful in the Navy prize competition missile firing undoubtedly resulted from the practice of conducting practical training using this new method.

There is one other special feature of a submarine missile attack. One must surmount the powerful and multifaceted countermeasures of the opposing side designed to hinder the missile firing. Therefore, the captain and crew must be tactically trained for covert actions. However, a missile carrier must also be a good submarine capable when required of defending itself reliably. That is why we began to consider reduction in preparing the submarine for a torpedo firing in a one-on-one situation as a vital factor in reducing the time required to make the boat combat ready. This seemed impossible. But, if such a sensation arises, one need only find, as was done during the war years, unusual, innovative ways to accomplish the mission. Capt-Lt Nikolay Sakerin once suggested such an approach. The entire crew was enthralled. And, the first attempts in the torpedo attack training room and then at sea brought excellent results.

Working out the firing in one-on-one situations under supervision of the officers of the deck became a new step in the development of this innovation. This was especially useful because the officers of the deck, sensing the full scope of the responsibilities placed upon them by the Shipboard Regulations, noted the requirement to test themselves in the role of the navigator, officer operator, and other KBR members.

A moral climate, mutual understanding, and psychological compatibility--without this there can be no real firm KBR successes, no successes by the entire crew. I have commanded ships for 9 years and have encountered no problem more difficult. Especially great here is the role of purposeful indoctrinational work with personnel. A real combat collective is a united organism and the higher its unity, cohesion, and monolithic character, the more missions it will have to its credit. A real crew is one that thinks like its captain, that sets about its business like the captain does, full trust among each of the members rules in it, and each senses the responsibility for himself and for his comrades. In this regard, Capt 2d Rank A. Aleshkin, the deputy for political affairs, and I always had a united opinion and we implemented it. A high point, a temporary success, are easily achieved, but true, reliable achievements accrue in those cases when indoctrinational work to rally the crew is underway continually, when there is a unity of word and deed, mutual respect and trust, a party, principled demandingness on one another.

Recently, our missile carrier, last year's initiator of competition in the Soviet Navy and which accomplished the socialist pledges made, was inscribed on the Board of Honor of the progressive units and ships by order of the USSR Minister of Defense. This imposes many obligations on us. Ahead lie the next scheduled missile firings. When and how soon this new missile attack would be is unimportant to the crew. It is important that each man aboard the ship understand that he must prepare for it steadily, creatively. Only then can one count on the attack's united breath, on success.

Criticism: Follow-Up Report

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Apr 80 p 2

[Unattributed: "The 'Supporters' Are Replacing the CPOs"]

[Text] According to Rear Adm A. Korniyenko, first deputy chief of the Baltic Fleet Political Directorate, the correspondence from WO G. Trunov published with the above headline on 14 March was discussed at a meeting of unit commanders and political workers and at a meeting of officers and warrant officers. Daily supervision of how the daily regimen is accomplished by specially designated officers and warrant officers and duty in the living quarters of the personnel have been changed. Measures have been developed to improve the organization of the daily routine.

7869
CSO: 1801

EDITOR'S MAILBAG: MONTHLY MAIL REVIEWED

Mail Received in March

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Apr 80 p 2

[Text] In March 1980 the editor received 23,895 letters from readers. Of these, 527 were published. There were 12,219 responses to articles published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

Two noteworthy dates are approaching--the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth, and the 35th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's March mail describes the way our people and their armed forces are preparing to commemorate these events.

"The great Lenin," wrote Private A. Lashta, "commanded that we learn military affairs well. We remember the leader's commandment, and we are fulfilling it. Every soldier of our battery takes the war heroes as his example, and tries to distinguish himself in socialist competition, and to complete the most complex tasks with high quality."

Many other letters mirror the lines of Private Lashta. Describing military labor of personnel in the subunits and units the authors of these letters report the successes being achieved by the soldiers. "Our construction company," reads a letter from Warrant Officer M. Mikhaylov, "recently completed the last phase of the Lenin Examination. It went satisfactorily. This is confirmed by the production indicators--the plan was 145 percent completed. Discipline and organization have risen in the company. A good foundation for work on subsequent tasks has been built!"

Warrant Officer V. Grebenkin tells us how military railroaders are preparing for the All-Union Communist Subbotnik. On the initiative of the communists, it has become the tradition here to organize trips to the Moscow Sorting Depot at the eve of a Subbotnik. Such a trip was made this week. After visiting the homeland of the Great Beginning, the soldiers decided to work hard on the Subbotnik.

As always, war veterans wrote many letters. Recollections of battles and campaigns, and stories about their life, labor, and public work in our days are the topics of their articles and notes. There are also many letters expressing deep gratefulness to the party and government for their fatherly concern for the participants of the Great Patriotic War. Major (Reserve) I. Ovcharenko expressed the thoughts and hopes of the veterans well.

"The Soviet Motherland," he writes, "never forgets about its defenders. We were decorated with high government awards for heroism in combat. After the war, we felt the fatherly concern of the socialist state more and more with every year. And now we are greeted by joyous news. The Communist Party and the Soviet government have adopted the decree 'On Additional Measures to Improve the Material and Personal Conditions of Participants of the Great Patriotic War.' A heartfelt thank-you! My comrades and I highly value the attention with which we are surrounded in our labor collective."

It is with a feeling of gratefulness that disabled veteran of the Great Patriotic War S. Galegov from Ordzhonikidze writes about the sympathy expressed toward war veterans by the directors of local organs. "All combat veterans," he communicates, "have been provided with fully equipped apartments in our city."

Unfortunately the March mail contains alarm signals as well. It has now been a year that war participant Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) V. Frolov has been appealing to various levels of authority to fix the leak in the roof of his home. But instead of help, he has been receiving nothing but lip service, such as that in the form letter sent by the rayon acting chief of the billeting operation unit Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel Shaykov, who made the excuse that the housing and administration does not have a roofer.

Colonel (Reserve) V. Palekha expresses the bitterness of insult to the executive committee of Shevchenkovskiy Rayon in Kiev. The institute in which he works decided to improve his housing conditions, but the executive committee rejected the proposition on the excuse that "he is not a veteran of the institute." But after all, Comrade Palekha is a veteran of the armed forces, and a participant of the war.

A letter written by N. Kuznetsov in Moscow expresses valid concern in connection with the impermissibly slow construction of a multiple-profile hospital in the town of Kryukovo, Moscow Oblast. No matter what authorities were notified of the problem, no major changes have occurred. "It took 3 years," the author writes, "to select the lot, to plan the hospital, and to achieve coordination. When construction finally did begin, the schedule could never be met. And last year the construction plan was completed by only 65 percent."

Concern for war veterans is a matter of the entire nation. And we must try to see that not a single participant of the war would go without attention.

To improve work with letters means to constantly comply with all requirements implied by Lenin's principle of an attentive and tactful attitude toward people, toward their needs, and toward their demands.

Mail Received in April

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Apr 80 p 2

> [Text] In April 1980 the editorial board received 30,245 letters from readers. Of these, 547 were published. There were 16,510 responses to articles published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

It was in a situation of great enthusiasm in labor and politics that our people and their armed forces celebrated the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth. The April mail extensively reflected this noteworthy event. Turning their thoughts to Il'ich, the authors of many letters to the editor make mention of the unfathomable needs Soviet soldiers have for learning as much as they can about the life of the leader, to meet with those who had the fortune of seeing Lenin, and to fulfill his assignments. "In the days of preparation for and celebration of the jubilee, our unit conducted Lenin lessons and Lenin readings," communicates Engineer-Major V. Mozhayev from the Moscow Military District. "In April, many soldiers visited the V. I. Lenin Museum and Mausoleum, and they visited the Lenin Hills. Our visit with Vladimir Il'ich's nephew--Victor Dmitrivevich Ul'yanov--left an indelible trace in our memory. The meeting was short, but it raised the spirits of all. Returning to their unit, the soldiers vowed, as if making a promise to the great Lenin directly, to study military affairs further."

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers describe the enthusiasm with which army and navy soldiers participated in the socialist competition for an honorable welcome for the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth. Many units and ships successfully completed their winter training period, fulfilling all of the training plans and programs, and satisfying their socialist pledges. Captain A. Toloknov of the Kiev Military District relates, for example, that the unit in which he serves participated in a missile launching practice on the eve of the Lenin jubilee. All missile launches received a grade of excellent. Officers N. Grabovskiy, A. Afanas'yev, R. Maykovets, S. Kunda, and others demonstrated high tactical, technical, and fire control skills.

Letters written during tactical exercises, flights, and long cruises persuasively demonstrate that as with all Soviet people, army and navy personnel are responding to the appeal of the CPSU Central Committee to mark 1980 with new successes in labor, and to transform it into a year of shock work, work in the communist style, in the Leninist style.

The editor also received letters communicating the results of the All-Union Lenin Communist subbotnik in the country. Army and navy soldiers took an active part in the holiday of labor. Engineer-Colonel V. Osyko from the Leningrad Military District writes: "Soldiers of the repair subunit commanded by Major V. Khursan enthusiastically participated in 'Red Saturday'. Personnel of the platoons headed by communist warrant officers B. Galushka and A. Bogdanovich completed their adopted pledges by 180 and 130 percent."

April falls at the eve of the 35th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War. The newspaper published, and continues to publish, reports from our readers and correspondents on how the country and its armed forces are preparing to meet this noteworthy date. Many letters come from war veterans. They share their recollections of the hard days of war, they describe their life and their participation in efforts to instill revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions in the young, and they express sincere gratefulness and a deep sense of indebtedness to their Communist Party and Soviet government for the concern they display for participants of the Great Patriotic War. The thoughts and wishes of the veterans are expressed well in a letter by disabled war veteran Sh. Chkhaidze from Batumi: "I am immeasurably fortunate to have been born and to live in the country of Lenin. It fell upon me to defend the fatherland against its enemies with weapon in hand. Our victory was not an easy one. As we came nearer to it, we, the frontliners, thought about the present day, a day of happiness, a day of creation. Forget not the war, my people! Let it not once again invade the privacy of our homes!"

Faithfulness to combat traditions and the high sense of duty felt by the heirs of the combat glory of the war veterans encourage Soviet soldiers to constantly improve their combat skills, and to defend the great achievements of socialism alertly and dependably. They are meeting the international holiday of the solidarity of laborers--May Day--with new successes in service and training.

Mail Received in May

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jun 80 p 2

> [Text] In May the editor received 15,768 letters, including 5,939 responses to our articles. The newspaper published 456 articles, reports, and readers' letters.

May has passed. Soviet people and soldiers of the army and navy triumphantly commemorated the holiday of international solidarity of laborers and the 35th anniversary of the great victory over mankind's arch-enemy--Hitler's fascism, in the defeat of which our motherland and its armed forces played the decisive part. The editor's mail for the month contains hundreds of letters dedicated to these events.

Many letters describe the successes in combat and political training and in the socialist competition with which army and navy soldiers met May Day and the victory holiday. "We, the signalmen," reports Major N. Ivlev, "are serving in the North. Our conditions are not easy. But all socialist pledges were satisfied in the unit, and the winter training period has been finished off with good indicators. Subordinates of Lieutenant Colonel I. Semenyuk achieved especially great successes. This is the third time that this subunit has taken first place."

"The eve of the victory holiday was marked by a memorable meeting for military builders," writes Captain V. Krylov. "Veterans of the Great Patriotic War, Hero of the Soviet Union Engineer-Lieutenant General (Reserve) M. Grigorenko and Engineer-Colonel G. Durov visited our unit. Warrant Officer A. Fedorov, the unit's Komsomol committee secretary, reported the labor successes of Komsomol members and young people to the guests."

Thousands upon thousands of frontliners visited the units and ships, the enterprises and kolkhozes, the training institutions, many cities and towns, and battlegrounds. Frontliners were solemnly honored everywhere with expressions of limitless gratefulness and indebtedness for their great victory. Hundreds of letters were received on these meetings and on attention devoted to veterans. And therefore it is especially disappointing to read what Major (Reserve) V. Kiselev writes from the town of Kozulichi, Mogilevskaya Oblast. "Before the holiday," he writes, "I brought out my combat orders and medals, and attached them to my parade dress. I thought that there would be a triumphant meeting, and that we the veterans would be invited. After all, it is a national holiday. But there was no meeting, and no one invited us anywhere. And had it not been for the television programs, this day would not have differed in any way from all the rest. I am disappointed not only for myself. I know how important it would be for indoctrination of the young to solemnly commemorate the victory holiday." The author of the letter is doubtlessly right, and we would think that such an error would not be made again in the future.

Commemorating the 35th anniversary of the great victory, we summarized the results of work done since then, and we thought about the future. Former 18th Army machinegunner Aleksandr Andreyevich Chakhunov wrote about this very well and precisely in his letter from the city of Pushkin in Leningrad Oblast: "Owing to the wise foreign policy of the Communist Party and our government, our people are living in peace, and we are building communism. But the imperialists have now intensified the arms race, and they are once again preparing for war. This is why we must strengthen the country's defenses, and be ready to defend the motherland; as Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev said quite appropriately, we must keep our powder dry. We, the frontliners, appeal to all who have taken our places in the army ranks: Learn military affairs as they should be learned, always be on guard, always be ready to repel any invasion by any aggressor!"

The Soviet people may be assured that the security of the Soviet motherland is under the dependable protection of our armed forces. Having successfully completed their winter training period, the units and ships have begun the hard military labor of summer. Letters describing the progress of combat training today are coming to the editor from tactical exercise fields, and from aboard ships on long cruises.

"Pilots of the flight commanded by Captain I. Gatal'skiy had to endure a difficult battle," reports Lieutenant Colonel V. Khmel'kov from the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. "Despite jamming, the airmen revealed targets in the stratosphere and annihilated them." A telegram from Captain 2d Rank M. Kulak, commander of the antisubmarine cruiser "Leningrad", contains the following lines: "New subunits have earned the outstanding title aboardship, the ranks of masters and classed specialists have been replenished, and missile and torpedo launching practices were completed with high grades. Now we are on a combat training mission in the Mediterranean Sea. The ship is constantly combat ready. We are forever vigilant."

Mail Received in June

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Jul 80 p 2

> [Text] In June 1980 the editor received 9,624 readers' letters. Of these, 590 were published in the newspaper. There were 277 responses to articles in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

As with all Soviet people, it was with deep satisfaction and avid approval that soldiers of the army and navy greeted the decision of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum to convene the regular, 26th CPSU Congress on 23 February 1981. Evidence of this can be found in readers' responses forwarded to the editor.

"News that the 26th CPSU Congress was to be held caught the tank crewmen of our regiment at the tank driving range," states a letter from Major V. Aksenov. "The privates, sergeants, warrant officers, and officers received it with great enthusiasm. At a meeting, the soldiers discussed the need for constantly raising their combat readiness, and for always being on guard, ready to offer a decisive repulse to any aggressor. On this same day, while performing their combat training missions, subunits commanded by Major V. Pribochenko, Senior Lieutenant V. Malykin, and Lieutenant V. Khokhlov demonstrated their ability to strike the target with the first shots, with the first rounds."

Many other letters mirror what was said by Major Aksenov. Their authors communicate that army and navy soldiers unanimously approve the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU and the Leninist CPSU Central Committee Politburo, headed by an outstanding party and state official of modern times, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev; they feel it their duty to join the socialist competition for an honorable welcome for the 26th CPSU Congress.

"The crew of our ship is on a long cruise," writes Senior Lieutenant N. Smirnov. "But we never feel ourselves separated from our native land, not for even a minute. In our minds and in our hearts, we are always together with our beloved motherland. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the Plenum's decrees, 'On Convocation of the Regular 26th CPSU Congress' and 'On the International Position and Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union', agitated the seamen. Agitation-propaganda work has begun aboard ship. Political briefings and discussions have been held, and preparations are being made for an evening discussion session. The ship's communists are taking an active part in explaining the historic documents of the party."

Active combat training is proceeding in all branches of the USSR Armed Forces, and the socialist competition is acquiring an ever-increasing scope. The soldiers are burning with a desire to completely satisfy their socialist pledges for the summer training period, and to meet the 26th CPSU Congress with honor.

"The crew of the infantry combat vehicle commanded by Sergeant V. Chetvertakov participated in a firing test," reports Lieutenant S. Temirbiyev. "Both the commander and the gunner-operator, Private G. Arutyunyan, struck all targets with the first shots and rounds." Present at the exercise, USSR Deputy Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Moskalenko gave a high assessment to the crew's combat skills and presented personalized watches to the soldiers.

However, discussing the successes in combat and political training, many readers also critically analyze the shortcomings in organization of the competition, in indoctrination of military collectives, and in the life and leisure of the personnel, they seek ways for eliminating them, and they single out concrete individuals that are making it difficult for the people to work at peak effort and satisfy their adopted pledges with inspiration. Here is one such letter: "We take pride in the service of the railroad troops," write privates V. Budylev, Ye. Kim, V. Grunin, and others. "We have been entrusted with construction of the Baykal-Amur Rail Mainline. We hold this trust of the party and people very precious. We tackle everything with desire, with Komsomol energy. But absence of adequate concern for our rest angers us. In the evening we return from work tired, wishing to rest. But we find that no one has thought about bringing in water, preparing a tasty dinner, or organizing a movie showing. We are told that supposedly these are just some of the minor inconveniences of life in the taiga. But they have a severe impact upon our mood, and they rob us of our working time."

This letter is alarming, and unfortunately it is not the only one of its type in the June mail. We will forward letters of this sort to the appropriate executives.

In June the editor received 657 reports on steps being taken in relation to letters submitted for investigation.
[249-11004]

11004
CSO: 1801

AIRBORNE TROOPS: COMBAT TRAINING ACTIVITIES

Regiment Shortcomings Noted

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Sr Lt A. Oliynik: "Tactics Rated Secondary"]

[Text] "The platoon under my command was performing reconnaissance in force during a tactical exercise. Covertly advancing to my object of capture and establishing its system of security and defense, I reported to the company commander by radio:

"'Up to a company of "enemy" tanks and infantry dug in ahead.'

"The situation was clearly evolving to our disadvantage--the 'enemy' had brought up reserves. Nonetheless Guards Captain V. Vedyakin would not change his previously made decision--annihilating the object of attack on the move.

"Extending into a line, the company attacked the 'enemy', who had secured himself on a commanding hill. There was no fire strike, and there was no haste.

"It would not be difficult to surmise what this might have led to in real combat. After all, the defenders were significantly superior to us in forces. However, summarizing the results of this attack, the battalion commander commended Guards Captain Vedyakin for bold action and initiative."

This example is far from the sole one in a letter written to the editor by Guards Senior Lieutenant Yu. Maletskiy. Each line carries a warning about deteriorating tactical training, and compels us to think about the sources of the shortcomings.

"I am especially alarmed," Yu. Maletskiy concludes, "that tactics is being dropped to secondary importance in drills and exercises. For practical purposes, dropping the personnel and equipment from the airplanes is all that is deemed important."

And so I visited the regiment. Impressions of the exercise discussed in the letter were still fresh in the memories of the officers. We also talked about it at unit headquarters.

"On the whole the exercise was successful," said Guards Major Ye. Bocharov, the regiment's chief of staff, and then he immediately added the correction: "Of course we did not practice an airborne drop. And there is nothing more boring than an exercise without parachute jumps."

So ended the conversation. And it would not have been worth citing these words, had they not unfortunately reflected a rather widespread opinion. No matter what words were used later to evaluate this exercise at regimental headquarters and at formation headquarters, they invariably carried the same meaning. In the end, without an airborne drop the exercise was "one big bore".

In this exercise the airborne troops did in fact not jump with parachutes--the weather let them down. This is perhaps why mistakes in tactics revealed themselves so obviously--absent from the exercise was the excitement of an airborne assault, on the background of which subsequent tactical inconsistencies usually appeared less obvious.

The lack of field training of the airborne troops revealed itself especially visibly in the next stage of the exercise--defense.

"Simplifications in the switch to defense," the same letter reads, "began with the battalion standing around bored in company columns on completely open terrain, even though there were woods right beside us. It stood there for a long time, more than an hour. No one organized reconnaissance or defined the missions of the subunits in application to the local conditions. Nor were things any better later on. Thus company commander Guards Senior Lieutenant Yu. Gaysin located his combat vehicles at the strongpoint in not the best fashion--on the ridge of the hill. Command and observation posts had not been set up in the battalion and in the companies...."

We can add the following note to the above. Checking the readiness of the defense area and the company strongpoints, the exercise leader asked battalion chief of staff Guards Senior Lieutenant A. Bespalov: "Where is the command and observation post from which combat is going to be directed?"

"In the tent," the officer answered.

Need I say more? The low grade given at the exercise to the battalion commanded by Guards Major V. Shipovskiy was mainly the result of the fact that tactics had still not become a principal training discipline in the regiment, as is required by the guidelines.

Naturally, every branch of troops is distinguished by unique features. It is with a consideration for these features that the entire training process is set up. What is specific to airborne troops is airborne assault training.

This discipline is not only important but also difficult. And it is entirely natural that every unit devotes priority attention to it. The personnel regularly undergo training in lashing down equipment and folding parachutes--there is no room for error in the sky.

Jumps typically proceed in organized fashion as a rule. The feeling one gets is that they are the ultimate purpose of all of the regiment's services. But following the jumps, we sometimes observe an entirely different picture. Here is one incident that I was able to witness.

A new type of airplane was being used for the jumps. The wind was up, sweeping the grainy snow about. The touchdown site was small, with woods to the side of it. But despite the difficulties the airborne assault proceeded on schedule and, efficiently. But when the airborne troops began their tactical drills, not even a trace remained of the former efficiency.

The drill began late. It took a long time for the personnel to come together after the landing--the deep snow and the drifts were a hindrance. However, the drill leader had it in his power to account for this "obstacle". Skis may have helped. But the problems did not limit themselves to tardiness alone. The plan foresaw advancing and seizing an objective in the "enemy" rear. But the tactical drill was limited to practicing just defense alone.

"We are effectively eliminating the shortcomings revealed in the exercise," the drill leader explained.

But we all know that tactical drill is a form of training in relation to which preparations are especially important. As we would have expected, the drill discussed above did not produce the expected results. Everything was reduced to topographical orientation and plotting the situation on a map.

Unfortunately such cases are not sporadic. A similar incident occurred on the next day. Nor can we fail to mention that drills are held extremely rarely at night and in other unusual conditions, even though this aspect of the training of airborne troops is extremely important.

It is also difficult to find an explanation for the following: Not once (!) in the winter period did the company commanders participate in drills in the command training group. And yet about 50 percent of the officers have not been at their post for more than a year.

What position does the unit's party committee take in regard to these issues? Here is an interesting fact: During the present training year, there was not a single party meeting or conference of the party committee at which the attitude communists display toward the quality of field skills was discussed directly.

And yet it was because of poor field skills that the airborne troops were unable to satisfy their competition pledges last year. It cannot be said that the party committee is ignorant of the shortcomings carried over from last year.

It does not always heed the remarks and proposals made by communists at party meetings. Before sitting down to write his letter to the editor, Guards Senior Lieutenant Maletskiy spoke about these urgent matters at a party meeting. He presented these facts at a conference of the unit's party committee in his capacity as party committee member. A representative of the political section was present at this conference. But unfortunately he did not attach significance to the criticism and to the communist's reasonable proposals.

Large letters proclaim the following in a visible place at headquarters: "The personnel pledge to confirm the 'outstanding regiment' title!"

Confirm.... The pledges, however, read "attain". Regiment has not yet achieved its outstanding rating. Perhaps this unfortunate "slip of the pen" is no big thing--at least that is what the regiment's deputy commander for political affairs seems to think. But what if we look deeper? People read this truth-distorting slogan each day. It would be difficult to find more-expressive evidence of a formal attitude toward the competition. Nor have representatives of higher staffs visiting a unit ever attached significance to this "slip of the pen".

And so, the regiment does not at the moment have an outstanding rating, but it is fighting to achieve it. And this makes it absolutely necessary for us to think hard about the simplifications and omissions in tactics. The regiment is doubtlessly doing a great deal to complete the plans and programs of combat and political training, and to satisfy the competition pledges. But as the facts show, one of the main elements of combat training is understated here. The regiment cannot achieve an outstanding rating with inadequate tactical skills.

Naturally, parachute jumps occupy an important place in the training of airborne troops. But airborne troops must pass their main test on the ground, after the glamour of the drop has passed. And I cannot but agree with officers of the regiment who say that a decisive turn is needed in the quality of the field skills of the airborne troops--not just in words, but in fact.

Development of Raid Operations

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jul 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen K. Kurochkin, Deputy Commander of Airborne Troops: "In the Enemy Rear]

> [Text] "Raiding tactics are given a great deal of attention in the combat training of the airborne troops. However, as exercises have shown, tactics are a complex discipline demanding occupational knowledge, independence,

> and initiative from the commander, and high skill from all the personnel. I would like to see KRASNAYA ZVEZDA carry a description of the history of the development of raiding tactics and their unique features in modern combat."
>
> From a statement by Guards Major V. Panteleyev at a readers' conference

It was the concluding phase of the battle of Moscow. Army General G. Zhukov, commander of the Western Front, decided to make an airborne assault to assist advancing troops in the defeat of fascist German troops in the vicinity of Vyaz'ma.

In the night of 28 January 1942 heavy TB-3's with airborne troops aboard climbed into the sky from temporary airfields. The airplanes assumed a heading towards Vyaz'ma. Forward detachments of the 8th Airborne Brigade were the first to land in the enemy rear. One of them was headed by Guards Major A. Kobets. After the personnel were quickly brought together, the battalion set out on its mission: reaching its objectives--the Vyaz'ma-Smolensk highway and railroad--and cutting them off.

Penetrating to the intended road sections, Guards Major Kobets set out road blocks. Meticulously camouflaging themselves, the airborne troops crept up to a column of German vehicles and destroyed them with a surprise attack.

So began a raid in the largest, corps-strong airborne assault of the Great Patriotic War. (This corps contained the 8th, 9th, and 214th airborne brigades). Corps commander was Major General A. Kazankin. Despite the great difficulties--minimum quantity of artillery (mainly battalion mortars), limited ammunition, absence of support from central aviation, harsh winter conditions--the airborne troops inflicted serious losses upon the fascists in manpower and equipment on the Vyaz'ma axis.

For 5 months the airborne troops waged intense battles with regular enemy troops. What they actually ended up doing was to create an active moving front in the enemy rear. Traveling as raiding parties for hundreds of kilometers, liberating more than 200 population centers, and annihilating about 17,000 Germans, the main forces of the IV Airborne Corps broke through enemy defenses together with Lieutenant General P. Belov's cavalry, and on 23 June they met up with units of the Western Front's 10th Army.

The nature of the raiding tactics of the airborne troops was diverse. It depended on the particular content of the missions and the conditions under which they had to be executed. Avoiding the enemy's centers of defense, the airborne troops sought out weakly defended axes and sectors and capitalized upon gaps between fascist troop groupings. If they failed, they maneuvered their forces to a new axis. Performing their raids, the airborne troops interacted closely with cavalry units and used the help of partisans.

Maneuver, strike, maneuver. These mutually associated elements of combat were in a sense the model upon which raiding tactics were based.

The role and significance of the raid is great in modern conditions as well. The reason for this lies in the very nature of combined-arms combat: high maneuverability and fluidity, increase in spatial scope, and swift rates of advance.

New equipment and armament entering the troops is having a significant influence upon raiding tactics. Airborne troop subunits and units are now outfitted not only with sophisticated automatic infantry weapons but also highly effective fire systems, dependable complexes to fight tanks and airborne targets, and stable communication resources. It would be sufficient to point out that just the addition of the airborne combat vehicle (the BMD), which possesses dependable armor and is characterized by high cross-country capability and considerable range, has made it possible to increase the firepower and maneuverability of subunits by more than two times in comparison with the prewar era.

These changes have increased the tactical independence of airborne units and subunits, as well as their mobility and self-sufficiency. Thus they are capable of conducting combat activities to great depth, making surprise attacks on the enemy on the move, and seizing and annihilating airfields, control posts, headquarters, nuclear missile facilities, and important enemy lines of communication with relatively small forces.

Last year, for example, in the "Neman" exercise, a parachute-landing battalion commanded by Guard Captain L. Arshinov landed in the "enemy" rear, performed a raid in order to reach a new area, and seized a tactically advantageous line before the opposing side could. The swift strike, surprise, and close interaction with fire support helicoptors predetermined the outcome of the battle.

One of the unique features of raids is the diversity of the combat activities. Within a short interval of time the subunits must pursue the enemy, conduct an encounter engagement, advance, go over to defense and, while warding off strikes they must withdraw to new lines offering better advantages. Reconnaissance in force, diversive actions, minefields, raids, and ambushes will be used extensively.

Without a doubt the enemy will do everything to contain the actions of the airborne party, to bottle it up, and to destroy it.

Thus it is no accident that the most important requirement imposed on a raid is covertness and swiftness of maneuver. Maneuver must insure prompt and full utilization of the results of a fire strike and strikes by aviation, swift crossing or detouring of obstacles by the subunits, and intensification of combat efforts on the decisive axis.

Modern combat does not tolerate stereotypy, which is doubly dangerous in the enemy rear. It should be emphasized in this connection that a successful raid requires a commander who is highly creative, who is capable of finding original tactics, and who displays resourcefulness and boldness. In one case the enemy may have to be attacked and annihilated on the move, while in another he may have to be bypassed, and combat may have to be avoided so as to permit an effective, surprise attack where he least expects it.

As a rule the time allowed for preparing for a raid is limited; however, this is no way permits us to reduce our attention to organizing coordination and support of the raid, and to forming the order of battle. The possibility that the enemy may use aviation, mass destruction resources, sabotage, ambushes, and obstacles makes this problem especially pressing.

It is especially important to maintain stable control and effective coordination with attached subunits, including fire support helicoptors, which often operate in behalf of a landing party. The significance of stable communication is also rising. Success is enjoyed by that commander who reacts quickly, without hestitation, to changes in the situation, and who can explain missions to subunits briefly and clearly.

It should be emphasized that the success of a raid depends in many ways on the way party-political work is organized, and on the purposefulness and concreteness of its performance in application to the given form of combat activities.

Troop experience provides many examples of a competent, thoughtful approach to working out the actions of subunits in a raid. I recall an exercise involving an airborne landing by the N-th Guards Parachute Landing Regiment. After landing in a hilly area, a battalion commanded by Guards Captain A. Kinzerskiy received orders in the course of combat to seize an "enemy" crossing.

Guards Captain Kinzerskiy planned to reach his objective at night on mountain roads. Although the route he chose was difficult, it insured the greatest covertness of advance. A company commanded by Guards Senior Lieutenant Yu. Monakhov was given the mission of performing a bypass maneuver and reaching the flank of the "enemy" troops defending the crossing.

Absence of complete information about the defenses prevented the commander from assigning precise missions. All he could spell out were the order of movement in column, and the starting lines and directions of attack. He rested his hopes on decisiveness and swiftness of action.

Subsequent events bore his hopes out. Reaching the river and being unable to find gently sloping banks along which to drive into the water, Guards Senior Lieutenant Monakhov opted for a risk: He decided to cross the water obstacle directly from the steep bank. Risky it doubtlessly was, but it was a justified risk, based on faith in the skill and bravery of the driver-mechanics and in the combat capabilities of the BMD.

The commander's vehicle was the first to "dive" into the water. It dropped beneath the water for an instant, but then it immediately surfaced and swiftly traveled to the opposite bank. The others hastened behind it.

By dawn, Guards Senior Lieutenant Monakhov's subordinates began their attack on the flank in accordance with the battalion commander's plan. Sensing the threat of a breakthrough by the airborne troops in this sector, the "enemy" undertook a counterattack, taking some of his forces from other defense sectors.

Meanwhile the battalion's main forces made a fire strike and then rushed toward the crossing. The outcome of the battle was decided in mere minutes.

Many examples of this sort can be cited. I would like to turn special attention to the fact that the road to success in actions in the enemy rear lies through a struggle against simplification and stereotypy in daily training. Much also depends on the coordination exhibited among small subunits, on the field and special skills of the airborne troops, and on their ability to act boldly, daringly, and decisively.

Unfortunately some commanders and staffs writing up plans for a tactical exercise create an insufficiently dynamic situation on the ground and in the air. The missions are made simple, and the enemy forces are small and passive. Sometimes a raid is reduced to nothing but a march. As a result neither the commanders nor their subordinates acquire the habits required for raids, and they receive an incorrect impression of their nature and unique features.

In one exercise a battalion commanded by Guards Captain A. Matsuyev had to conduct a raid over a long distance. What happened? The combat vehicles reached their appointed area precisely on schedule. But while en route, the battalion was never subjected to an "enemy" attack, it never had to repel attacks from the air, and it did not have to utilize its own resources to annihilate the enemy. It was revealed that the exercises were conducted in simplified conditions in previous times as well. Naturally this is impermissible.

Preparedness for highly maneuverable actions in the enemy rear is an important indicator of the coordination of airborne subunits and units, and of their mobility and combat readiness. To study raiding tactics and to improve them in drills and exercises during summer training means to raise combat readiness and the field skills of airborne troops to a new, higher level. [250-11004]

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MISSILE AND RADAR UNITS: TRAINING ACTIVITIES

Communications Problems

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen A. Bezotosov: "To the Set -- of the Commander!"]

[Text] The air defense missile unit completed the long night march over bad roads successfully. In minutes, the communications equipment was deployed and the operation of the radio and radio-relay lines and channels to the senior chief and subordinate subunits was adjusted. After another short time, reports began to arrive from the sites about their readiness to repulse an "enemy" air attack.

The chief of staff, Major M. Kozyrenko, who was filling in for the unit commander, looked at his watch: The subunits had bettered the combat training norms by ten percent on the average. Only one subunit was somewhat late in arriving in the designated area. The chief of staff decided to visit it and to investigate on the spot what the matter was.

The decision was correct. However, Major Kozyrenko went to the battalion's position in a light vehicle without communications equipment. He took several staff officers with him.

Within a few minutes, the tactical situation changed sharply. The senior chief, who had arrived at the command post, demanded to communicate with Major Kozyrenko: a new task had been given to the air defensemen. However, he failed to communicate with him. The officer, who was filling in for Major Kozyrenko, was slow in making a crucial decision. Valuable time was thus lost.

This event received a highly principled evaluation during the critique of the exercise. I remembered it during recent tactical classes when I again had occasion to observe a somewhat similar picture.

A column of combat vehicles had completed a move over forested swampy terrain. A UAZ moved in front. The commander was in it. Suddenly, they began to wave signal flags from the command vehicle which was following behind it. The UAZ stopped.

The communications chief addressed the commander, "Comrade lieutenant colonel, he is calling for you on the 100 set."

The question followed, "Who is it?"

The officer mentioned the name of the senior chief. The lieutenant colonel quickly left the UAZ and took his place in the command vehicle near the portable radio set.

The general demanded of him, "Report where you are located."

The lieutenant colonel quickly got his map and confidently named a population center which was about five kilometers away.

"Report the situation!"

Here, it turned out that the work map was not prepared for the exercise. This did not permit radio transmissions to be conducted intelligently and the battle to be controlled successfully.

The cited examples testify to the fact that individual commanders still do not have a completely correct understanding of the importance of uninterrupted and steady control at all levels and do not have a deep sense of the value of time during modern combat. Now, the loss of communications-- even for one minute -- threatens serious consequences. Silence in the ether -- this is uncertainty about the situation, delayed and contradictory information on the "enemy's" actions or intentions. It means wrong decisions and untimely reorganization of the combat formation. In the final analysis, it is an interruption in the control of subunits during combat.

All this once again convinces us that the commander, who is without communications equipment or who is not good at using it with coded documents for controlling troops, is not in condition to direct modern combat, affect its dynamics, and maintain the tactical initiative.

Here is a typical case from recent exercises. Two subunits approached a crossing, built by the engineers, from different directions. Both were bound for the designated area. Both commanders were trying to cross first, not wishing to be delayed at the meeting point. A radio message had been sent earlier to the crossing commandant. It was clearly stated in it who would cross when -- the air defense missile subunit had priority. However, the officer twirled the message in his hands and shoved it into his bag, as they say, to investigate the what and for whom a little later. Having seen that two subunits were approaching the crossing at the same time, he became flustered because he did not know which one had priority according to the senior chief's command. A radio set was located nearby, but the officer did not avail himself of it. The commandant made his decision based on "intuition": "First I will allow the motorized riflemen to pass and then the air defensemen".

As a result, the air defense missile subunit was late in arriving at the designated position. This complicated the subsequent organization and conduct of combat operations for it. Of course, the subunit's rating was lowered although it acted in an exemplary manner during the exercises. They did not even think about the crossing commandant when the results were summed up. What a pity! His wrong actions also broke the chain of command.

Modern combat imposes ever higher requirements on control of the troops and the use of communications equipment for this purpose. Such questions as the ability of the commander to maneuver with communications equipment, use its outstanding combat capabilities fully, and ensure the secrecy and masking of radio transmissions, have now been entered on the agenda of the day. Unfortunately, these tasks are still being solved with insufficient effectiveness in some subunits.

Staff officers recently measured the time spent by a radio company commander and a battery commander in assigning combat training tasks over the radio. The signal officer did this clearly and accurately. The artillery officer was not able to confine himself to the established norms; moreover, he committed a violation of radio transmitting procedures.

Why is the difference in the training of the two officers so great? It seems that it is explained by the fact that questions on control and the use of communications equipment are in some subunits not worked on sufficiently in the command training system. Here and there, such methods of training officers as training sessions on controlling subunits and staff and radio training sessions, are seldom used. What is the result? Some officers have a good knowledge of the importance of communications equipment during modern combat, the construction of the equipment, and its tactical and technical characteristics but almost always do not use it skillfully.

We recently listened to the decision of a commander who had assigned the chief of communications the task of providing him at a minimum three channels with the lower headquarters. We asked: "Why do you need so many channels?"

The officer answered: "For reliability of control."

Is such a decision justified? Not at all. The commander made a clear "over-expenditure" of communications equipment. It would have come in handy to provide him with reliability of control over all subunits.

In practice, you sometimes also encounter cases where the outstanding defensive capabilities of radios against jamming are not fully used. There are cases where individual commanders incorrectly move antennas to communicate with subscribers separated by different distances. The overloading of radio sets, unsound arrangement of radio links, and clumsy use of repeaters are permitted during exercises.

What is surprising? Some commanders try to find different excuses, if only to justify their inability to use communications equipment by something. There it is -- they do not remember that well known truth: "He, who tries to carry out a training task, will find the ways and means to do it; but he, who does not try, will find an excuse."

During one command post exercise, the higher headquarters had assigned in advance the task of protecting a lengthy objective to an air defense regiment. When working out this plan, we understood that the unit commander and the staff would primarily encounter problems in control and in using communications equipment. How did they solve the task?

Having evaluated the situation and the terrain which abounded with steep hills, the commander, chief of staff and chief of communications understood that the usual and typical solutions to the task were not suitable here. Therefore, it was necessary to look for a non-typical decision which was appropriate to the situation. And it was found. The air defensemen set up two repeater points. These permitted firm and steady communications to be maintained with the subunits.

And so it is important that each commander continuously perfect the art of using communications equipment in modern combat. And he has many opportunities. Primarily, this is command training. Independent studies also provide a lot. Tactical classes and exercises are a truly valuable school for a commander.

All these methods are broadly and skilfully used in the guards air defense missile unit which Guards Lt Col V. Kulagin commands. Here, all officers and warrant officers [praporshchiki] have a good knowledge of communications equipment and use it skilfully.

On days of command training, classes on the physical components of the radio stations are regularly conducted in the unit and the rules for netting communications are studied. During them, subunit commanders occupy the sites designated to them. The unit commander or the chief of staff gives the situation over the radio and orders that it be plotted on a map, a decision be made, and that it be formulated graphically. Then, the officers and warrant officers train at controlling subunits during the dynamics of a battle using a radio, and issue appropriate instructions to subordinates with each change in the situation. Conventional signs and call signs for officials are used during transmissions. Special attention is devoted to the brevity and accuracy of radio transmissions.

On the eve of moving out for tactical exercises and live firings, the regiment's chief of staff and chief of communications usually compile a plan which provides for the study of radio traffic rules and training in working on the equipment when there is interference and large distances. During these classes, officers improve their skills in using radio equipment to control subunits and in tuning out interference. In doing this, they maneuver by frequencies and antennas. For example, the air defensemen were able to provide steady communications under conditions of active and passive radio jamming during recent exercises.

Undoubtedly there are also other ways and methods to train officers in the effective use of radio equipment. To incorporate every day all that is valuable and progressive into practices --this means to ensure a further improvement in the combat skills of commanders and the achievement of continuity, reliability, and steadiness in control during modern combat.

Battalion Night Launches

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by Maj A. Nemets, Belorussian Military District: "Night Launchings by Missilemen"]

[Text] It had thawed during the morning. However, frost struck by evening. Ice appeared in the potholes filled with the melted water. Powdery snow fell from above and covered the ruts and bumps with a white covering.

Major M. Zapronetov, commander of an air defense missile battery noted: "The weather is insidious. It brings a lot of trouble to us."

The battery had received an order to occupy a new position area in order to protect advancing motorized riflemen from the air "enemy". This meant that the move would have to be completed during the night and the equipment deployed during darkness. The task was not one of the easy ones. True, it was not a new one for the missilemen. A lot of attention is devoted in the battery and in the battalion to night training. More than half of all classes are planned and conducted under conditions of limited visibility. The most experienced instructional methodologists, who know how to organize the training of subordinates in accordance with the demands of modern combat, are appointed the directors of these classes. Questions on gunnery, tactical and technical training, on protection against weapons of mass destruction, and on physical training are worked on fully and in a combined way during the night classes. This permits teamwork to be achieved more rapidly in all links, and accurate missile launches to be conducted. The commander had no doubt about success today. The subordinates were ready to endure the greatest loads.

Bent over a map, Major M. Zapronetov studied the movement route. The terrain abounded with swampy sections. You could not manage without a reconnaissance. However, time was needed to organize it -- but there was just enough time without it. Therefore, the battery commander adopted one of the tested decision practices -- to send the column immediately behind the reconnaissance group.

The engines droned in a strained manner. The combat vehicles crossed the range, ploughed by tracks, with difficulty and skidded on the icy surface. Driving the cumbersome equipment was complicated when complete darkness interferred with the selection of the best road. However, the experienced mechanic drivers of the launch mounts, transporter -loaders, and other vehicles drove them confidently, and strictly adhered to the prescribed speed.

It seemed that all was in order and that the missilemen would arrive in the new area outstripping the norms. However, they soon had to repulse an assault, combat "enemy" helicopter gunships, cross a "contaminated" sector, and perform a partial chemical and radioactive decontamination. The control group confronted the batteries with these and other inputs. This group was formed by the unit's staff from the best trained officers in the services, and it was not the first year that it actively affected the progress of combat training. Major V. Kashin, deputy unit commander and master of a military specialty, headed it. The staff officers complicated the situation with a series of inputs. It was difficult for the missilemen but there will be difficulties like this in actual combat. Moreover, today was not a normal training session for them. They were performing combat work which would affect the rating of the entire unit.

Having successfully solved the inputs, the missilemen rushed forward. Here is the area of the positions. The combat vehicles dispersed on the terrain from the move, and commands to deploy the equipment were heard. There was fresh snow under foot. It hid the shiny crust of the ice. It was not easy to keep on one's feet, but it was necessary to hurry. The norm regulations do not provide allowances for bad weather. Under any conditions, personnel must prepare the formidable weapons for combat in a short time. The strength of the missilemen is in this. This is one of the points in their socialist obligations.

A little time passed and Lieutenant V. Artamonov reported:

"The launcher is in a combat mode!"

The officer had finished a military school last year. He had studied the equipment well during the short time and had prepared to raise his rated specialty.

The specialists at the missile guidance station headed by Sr Lt. G. Shkurov also acted correctly. A sharp competition for the fastest readying of equipment flares up between the launch personnel and the operators during classes and exercises. The officers also compete with each other. As a result, everyone wins.

They well understand in the unit, battalion and battery that the basis of success is in the high tactical, special and technical training of the officers and warrant officers [praporshchiki] -- the leaders of the crews. However, the best soldiers and sergeants also play an important role here -- for example, those like operators Sgt Viktor Ishchenko and Pvt Sergey Khitrov. The officers entrust the most complicated operations on the equipment to them. This is not at all accidental. For example, Sergeant V. Ishchenko had completed an automation the telemechanics technical school before his induction into the army, and has an excellent knowledge of the equipment. Pvt. S. Khitrov is a firstclass specialist. They are genuine helpers for the commander in solving complicated firing missions, and again proved this when the targets appeared in the skiy. The fighting men locked on the aircraft at maximum range and tracked them confidently. This permitted the launch control officer to conduct an accurate launch of the first missile.

Major M. Zaprometov and his subordinates were happy with the success. He is commanding the battery for the second year -- and the subunit is increasing its successes all the time. The battery occupies a solid place among the right flank ones in the competition to greet the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birthday in a fitting manner.

The role of the unit staff, which is doing a lot to improve the training material base and is summarizing and disseminating progressive experience, is a great one in the subunit's successes. Trainers to train the leading specialists have been recently created here by the innovators, and instructional methods handbooks have been developed for the conduct of combined classes.

The creative approach to the personnel's training, the saturation of training sessions, and the creation of a dynamic situation during classes ensures a steady growth in the military skill of the missilemen who are capable of carrying out any task in destroying aerial targets.

Radiotechnical Regiment Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Col N. Gritskov, commander of a radiotechnical regiment, Transcaucasus Military District: "A School of Courage and Skill"]

[Text] Our 2d Battalion was operating during this exercise. The radar antennas were revolving in the positions, sounding the sky. A normal, but always inspiring picture. The battalion commander, Lt Col N. Zinov'yev, explained to me:

"These are not the first days that we are working without a schedule. There is not a minute of rest; targets come uninterruptedly."

One sensed that the battalion commander was tired. And those, who were at their posts in the cabins of the sets, were of course tired also. Here is the test for strength of character and a check of training, endurance, and strength of spirit! As if having guessed the course of my thoughts, the battalion commander noted:

"Of course, it is difficult for the men. However, everyone is behaving staunchly and, I would say, courageously. The tasks are being solved. I believe it will be this way until the end of the exercise."

I said jokingly: "It turns out that you have men of iron, Nikolay Kus'mich."

The battalion commander without even smiling agreed:

"They are men of iron. We tempered them ...."

This is true. The fighting men receive real military tempering in the 2d Battalion. The exercise was the best witness to this. The battalion commander and I recalled how the column had moved along a difficult road--weaving over a ravine with steep ascents and descents. The battalion commander explained: "It is necessary to train drivers under difficult conditions."

When they arrived in the area of the positions, the officer created a complicated situation. The crews had to work in chemical protective equipment and some --understrength. For example, it was necessary for the crews in the company, which Capt V. Plakhtyukov commands, to deploy the sets under these conditions. And they coped with the assigned task.

The "enemy" was especially active on the first day of the exercise. The situation was also aggravated by the fact that the "visibility" of the sets was at a minimum. A mighty mountain ridge , which squeezed the battalion's positions from two sides interfered with it. However, the targets appeared from different directions and at different altitudes. Time was literally calculated in seconds. During one of these moments the crew of the set, which Sr Sgt P. Boltin commands, fell into a critical situation. Communications were broken. The crew commander himself, a highly rated specialist, undertook the task. Communications were restored ....

When we were at the position of the company, the same one that Captain Plakhtyukov commands, Lieutenant Colonel Zinov'yev said: "You can rely on the 2d Battalion. We have good specialists. Here is one of them -- Pvt V. Potseluyev. Watch his work ...."

The swift beam of the radar display sweep ran around the shining circle of the screen. The soldiers were working energetically, intently and without fuss. It was as if they were not tired. One could only guess at it -- sleepless days and nights were behind them. Nevertheless, he decided to give an input: Private Potseluyev has been "wounded". A command followed, and Pvt V. Krylov took his place at the artillery board. It turned out that he is a driver electrician and has served for only one year. However, he has firmly mastered the allied specialty of an artillery board operator during this time. The very first data, prepared by him, confirmed this.

Recently, if it is necessary for some subunit to give an example, we name the 2d Battalion in our regiment and this is justified: Its fighting men are in the vanguard in everything and are the best in everything. I will share with you one, perhaps not very important but for me, the commander, very significant, item. When I walk about the camp and meet the soldiers, I correctly determine Lieutenant Colonel Zinov'yev's subordinates. They are noted for their special dashing and smart appearance and drill training. Here, instances of gross violations of military discipline were eliminated long ago.

The fighting men bear the honor of their native battalion high. A convincing witness of this is the result of the last exercise. The battalion received an excellent rating and did not allow a single target to get through. The radarmen were primarily helped in this by their high military skill. It has firmly fused with such qualities of theirs as deep ideological conviction, discipline, vigilance, courage, steadfastness, and will power.

What is the source of these remarkable qualities? How did they come to the young men with soldier's shoulderboards? There is only one answer-- these qualities were acquired during strenuous military work and during the course of painstaking party, political and indoctrinational work.

In speaking about the indoctrinational role of our armed forces, I, as a regimental commander, would like to stress the important significance of the fighting men's military training in solving the tasks of military indoctrination which is part of the military training process. Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Minister of Defense, speaking during one meeting of the leading element, said about this: "When organizing the training of personnel, each commander and chief and each headquarters and political organ must see to it that every class serves not only the task of training but also the tasksof instilling in fighting men a communist consciousness and high moral qualities and of strengthening military discipline."

Every commander and political worker in the regiment sees the goal of his practical work to be the organic unity of military training and indoctrination. We are convinced that the indoctrinational significance of the combat training process is stronger where it is organized better.

I would especially like to talk about the indoctrinational role of an officer's personal example during combat training. The results of his command work depend a lot on how he knows military affairs and improves his instructional methods training and how correctly and confidently he acts during classes, training sessions, and exercises. Theoretically, this is known to all graduates of military schools. But in practice we encounter considerable problems in the tactical, technical and special training of the officers. What are the reasons? Some, it seems, do not have enough persistence and tenacity; others lack the ability to organize independent study in a business-like way.

In life, you also sometimes encounter a scornful attitude toward the requirements which are imposed on all servicemen during classes and exercises. Let us say that the soldiers and sergeants, who are working on an input, are working in chemical protective equipment. They find it hard but the officer stands aside as if it does not concern him. We, the senior chiefs, are at times indulgent in evaluating such defects. A strict and highly principled inquiry is required here.

Some officers evaluate the damage, caused by excuses and over-simplifications in combat training, narrowly and one-sidedly. They think that this has a negative effect only on the quality and effectiveness of the classes. However, direct losses are also inflicted on the men's indoctrination. This is another side to the affair -- a no less significant and no less important one. We must teach all officers to understand the question this way; we must instil in them an intolerant attitude toward over-simplifications and excuses.

I cannot fail to also talk about the commander's attitude toward criticism for omissions in the organization of combat training. This criticism resounds during service meetings of the officers and during party meetings. The attitude toward it can be mentioned as an indicator of the commander's maturity.

Of course, criticism is not honey and it is not very pleasant to listen to it. However, as practice shows, the admission of shortcoming are eliminated in time, and that the effectiveness of the training process and its indoctrinational role are improved.

Once while still a young commander, I read and remembered A. Makarenko's words about the fact that it is impossible to rear a courageous individual if you do not put him in those conditions where he can display courage. They, these words, often come to me when the regiment's subunits move out for an exercise. There, in the mountains under conditions which approach combat ones as closely as possible, while overcoming difficulties -- there, courage, valor, steadfastness, friendship, collectivism, keenness of unit, and initiative are instilled. Therefore, we try to organize each exercise and create a situation during it where the radarmen will experience the maximum stress.

The performance of a combat watch has become for us a genuine school of military training and courage. Those, who serve in an excellent manner and demonstrate high results in training, receive the right to perform it. For this purpose, competitions for the best subunit, the best crew, and the best specialist are often organized in the regiment. The company, which Capt V. Plakhtyukov commands, and the crews, which Sr. Lt K. Merkuov and Sgt V. Yurchuk head, demonstrated especially high results during a recent competition of this type.

However, I cannot fail to dwell also on the unsolved problems and omissions in the organization of the fighting men's combat training and military work. For example, once we entrusted the performance of a crucial training task to the company which Capt A. Vorob'yev commands. At the time, everyone in the regiment was convinced of the correctness of the inverse formula: Where the training process is poorly organized, there its indoctrinational role is lower.

But the following happened. Some crews treated the preparation of the equipment on the eve of moving out for the exercise carelessly. As a result, one set was brought to the field in non-working order. Quite a bit of time passed until the breakdown was eliminated. Individual crew members remained without work and without the necessary control during these hours. This led to the committing of a gross violation of discipline by Pvt Ye. Metasov.

We carefully analyzed this case. It turned out that the commander and the other company officers had decreased their attention on the organization of combat training in the subunit, permitted violations of class schedules, looked through their fingers at the low quality of lessons and training sessions and at simplifications and excuses during them. It has happened that the soldiers arrived in the combat vehicle motor pool and, instead of training, sat in the smoker for a long time and wasted valuable time waiting for the class director who was late. This dampened the men's ardor and lowered their interest in combat training and in the care of the equipment.

It is necessary to say that Capt A. Vorob'yev reacted correctly to the deficiencies which were pointed out to him in the training and indoctrination of subordinates. He did not justify himself and did not cite "objective reasons", as sometimes happens, but honestly admitted his mistakes and immediately began to correct them and to adjust combat training in the subunit. Matters have now been noticeably improved here.

All that I have talked about concerning our shortcomings can be eliminated. Only one thing is required for this -- subunit officers must always evaluate the results of their work in an exacting manner and be genuine organizers of combat training and good indoctrinators.

... The gates of the control technical point have been flung wide open. The regiment's subunits are moving out for an exercise through them. I recognize the fighting men of the company which Captain Vorob'yev commands. Positions, which during these final winter training days must be a school of military skill, courage and valor, and a school for raising reliable defenders of the Motherland, wait for them somewhere high in the mountains.

Missile Unit Economy Measures

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by Col V. Fedoseyev: "The Personal Account of the Missilemen"]

> [Text] During these spring days, active preparations for a communist subbotnik [day of work donated free of charge to the state], dedicated to the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birthday, are taking place in Strategic Rocket Force units and subunits just as everywhere in the army and navy. The missilemen have planned a broad work front for servicing equipment, improving the training material base, and organizing the public services and amenities of camps. The struggle for economy and thrift has become a special mark of the preparations for the work holiday. "To work one day a month using saved material and electricity" -- the competition has been spread among the troops under this slogan. However, the initiators of this initiative -- officer M. Savinskiy's subordinates -- are already going further. They have decided to work a "Red Saturday" using the resources saved during just 18 days of April.
>
> We are publishing a report from this unit.

The unit missilemen and other specialists are ensuring the uninterrupted operation of equipment and the accurate performance of combat watches.

Maj V. Lyakh, deputy unit commander says: "We were seized with happiness when we found out that our initiative had been approved by the military council of the rocket forces. The movement which had spread in the unit for the economic expenditure of fuel and energy resources literally stirred the men. However, I admit that at first also misgivings arose. Would it not turn out that in devoting a lot of attention to the struggle for economy, we at the same time would seemingly move other very important questions to second place ...."

Major Lyakh paused and then continued.

"So that this does not happen, we try to solve all questions in a combined way. How does this look in practice? The struggle to save resources begins not here at the work sites but even earlier -- in the training classrooms. The main thing is to arm each fighting man with solid work knowledge and skills. Then, he will operate equipment in the most economical manner. In this way, a dual task is solved. The skill of the missilemen grows and opportunities for the rational use of resources are fully utilized."

Major Lyakh says with animation: "Let us now take such a question as technical standards. The struggle to economize affects it also. It is difficult for us to meet a specialist who would be able to calmly pass by, let us say, a leaking gasket. A minor detail ? No, I do not agree. Even grams of saved fuel mean a lot in the final analysis, and moreover, such an attitude toward work increases work standards and develops discipline in the men."

No matter what building we drop into, perfect cleanliness and exemplary order strikes one in the eye everywhere. The work positions are equipped, as they say, with the latest word -- with a consideration for the requirements of scientific work organization. Posters and diagrams also help the specialists in their work.

The subunit, which Captain Yu. Ryabov commands, is one of the progressive ones. The specialists maintain the working conditions of the assemblies depending on external conditions. The higher the temperature of the surroundings, the less the expenditure of fuel. Other non-permanent factors also have considerable effect. Calculating their changes is far from a simple matter. Some specialists, having in mind that the scrupulous calculation of the different parameters requires a large expenditure of resources but the savings are not as great, reason as follows: "The game is not worth the candle."

Maj D. Gutman and WO [praporshchik] I. Oseyev, who head the subunit's group of innovators, report: It is worth it! They have compiled performance charts and design tables and now the need for complicated measurements and recalculations or, as also happened at times, for estimates "by eye" has passed. It is sufficient for a specialist to take readings from two or three instruments, and the performance charts will help him to select the most optimum operating mode for the assemblies depending on the external conditions. The use of this method has permitted additional reserves to be realized in the struggle to save fuel.

It has already become a good tradition. The collective works one day a month using saved resources. A meeting is conducted in the unit, and the temporary prize is handed over to the competition winners. It is understandable that saving an amount of fuel and electrical energy sufficient for a full day of work is managed only by the end of the month. However, now when preparing to greet the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birthday, unit personnel have decided to work on a communist subbotnik using resources saved during 18 days. How will such a high savings be achieved?

Sr Lt Yu. Karaul'nyy, secretary of the unit's party bureau, and I were in the equipment room. He talked over the even buzzing of the operating systems:

"We first planned that we would work using saved resources on the date of the Leninist jubilee -- 22 April. However, an open party meeting was held and a new thought was born: to achieve the planned savings by the date of the subbotnik -- 19 April. Quite a few useful suggestions were introduced during the meeting. As if ...."

Senior Lieutenant Karaul'nyy beckoned to a junior sergeant: "Let us see what indicators you have today." The junior sergeant took a notebook from his breast-pocket. On the first page was written: "The Personal Account Jr Sgt V. Mikhalevich" -- and next figures showing the planned and actual savings for the shift, the day and the week. There were also brief conclusions from an analysis of the work and notes for the future.

All the specialists have these personal records. Pvts S. Drozhzhin, V. Zernov, S. Makarov, and others show them with pride. The fighting men themselves have made suggestions: to consider strictly the contribution of each one to the performance of the obligations adopted by the crew and subunit.

The day is close when millions of Soviet people, and army and navy fighting men will move out for the communist subbotnik in a happy and elated mood. They are impatiently waiting and preparing for this work holiday in this missile unit also. A warm spring breeze waves the colored banner raised in honor of the subunit which was the winner in the competition. This is a moral stimulus for the subordinates of Capt Yu. Rybov who achieved the best indicators in the struggle for economy and thrift. It is completely possible that another subunit will come forward next week. Then the flag will be raised in honor of this subunit.

On the day of the Leninist communist subbotnik the red banner on the flagstaff will be visible far away. The missilemen who are occupying their work positions near the assemblies and systems in order to work in an urgent manner on that day, will see it. Strictly speaking this flag is in their honor.

Electric Power Personnel Praised

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by Lt Col A. Grishin, Moscow AD District: "Without Missing a Beat"]

[Text] The low solid roar of the engine of the diesel electric power station filled in an instant the entire structure of the equipment bay where the persistent smell of heated oil and the fresh paint of the metal cabinets with the equipment normally persists. The deep roar at once covered the other sounds and the electrician on duty, Pvt A. Pavelkovskiy, had guessed before he heard the command of Pfc S. Volodin who ordered the units to be switched into the network. The soldier turned the switch. The arrow of the measuring instrument obediently tore itself from the number and stopped exactly near the required value.

The group commander, Maj V. Bunyakin, glanced at the clock. The power systems had been prepared for operation earlier than the prescribed time. Little time is allotted for the subunit specialists to provide the missile complex with electricity; however, Major Bunyakin's subordinates had learned to better even this severe norm.

No matter what skill operators or launch crew members have mastered, their work will be ineffective if the specialists in the energy complex dawdle. Here, in the spacious and bright structure of the equipment compartment, is born the energy which gives life to the launch mounts, screens, measuring instruments, and control systems.

The pulse of the combat work of the entire collective of missilemen depends on how accurately and reliably the electrical heart beats. A great deal of work is conducted caring for the power systems so that this heart will not skip a beat. Major Bunyakin pays special attention to the daily inspection of the power -supply units,power switchboard, transformers, and electrical transmission lines. When doing this, the specialists carefully check for the presence of oil, fuel and coolants in the systems, and start the unit. The electricians closely watch that there are no leakages of fuel, oil and water or seepage of exhaust gasses.

A matter of special pride for Major Bunyakin's subordinates is the complete cleanliness and strict order in the equipment premises. Adjustment operations at different frequencies are also performed with high quality in the subunit. Special charts, which have been developed based on the network planning method, contribute a great deal to this. They provide an opportunity to determine the most effective procedure for carrying out all adjustment maintenance operations and to check on work time and work quality. Here, the group commander has a reliable helper -- WO [praporshchik] I. Baranovskiy. He has worked with power systems for more than ten years, acquired a great deal of experience, and become the best specialist in the unit. Warrant Officer Baranovskiy eagerly helps beginner power specialists to master their skill and achieve high results in combat training.

A strict account of each minute of operation of the power-supply units is kept in the subunit and a careful check is made of POL expenditures. This procedure produces a noticeable effect -- quite a bit of fuel is saved each month.

Over the course of the last several years there has not been a single case of a misile complex system being put out of operation through the fault of the specialists who service the electrical power-supply units. Major Bunyakin's subordinates act skilfully during all classes and training sessions. The power specialists particularly distinguished themselves during recent exercises which were conducted under complicated conditions. The fighting men prepared the power equipment for combat operations without the slightest delay and accurately carried out all inputs. The subunit completed the winter training period with high indicators.

... The motors of the diesel electric power sets roar together. Power flows uninterruptedly to the launch mounts and indicator screens. The electrical heart of the missile complex operates without missing a beat.

Training Test Results

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by Engr-Col G. Mikhaylov, Moscow AD District: "The Light of Missile Summer Lightning"]

> [Text] Just yesterday, a very cold arctic wind stirred the taiga, and a whistling snowstorm had a good time among the pines and fir trees. But today, a calm clear morning presented itself as if especially for the occasion of the missilemen's assumption of the combat watch. The battalion is on the parade-ground. The sounds of a solemn march carry far and wide in the hollow silence.
>
> In looking at the young missilemen, especially at those of them for whom the words of the combat order are sounding for the first time, I again think about the history and combat journey of this unit and about its military present. During the war years, the antiaircraft artillery regiment covered thousands of kilometers of frontline roads. It was awarded the title of "Guards" for its valor and courage. The exploits of the guards air defensemen were singled out with high military decorations -- many of them posthumously. Brother soldiers sleep the eternal sleep at Moscow, Tula, Kherson, and Vienna. But their glory, like a sacred legacy, is transferred from one generation of guardsmen to another.

During "Peak" Minutes

The training combat firing at the range, which Guards Maj V. Abayev was directing this time, delighted everyone who had occasion to observe it.

Having been pushed away from the launch mount by a stream of fire, the first missile rushed upwards. The fragments of the target, struck down by it, had hardly appeared from the clouds when its neighbor rushed over the sand-hills, driven on by a raging flame. It interrupted the flight of a low altitude target. This tense and dynamic battle was crowned by the strike of a third missile which cut down a radio-controlled target in the stratosphere.

One of the group of officers, who was standing on a sandy prominence not far from the position, exclaimed: "That's class!" It was not difficult to imagine the mood which reigned during those minutes in the very center of the events -- in the control cabin of the missile guidance station. As it later became known, the time segment, which was filled to the limit and into which this entire, rapidly moving duel with an air "enemy" was packed, was saturated for the missilemen headed by launch control officer Maj V. Abayev with surprises to such a degree that, as they say, only iron nerves could bear up and only finely finished skill would not let one down. The culmination of the events was achieved at the moment that operator Guards Pvt S. Pirogovskiy reported the disappearance of the target blip from the indicator screen -- the target with which the gunnery examination for the missilemen would end.

The high-speed target performed such a complicated maneuver in its trajectory at that time that the specialists who were controlling it by radio, marvelled that it withstood the unbelievable aerodynamic strain.

During these "peak" minutes which were strained to the limit, Guards Major Abayev was somehow able to find -- and what is the most important thing-- to implement a plan leading to success.

He gave the command: "Search! Azimuth ...." And so much calmness and even humdrumness was in his voice that the operators, including Guards Private Pirogovskiy, felt for an instant that they were not on a gunnery test but were training on a very normal simulated target. Immediately, the tension subsided, and the men acquired calmness and confidence. A second passed, another .... And as if nothing had happened, Guards Private Pirogovskiy reported: "I have the target! Azimuth...."

When the last target had been destroyed and the missilemen had moved out of the cabin, everyone saw that the uniforms on them were damp as if they had been in a rainstorm. The operators looked delightedly at Guards Major Abayev. Going up to Guards Private Prigorovskiy, he shook his hand firmly. "Thanks! You worked in an excellent manner during the 'peak' minutes!"

The Last Input

The unit was preparing for an exercise. The commander looked at the young soldier calmly. On the one hand, he wanted to have them feel as quickly as possible the breath of real combat. On the other hand -- he experienced doubt. The new men had arrived at the "point" quite recently. They had not even had time yet to receive a rating -- was it not early to entrust them with the performance of such a task?

Then, the commander decided to seek the advice of the soldiers and sergeants in their second year of service. No one knows young soldiers as well as they do. The experienced fighting men declared in one voice that the young replacements would not let him down.

... Over the course of several hours, actual air targets came to the defended objective. The indicator screens were dotted with blips from the aircraft. It seemed that it was not at all within the capability of an individual to delve into such a swarm. However, I am convinced this is not so -- it is within their capability! See how the fingers of operator Guards Private Vladimir Snitki confidently press the numerous buttons!

Everything is taking its normal course. Suddenly, at the very time when Guards Engr-Sr Lt Vyacheslav Prudnikov, having received instructions from the unit's command post had shifted the subunit to radio communications and when the loudspeaker had been turned off, the diesel motor was "put out of action" by an input. Seconds were needed for the electrical equipment to come alive again -- using the reserve diesel motor. As the objective control equipment later showed, the temporary "dying" of the complex did not affect the results of the task performance. The battle continued successfully.

The launch control officer was "put out of action" by a new input. Guards Engr-Sr Lt Vladimir Rassomakhin took his place. The slightest break did not take place in the rhythm of the aerial duel. However, new inputs followed one after the other. The youngest subunit officer took the post of the launch control officer. He also did not waver.

Then, the inspectors, who did not know that young soldiers were seated at the indicator screens at the time, decided to give one more final input. It was important for them to know how the crew would continue the battle if a single engineer and technician did not remain in it.

Tense silence settled in the cabin for a short time. However, the firm voice of the deputy subunit commander for political affairs, officer Aleksandr Georgiyevich Vyrivikhvost, rang out: "Crew! Listen to my command ...." With these words, the officer political worker assumed the functions of the battle director.

But who would occupy the other key post -- who would fill in for the guidance officer? During these seconds, nervousness was reflected even on the faces of the inspectors themselves. There was a moment when it seemed they were ready to call off the input. However, at that moment Guards Private First Class Yevgeniy Izenkov took the guidance officer's place having left a young soldier to fill in for him.

The crew fought in this state for about an hour. During this time, several targets were detected, tracked, and "fired at". The task was carried out successfully.

* * *

The subunit was moving out for the combat watch with a firm measured tread. A song sounded over the formation -- a song about courage, military ability and the sacred loyalty to the traditions of the older generation. The eyes of the missilemen grew warm as if the light of far off missile summer lightning was reflected in them.

Training in Outstanding Unit

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Maj A. Korkin, Siberian Military District: "The Symbols of Expert Launches"]

[Text] The launch mounts stood out as dark spots in the snow which had still not ended. Maj N. Shevchenko as usual inspected the position. The launch personnel had just occupied it from the march and were now preparing to conduct a launch. The officer involuntarily regarded their work with admiration.

He remembered how ardently the missilemen had examined the obligations for the competition to greet the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birthday in a fitting manner, and how stubbornly they had fought to carry them out. The training sessions were replaced by multi-theme field classes, and the hours of self-study by contests and technical quiz games. The missilemen became tan in the winter sun and were tempered in the very cold wind. It seemed that they endured every strain quite easily. One of Shevchenko's colleagues, who visited the subunit on training, jokingly pointed out regarding this: "You were born under a happy star, comrade major. Just think -- for four years in a row you have not yielded first place to anyone." Immediately, as if to excuse the joke, he added: "A star, of course, is not everything. You are lucky in having sensible officers -- this is a fact."

Major Shevchenko is not hearing this for the first time. He knows what stands behind this "luck". Yes, the subunit has held onto the title of "best in the unit" for many years. However, how many outstanding officers have left during this time for promotions! As a rule, military school graduates came to replace them. The formation of each one of them took place far from smoothly.

Was it possible for the commander to really forget how much grief Lt Andrey Markovskiy brought at one time. The officer's capabilities were good, but inertia in training spoiled everything. For some reason, the lieutenant came to believe that he now had enough knowledge for many years. Naturally, the lieutenant, so to say, brought up the rear during the very first summation of competition results.

It was necessary to improve the control over the new man. In order for the lieutenant to properly feel the gaps in his training, Major Shevchenko arranged a contest between the missilemen. Here, Markovskiy graphically saw that he was prepared more poorly than the other officers.

Having been convinced that the subunit could lose its leading place in the competition because he was lagging behind, the young officer recognized -- perhaps for the first time -- his responsibility for the common success and really began to study from that time.

Lt Sergey Zdor also did not enter into the rhythm of the collective without rough spots. However, they did not appear in him the same as in Markovskiy. Zdor had completed school with honors and began to serve diligently with a complete expenditure of effort. However, here is the trouble: The lieutenant devoted a lot of attention to the equipment but a minimum of attention to his subordinates.

Life forced him to reorganize his views both on training and on competition. This took place during the first summing up of results for the month. Major Shevchenko's announcement that Lieutenant Zdor's crew would have to be satisfied with last place was a very complete surprise to him. The poor interchangeability of the specialists had let the crew down.

The young officer had much to think about, especially the so-called moral aspect of competition which is an extremely important factor.

No, the collective is not at all obliged to luck for its accomplishments. An accurate organization, which is sound in every detail, of the training process and of socialist competition and the selfless work of the missilemen -- these are what primarily determine their successes.

The last time I had occasion to be in the subunit was quite recent, just after it had finished a tactical exercise. As always, the missilemen worked first rate during it. Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Moskalenko, who was present during the exercise, commended all the subunit personnel and gave the commander an engraved watch.

I remember how Major Shevchenko at the time went to one of the cabs. There was a long row of red stars on it -- the symbols of expert launchings. The very first ones, the old ones, had already become dim. But those that were at the end were gleaming and bright.

The major smiled at something. He explained to me. The stars had begun to sparkle just on the eve of the Leninist jubilee -- and that Lieutenants Markovskiy and Zdor had set them "on fire" together with everyone else.

Outstanding Battalion Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Parfenov: "All the Targets Have Been Destroyed".

[Text] Southen Group of Forces (from our correspondent).

This air defense missile battalion has been an excellent one for four years in a row. The missilemen are doing everything to hold on to the positions which have been won. During the final inspection which took place, they demonstrated high combat training, completely carried out the socialist obligations which had been adopted for the winter training period, and again confirmed the title of "excellent subunit." All the officers and 80 percent of the sergeants and soldiers have become specialists with an improved rating.

The final inspection began with combat work. Upon the signal, the crews prepared the missile complex for combat quickly and dexterously. After the report of Maj O. Kobylkin who was performing the duties of the subunit commander, a colonel who was a member of the commission, said with satisfaction:

"The time for an excellent norm has been bettered."

However, the main thing was in front of them: detection of the air "enemy" and the performance of training launchings.

The inspectors complicated the situation as much as possible. Several simulated targets entered the zone of fire simultaneously at different altitudes. The screens "blazed up" on the spot from heavy interference. However, this did not decrease the rhythm of the specialist's work. At the necessary moment, Major Kobylkin, the launch control officer, gave the command and Sr Lt A. Sokolov, the guidance officer, performed an accurate launch. After it -- a second, a third ....

Both the launch control officer and the guidance officer are experienced missilemen who have been tested repeatedly in a difficult situation. Major Kobylkin has a high qualification -- an expert, Senior Lieutenant Sokolov is a specialist firstclass. The commander of the launch platoon, Lt V. Sergeyev, is still an officer with little experience; he has not had to act often in such a situation. Moreover, today he had to replace the battery commander. At first, the lieutenant is uneasy and makes mistakes. However, accuracy and confidence are added to his actions with each minute.

One of the systems of the complex was put out of action by an input at the end of the combat work. They demonstrated high training. The commission members drew this conclusion when summing up the results of the inspection.

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MOTORIZED RIFLE UNITS: TRAINING ACTIVITIES

Company Training Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Sr Lt A. Lapynin, Motorized Rifle Company Commander, Red-Banner Siberian Military District: "Only on Paper...."]

[Text] The winter training period is coming to an end. The time is drawing near when every officer must render an account on what he himself has learned and what he has taught his men. Right now each of us is asking himself: have I done everything to improve personal skills and the combat readiness of the subunit?

Naturally this question is also of concern to the officers of our subunit. Not everything, however, depends on us. In particular, commander training classes are held at considerable intervals in our subunits. And yet externally everything seems fine: entries indicating that such classes have been held are regularly made in the registers. Why is this being done? Obviously for the sake of the report. We well know the price of such "paper" classes. They were one of the reasons for the fact that last spring we were unable to rise higher than a mark of satisfactory. It would have seemed that effective measures would be taken at that time to improve organization of combat and political training, including officer training.

But in the summer training period commander training classes with subunit personnel also frequently failed to be held for various reasons. And then rushwork began when the fall inspection was approaching. For example, we worked from morning to late at night copying old summaries on Marxist-Leninist training and distributed training topics among ourselves. Thanks to this "system," the group received a mark of good.

Many were worried. "We shall flunk weapon training for sure!"

The fact is that weapon training with officers is conducted with major departures from method requirements. Weapons are not studied, and problems of fire control are not worked on.... In short, everything boils down to firing. And once again, just as in the spring, we would not have received better than a mark of satisfactory if this time the inspecting personnel had not turned out to be more obliging: we were also tested only on firing proper.

A brief tactical training exercise was held, with considerable unnecessary relaxation of demands. The tactical situation had been hastily transferred with tracing paper to prior-prepared maps. But it was necessary in addition to make a decision and assign missions to the subunits. This became a stumbling block for some. In order to save the day, the regimental executive officer, taking advantage of the fact that no inspecting officer was present, dictated a decision to us. And to ensure that the wording was not glaringly identical, he recommended that each of us rearrange the wording at our own discretion. As a result we received a mark of good on this as well.

Naturally such "successes" are not a source of gratification to us. And we are awaiting the coming test and inspection with considerable nervousness, for everything is continuing as before in the current training year. Again classes fail to be held and are conducted on a low organizational level. Even subunit commander meetings have had poor officer attendance. And these training methods meetings are not methodologically instructive. The officers were not even tested on the basic points of guideline documents for the current training year, although the training schedule called for this. Unfortunately matters pertaining to organizing competition and ensuring effectiveness of competition also failed to be discussed at these meetings.

It is of course unpleasant to talk about the negative aspects of life in our regiment. But one cannot remain silent, for the main thing is combat training, the high quality of which should be a matter of primary concern for each and every commander. I am convinced that we have every capability to receive high marks -- not phony ones, but deserved marks.

Regiment Air Defense Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by Gds Sr Lt I. Kushelev: "Fire Expert"]

[Text] A red-black wall of flame and smoke was advancing deep into the "aggressor's" defenses. Even with the naked eye one could see plumes of smoke from shellbursts rising far beyond the forward edge of the battle area -- artillery fire was continuing. Aircraft were mounting bombing attacks.

It seemed that the "aggressor" would no longer be able to offer resistance. But the motorized riflemen had hardly deployed from a line of platoon columns into battle formation when enemy helicopters appeared from behind the serrated forest edge. Swooping down, they were about to deliver fire on the infantry combat vehicles and tanks which were advancing just ahead.

The helicopters' actions, however, were anticipated by the regiment's antiaircraft defense subunits. The combat vehicles spat fire at the helicopters. Rocket missiles hissed toward the air targets. The "aggressor's" air attack was repulsed.

But Gds Lt Col F. Il'menev, the motorized rifle regiment's air defense commander, knew that the "aggressor" would attempt another attack, especially on the motorized rifle battalion which was advancing in the advanced guard. The officer sent instructions by radio to Gds Maj V. Firsov, who was serving as acting battery commander at the exercise, stating the possible direction of an "aggressor" air attack.

When the tankers and motorized riflemen penetrated the main line of resistance, helicopter gunships again appeared. Their attack, however, was not a surprise. The helicopters had been spotted by prior-assigned spotters in the motorized rifle companies. The antiaircraft gunners were also on the alert. This time their fire proved even more effective.

This was not the first success achieved by the antiaircraft gunners of the motorized rifle regiment. Suffice it to say that they have received nothing but marks of excellent at all combat training firing exercises in recent years. Guards Lieutenant Colonel Il'menev has been awarded the Order of the Red Star for excellent achievement in combat and political training. The Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces presented him with a valuable gift. On the basis of socialist competition results, Il'menev was awarded first prize among regimental air defense commanders in the district.

One cannot help but think about the enviable stability of the excellent results of this leading officer. How are they being achieved? First and foremost by an innovative approach to organization of the training process and socialist competition. For example, new training method recommendations were received by the regiment. They have been thoroughly tested, so they can be simply adopted and applied. But even in this case Guards Lieutenant Colonel Il'menev "will not deny himself the pleasure" of examining the methods with an eye to improvement. And he frequently succeeds in finding additional reserve potential where it would seem that there is none.

Guards Lieutenant Colonel Il'menev also teaches his subordinates to employ the same approach to training specialists and equipment operation and maintenance. Following his example, officers V. Firsov, G. Ratovskiy, I. Tomaka, Gds WOs N. Mironov and N. Fedorov are constantly seeking the most efficient ways to accomplish training tasks.

Once Il'menev became acquainted with a method, just adopted in the antiaircraft battery, of accelerated training of specialists arriving from training subunits. He immediately appraised its merits. Gathering together all officers and warrant officers and explaining to them the essence of the new innovation, the guards lieutenant colonel asked them to think about what changes should be made in the method so that it could be utilized with equal effectiveness in all subunits. An exchange of views began, and a heated debate. The optimal solution was found through joint efforts.

At one post-exercise critique the regimental air defense commander presented a suggestion which in his opinion should substantially improve control of antiaircraft subunits by radio. They put his recommendation to a practical test -- the result proved worse than normal performance. Everybody else was ready to give up, but Il'menev persisted. He argued with clarity and persuasively that initial results should be somewhat worse. This was natural. As the specialists improve and reinforce the new skills, however, performance results will definitely improve. As time showed, the officer was right.

Guards Lieutenant Colonel Il'menev also teaches his subordinates with errors, and they do sometimes occur. Once during an exercise a motorized rifle battalion, having executed a maneuver, fell behind schedule during a river crossing. In this situation antiaircraft platoon commander Gds WO N. Mironov should have moved some of his weapons across to the far bank. But he erred and was late in issuing the appropriate instructions. As a result the antiaircraft crews failed to accomplish their mission in optimal fashion.

This incident was analyzed at a meeting of officers and warrant officers. Soon Gds Sr Lt A. Timoshenko, the regimental armored service chief, held at Il'menev's request special training classes for officers and warrant officers of the air defense subunits. Subsequently with his assistance adjustments were made in the training exercise and combined training drill schedules for air defense personnel.

I recently encountered Guards Lieutenant Colonel Il'menev out on the training ground. Antiaircraft crews were providing the regiment's subunits with cover against air attack during a march. Some air defense weapons were proceeding with the battalion in the advance guard. Firing was being performed both during daylight hours and at night. The men showed signs of fatigue, but their eyes were sparking with joy. The antiaircraft crews had performed all combat-training tasks with a mark of excellent. This means that they had made a weighty contribution to the campaign to honor in a worthy manner the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth and the 35th anniversary of Victory.

Regiment Training Results

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Parfenov, Southern Group of Forces: "Examination on the Training Ground"]

[Text] The muffled booming of artillery could be heard somewhere in the distance, beyond the command-observation post. Plumes of smoke from shellbursts began drifting skyward at the strong points of the defending force.

Preliminary artillery bombardment for the assault had begun. Shells were falling thick and heavy.

"The gunners are doing a good job. They are hitting the targets precisely," the general noted with satisfaction, observing the field proficiency of the unit's personnel.

Gds Lt Col A. Korzh, who was busy with fire control, appeared not to react to these words of praise. But his precise, laconic instructions seemed to increase in vigor.

When the tankers and motorized riflemen, having penetrated the defense, were advancing deep, the artillery battalions proceeded to move to the new firing position area. At this moment they were faced with an even more difficult test. The column had just crossed a knoll when targets appeared and scenario instructions were received: "'Aggressor' tanks to the left. Destroy without halting."

The battery under the command of Gds Sr Lt S. Chapovskiy had the job of repulsing the counterattack. The gun crews, surpassing performance standards, deployed their weapons and opened direct fire. The majority of targets were hit on the first rounds.

At another point the men of Gds Capt A. Golubkov engaged tanks. This battery also demonstrated a high degree of precision and accuracy of fire.

The regiment portrayed a different picture at the beginning of the winter training period. Not all officers, especially those who had recently completed service school, possessed firm skills in artillery preparation. This was noted following a number of graded exercises on complex topics. The skill of the young commanders improved gradually, but steadily. And now the inspecting officers are giving high marks to their battlefield performance. What helped the artillerymen make such an appreciable forward stride in improving their combat proficiency?

First of all, it is close attention to organization of the training process and a vigorous campaign to improve the quality of training classes, a campaign which was kept going strong throughout the entire training period. The level of artillery gunnery drills and firing exercises in the regiment particularly improved. Conditions on the gunnery range were made steadily more complex. Failure to hold or complete a training drill was taken seriously, and this ensured completion of the training schedule and programs.

Throughout the entire winter officer professional training was unremittingly monitored by the regimental commander and his staff. The party organization closely examined this training. The unit's officers are active participants in socialist competition. They became regular competitors for the honor of the title of best artillery officer. Gds Sr Lt V. Strel'nikov, for example, is maintaining his leading position among battery commanders.

Hero of the Soviet Union Gds Maj I. Bykov is permanently on the rolls of the battery which he commands. Bykov commanded this subunit during the war. The men of this battery are preserving and building upon the fine traditions of the combat veterans. For the fourth performance test in a row now the men of this battery have earned a mark of excellent in performance of fire missions. The experience and know-how of Guards Senior Lieutenant Strel'nikov and the battery he commands have been assimilated by the rest of the regiment and by all officers.

In the course of winter training, the regiment continued developing and improving training facilities. A new rifle and artillery range made it possible to improve quality and effectiveness of training drills. A small indoor-type rifle range was set up right on the post, usually used for rifle practice by those who are on garrison duty detail and cannot attend scheduled training activities.

Painstaking work by the commanding officer, his staff, and the party organization has produced fine results: unit personnel are honoring the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth and the 35th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War with full achievement of socialist pledges.

Criticism: Follow-Up Report

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Apr 80 p 2

[Unattributed article: "What Is Hindering Us"]

[Text] This title appeared above a letter by Capt Sh. Gabasov, commander of a motorized rifle battalion, published in the 29 February issue. The letter stated that training facilities at the unit where the author of the letter serves fail to meet today's demands.

As was reported to the editors by the regimental commander and deputy commander for political affairs, the newspaper article was discussed at an expanded meeting of the party committee with the participation of subunit commanders and chiefs of arms and services. Measures were specified for correcting the deficiencies reported in the letter. The party committee discussed at one of its meetings the question of work progress on training facilities. Equipping of target ranges is presently in the completion stages.

At the same time the response received from the regiment states that correction of a number of deficiencies noted in the letter requires the assistance of higher echelons.

Training Aids Described

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by Capt N. Panyukov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District: "Final Training Drills in Progress: With the Aid of Simulators"]

[Text] The inspecting officer introduced changes into the tactical situation and made the target display variants more diversified. The men on the line -- the gunner-operators and infantry combat vehicle commanders -- from the company under the command of Gds Capt Yu. Vokhmintsev, however, received no mark below excellent or good. All shells hit the targets, and the machinegun bursts were delivered with accuracy.

"This way we'll use up all the targets," joked the specialists operating the range equipment. They were proud of their fellow soldiers.

The company received a mark of excellent in weapon training. The inspecting officer noted the ability of the motorized riflemen to gain their bearings in a complex situation, correctly to determine range to the target, and to prepare swiftly to deliver accurate fire.

Praise of the company's motorized riflemen was also spoken after they completed the combat vehicle driving exercise. All drivers earned marks of excellent.

"The cause of this success," stated Guards Captain Vokhmintsev, "lies in the fact that we utilized our training facilities, particularly the various simulators, efficiently and with full work loading."

The motorized riflemen indeed have fine simulator devices. The drivers, for example, are very fond of the motion picture assisted simulators. They make it possible in the course of a training class to drive, of course in simulation, on the most varied routes and to negotiate the most complex obstacles: the motorized riflemen have a large film library. It is more difficult to "drive" a vehicle with the film-assisted simulator than on the actual terrain. One must make decisions instantly. The equipment permits the instructor to record not only mistakes, for which the grade is marked down, but also the slightest errors in the driver's actions. Vehicle driving shortcomings are immediately indicated on a special illuminated display.

The unit has a simulator for firing drills with a real target layout without expending ammunition. Vehicle movement is simulated with electric motors. Shells and cartridges are replaced by an electron beam.

Test training classes convincingly indicate that skillful, well-managed utilization of modern simulators produces excellent results. A high degree of field proficiency is achieved in a short time and with minimal material outlays.

Battalion Training Results

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by Col R. Dukov: "By the Measure of Combat"]

[Text] Pursuing the retreating "aggressor," the motorized rifle battalion under the command of Maj N. Romashin was approaching his intermediate defensive position. According to intelligence, this position was not adequately fortified, and the battalion commander made the decision to continue the advance. A swift rush forward enabled the battalion to accomplish the mission assigned by the regimental commander -- to beat the "aggressor's" reserves in reaching a tactically advantageous position.

At first events were developing well for the battalion. During the night the motorized riflemen penetrated the "aggressor's" intermediate defensive position and reached the river by dawn. Beyond the river was the objective specified in the regimental commander's order.

"The company commanders report that they are almost out of fuel," the battalion executive officer reported at this time.

This was, as they say, food for thought. Major Romashin, however, did not attach importance to the report. He firmly decided to continue fighting. And in general his decision looked rather attractive on the commander's battle map. Two companies, taking up an advantageous position on the far bank of the river, were frontally meeting advancing "aggressor" reserves, while the third company, deployed in the woods, was waiting for the signal to mount a flank attack. Thus the "aggressor" would be crushed before even deploying.... That was the plan. In actuallity, however, things worked out differently.

While withdrawing beyond the river, the "aggressor" was able to blow up the bridge, and the companies would be forced to cross the river afloat. As we know, motorized riflemen are accustomed to such operations. Equipped with modern amphibious vehicles, they are capable of accomplishing a hasty crossing of the most diversified water obstacles. But on this occasion many vehicles ground to a halt after barely reaching the riverbank -- they had run out of fuel. The riflemen were forced to dismount before they had intended.

There was no possibility of beating the "aggressor" at taking up an advantageous position if they had to advance on foot -- the difference in speed was too great. Therefore Major Romashin was now placing all his hopes on the left-flank company which stood concealed in the woods. It could still save the day, attacking the "aggressor" in the flank and rear.

But this was not to be: this company as well, also out of fuel, was unable to complete its mission. The engagement, which had begun well for the battalion, was lost.

The battalion commander and the other participants in the exercise were genuinely upset over the failed operation. At the same time some officers, sympathizing with Major Romashin, were saying: "Just a matter of bad luck...."

It was precisely this which bothered me most of all. Combat veterans probably always view what is taking place in the line units through the prism of experience gained in battle. And this is understandable, for now and then we had to pay dearly for our mistakes. This field exercise incident reminded me of combat in the Ukraine in 1943.

A rifle regiment, supported by the fire of an artillery battalion, was successfully advancing. Soon, however, it was counterattacked by superior enemy forces. At this point we were about to run out of ammunition. We were forced to retreat while heavily engaged, yielding back to the enemy native soil which had been wrested from the foe at great effort. And all this happened because somebody failed to provide the subunits with all requisite supplies at the proper time.

Analyzing the reasons for such deficiencies in performing the job of combat support of subunits at field exercises (and unfortunately these are not rare occurrences), one reaches the following conclusion: most frequently that commander who is accustomed to attention to form rather than contents, unnecessary relaxation of demands and unwarranted situation simplifications in daily training activities, "becomes carried away" in combat, forgetting about so-called "minor matters."

During this spring's field proficiency testing I was present at exercises conducted by a number of subunits and units. It was gratifying to see the improved field proficiency of the motorized riflemen, tankers, artillerymen, and representatives of special troops. However, I and other representatives of the Ground Forces Main Combat Training Directorate also encountered facts of a different kind, and in particular failure properly to appreciate matters of combat support, as well as unnecessary relaxation of demands. Some commanders, for example, attempted to perform personal reconnaissance in full view of the "aggressor." Sometimes we would see at exercises land-mine simulators flash under tank tracks, but nobody would pay any attention to it, and the tanks would continue crossing minefields in this "manner." All this is a consequence of unnecessary relaxation of demands in the training routine.

There is also, however, one additional aspect to this problem.

Practical experience convinces us that both the setbacks of the battalion under the command of Major Romashin and the deficiencies noted in other subunits during proficiency testing are a consequence of flaws in commander training. Let us take such a matter as support of combat operations. As we know, according to the commander training program an officer should have the ability to do many things, including organization of all types of support. Time is specially allocated for working on these items within the commander training system. In the course of a training exercise, for example, officers of the specific arms and special troops, as well as deputy commanders for technical matters should work together with combined-arms commanders. They work on problems of organization for combat, comprehensive combat support and cooperation in performance of combat missions.

This is the way it should be. We must admit, however, that one does not see this very often at commander training activities. Even less frequently is practical work done on matters connected with replenishing supplies and refueling during combat, evacuation of wounded, and recovery of damaged equipment. And yet an officer must have the ability to organize all this. There are no minor items in combat. When readying for an attack, for example, a commander should know precisely with what he is going into combat and what point he can reach with the fuel remaining. To correct shortcomings connected with organization of support of combat operations of subunits means to boost their combat readiness to an even higher level.

Division Training Results

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Gaponov, Chief of Staff, Pacific Motorized Rifle Division, Red-Banner Far Eastern Military District: "Regimental Achievements"]

[Text] On the desk before me were the results of the most recent final training exercises conducted under the supervision of the combined unit's staff officers. I was comparing them with what had been achieved by the regiments in the last training year. The combined unit's performance results on the whole were better this time. One more detail was clearly evident -- the regiments' grading marks had become more uniform. A previously lagging unit had noticeably improved. And in some indices, such as weapon training, it had even surpassed the leaders. In short, the men had done a good job. We see in this the effectiveness of the campaign to become a leading combined unit, special impetus to which has been given by the competition to honor in a worthy manner the anniversary of Lenin's birth and the 35th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War.

We shall of course be weighing in detail the contribution of each and every military collective and each and every officer to the campaign to achieve excellent overall results in competition. We shall also definitely discuss reserve potential. At this point I should like to talk about the wealth of potential contained in regiment competition.

It was not so long ago when this seemed too complicated a matter for many officers, including at division headquarters. There were indeed unclear items. For example, what does one do to ensure that competing regiments are constantly monitoring each other's achievements? Or does one maintain constant contact between them?

We began with study, together with regiment and division leader personnel, of the methods manual on organizing competition between units, prepared by the district political directorate. We then discussed at a meeting of the division headquarters party organization any questions which arose. We reached the following conclusion: we possess all conditions to ensure effective competition among regiments. It is very important in this regard that training exercises be conducted at a single training center, at the same facility, so that one can always compare results, and competition begins with this. In addition, unit staff officers get together on a regular basis at meetings and conferences held at the division level. Meetings of party activists, methods conferences, demonstration classes, various seminars, review-competitions, and contests between subunits are held periodically in the combined unit.... Thus the forms of contacts are also diversified. They make it possible to arrange military competition between regiments and to adopt from one another all new and advanced innovations in a flexible and efficient way.

Soon everybody became convinced of this in a practical manner. At one time our regiments poorly handled training methods for combat vehicle drivers. Only the motorized rifle battalion under the command of Capt V. Seryakov did well. Not so long ago this battalion also had problems. However, the battalion was able to catch up in short order and even to become one of the leaders. How did Captain Seryakov and his men succeed in accomplishing this? The most important factor was the training facility for training vehicle drivers, with personnel addressing the matter of improving facilities in a responsible manner. In the other subunits facilities remained the same, although everything requisite for their improvement was available. We discussed this at an officers' conference held each month at the combined unit level. It was recommended that representatives be sent to leading units to study training facilities and driver training methods. This proved useful.

Conferences are always held in a spirit of demandingness. We saw that if one makes mention a few times of shortcomings in the work style of a given commander, political worker or staff, they soon begin displaying initiative and seeking contacts with competition rivals. Now one can frequently see, for example, in the course of field exercises or following meetings and conferences, commanders of competing regiments, battalions, companies, platoons, and staff officers conferring with one another. Lively contacts promote mutual enrichment with experience and know-how in organizing competition.

Of course it would be wrong to think that in organizing competition between regiments we rely solely and entirely on initiative on the part of the competitors themselves. The organizing element in this business is the political section and division headquarters staff. The division commander devotes close attention to these problems. We help unit headquarters staffs objectively appraise their work performance results and methods, and we compare them.

The smoothness and efficiency of regimental headquarters staff operations are checked, for example. They operate independently, separately from one another, at exercises. But how is it possible to determine and appraise the work style and methods of each? This is a matter for the division headquarters staff. They also synthesize advanced know-how in this area. At one headquarters, for example, the chiefs of arms and services are vigorously enlisted to work on the operation plan, while at another headquarters this is for some reason not done. Division staff officers seek to ensure that in all units specialists take part in operation planning.

Many such questions arise, with the division headquarters staff participating in finding the solution. Overlapping with utilization of training facilities would occur. A battalion would arrive at the training center, for example, and the subunits of another regiment would still be working there. This is where problems of coordination begin. An examination of the situation was made. It was necessary to revise certain documents and to work harder on matters of planning combat training. Now every time the week's training performance results are totaled up in the subunits and training activity schedules are prepared, division directorate representatives are sent in to help commanders.

Uniform procedures on methods of conducting various training activities are elaborated and ratified in like manner. This is always done taking into consideration the opinion of various experts. Using as an example one of the regiment's leading subunits, we demonstrate to all commanders an illustrative version of conduct of a training activity on some highly complex topic, after which the officers discuss the activity and present their comments and suggestions. Naturally some things are rejected in the course of such an exchange of views, while something important, valuable, which originated in another subunit, is adopted by all.

Of course in the regiments we note in advance and thoroughly study everything to be recommended for extensive adoption. This job is usually assumed by unit headquarters staffs, while at combined unit headquarters suggestions received from the regiments are carefully studied by a team of experienced officers headed by Lt Col N. Sosyurko.

Today as well, when the results of winter combat training are analyzed, the innovative search in methodology, in the work style of the various echelons of the division organism, which determine the effectiveness of regiment competition, is continuing. We had a detailed discussion of this at an open party meeting under the slogan "Live, Work and Struggle in the Leninist, Communist Manner," involving the participation of representatives of competing regiments. The new influx of enthusiasm in young personnel, which is bringing Komsomol fervor to the campaign for leading combined unit, was evoked by a recent Lenin lesson entitled "We are studying and building communism in a Leninist manner."

The division commander and political section pay constant attention to matters pertaining to organization of competition between regiments. We all see our task as, building from what has already been achieved, mobilizing unutilized reserve potential in regiment competition, and achieving in the summer training period additional success in the campaign for the leading combined unit and for increasing combat readiness.

Helicopter Support Described

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col Yu. Romanov, Red-Banner Transcaucasian Military District: "Wings of Motorized Riflemen"]

> [Text] The infantry combat vehicle -- swift, highly maneuverable, and well-armed -- has long since become the embodiment of the technical might of today's motorized rifleman. But in mock battle, especially in the mountains, the soldier sometimes is seen with another vehicle as well -- the helicopter. Today's "infantryman" has learned to utilize the advantages of the helicopter.

Smashing pockets of "aggressor" resistance, the advancing troops proceeded toward "Ice" pass. Intelligence reported that the "aggressor" had planted mines along the mountain pass in the vicinity of Peak 2840 and had set up a company strong point there, covering the road onto the pass. The senior commander decided to employ an airborne tactical assault force consisting of a motorized rifle battalion to seize the pass.

The helicopters took to the air. They flew past snow-blanketed mountains, which were becoming ever higher and more rugged.... Our two-helicopter flight skirted a projecting cliff and headed toward the objective. Through the open door of the flight deck I could see a segment of the mountain panorama. Against the background of the snow-framed slopes, the placid face of flight leader Capt O. Panov, concentrating on the job at hand, also seemed carved from stone.

The "aggressor," designated by a group of targets, appeared in the distance. The helicopters opened fire on the targets at long range with rockets. The rocket attack was impressive from the air: clouds of dust and puffs of smoke rose skyward from the heights where the "aggressor" had dug in. A very large area was receiving fire.

"Prepare to land!" instructed Sr Lt A. Ivanov, commander of the landing zone seizure team, to the personnel on board our MI-8 and the motorized riflemen on board the wing helicopter.

Ivanov was described in a militarily concise manner. Son of a combat veteran and the best company commander in the combined unit.

The assault troops performed with speed and precision. The blisters were swung open, as was the door. A stiff wind and loud engine noise invaded the cabin. Assault rifles and machineguns were secured to swivel mounts.

"Fire!"

The cabin of the transport helicopter was filled with the chatter of machinegun fire and gunpowder smoke. Down below the dust and smoke cloud following the rocket attack had barely dispersed, when the "aggressor" was hit by a storm of aimed small-arms fire.

One could sense from everything which was happening that the motorized riflemen were just as accustomed to the helicopter as to the infantry combat vehicle. That is understandable, for today the helicopter is an indispensable tool in mountain terrain. If necessary, the MI-6 will even carry an infantry combat vehicle wherever it is needed.

The motorized riflemen jumped out of the helicopter onto the ground, attacked the surviving "aggressor" troops boldly and resolutely, and took control of the landing zone. The reconnaissance effort did not cease for a single minute, and mine-clearing activities commenced. The mountains echoed back the simulated shellbursts, machinegun and assault rifle bursts.

The helicopters carrying the main assault force were approaching without delay. In the meantime the wind picked up. The wind gauge held by helicopter flight leader Capt F. Yung, who was standing alongside the assault force commander, Maj I. Levitskiy, was spinning madly.

"Gusting above 20 meters per second," the captain reported with concern in his voice, glancing at the wind gauge scale.

The wind in the mountains was fierce. Not even the noise of battle and the roaring of the helicopter engines could drown it out. The wind gusts were making it difficult to breathe and even to remain standing. and yet helicopters were operating, and not only at this objective. What other assault force than a heliborne force would be possible right now in this sloping rocky valley, compressed between mountains?

Over to the left, helicopters carrying the motorized riflemen of the flanking detachment swept past a ridgetop saddle. The detachment was being led by Lt Yu. Timofeyev. A few minutes later we received word by radio that the detachment was engaged. The tempo of events was swift. Comparisons involuntarily came to mind. Once I was in a flanking detachment which climbed on foot high into the Tian Shan mountains. It was an incredibly difficult and long journey, both physically and mentally exhausting. Now the same journey is being accomplished in minutes by helicopter.

The fighting was becoming increasingly more intense. The "aggressor" was holding firm and maneuvering his reserves. His mortar fire was highly effective.

Major Levitskiy requested additional firepower. Helicopters brought in tractor-towed mountain guns and mortars. Gun crews from the batteries under the command of Sr Lt V. Stolyarov and Lt N. Shmat quickly took up firing positions and opened fire, utilizing target designations from a spotter aircraft.

Another helicopter -- an Mi-8 -- was planting mines on the flank of the flanking detachment. Approaching "aggressor" tank reserves were spotted. The mine-laying helicopter flew low over the road, placing onto the ground with pinpoint precision heavy dark-green disk-shaped mines. The tanks could not bypass them, and time, so precious in combat, would be gained.

The motorized riflemen launched a decisive assault. Smashing through the last "aggressor" roadblocks, they advanced swiftly toward the mountain pass. Chattering bursts of small-arms fire delivered by the flanking detachment could be heard on the reverse slopes. The defending force was unable to withstand assault both from the front and rear.

Major Levitskiy lowered his binoculars. The mission was accomplished, but the assault force commander still had many things to do. It was necessary to set up a perimeter defense and to ensure that the captured mountain pass would be held. Helicopters continued darting back and forth in the air overhead. They were conducting reconnaissance, evacuating "wounded," and delivering ammunition and rations....

3024
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COMBAT ENGINEERS: DIVER TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by Capt V. Rodin: "Underwater Combat Engineers"]

[Text] Pushing off from the edge of the ice, Gds Jr Sgt Ye. Kuznetsov slowly descended through the break in the ice. The diver's movements were careful and steady. This was not the first time he had been tasked to set up a crossing, to build underwater engineering structures, to lay or remove a minefield... He had about 150 hours operating under water to his credit. In other words, almost 20 work shifts. He had always accomplished the mission in a quality manner. Lessons learned from Gds Capt G. Skoba and WO [praporshchik] V. Sidenko came to the fore. These lessons helped him, as they had the other young combat engineers, gain psychological steadfastness and the ability to skillfully, prudently operate under water.

Today's activities are regular practical training. Kuznetsov must locate a sunken mine and bring it to the surface. The difficulty lies in doing this under the ice. Such missions are possible during actual combat. And, during training, do not always seem like training.

Members of the unit [chast'] remember well one incident. During a tactical exercise when tanks were crossing a frozen swamp, one fell into the quagmire. Master diver WO V. Sidenko and two subordinates were ordered to attach a tow cable to it. After several dives, they discovered that the tank was under a 4-meter thick layer of peat. The divers also had to penetrate this layer of peat. This was a most difficult test, but the guardsmen accomplished the assigned mission. They rescued the crew and saved the expensive piece of equipment.

...Having received the signal that Kuznetsov already was on the bottom, exercise director Gds Cpt G. Skoba lightly tugged on the signal line--a thin firm cord connecting the diver with the surface. This is a query about the diver's condition. In answer the cord moved back and forth--the diver feels fine.

Gds Cpt G. Skoba naturally un[illegible]ds that things are not easy right now for Kuznetsov. The bottom is silty and there are many rocks there. The light of day barely penetrates through the layer of ice to the diver 8 meters under the water. The light from the flashlight also has difficulty penetrating the dark water.

Several seconds pass and the figure of the diver, wreathed in the diving suit, is reflected in the mirror of the water. The heavy mine lies on the ice.

Gds Cpt G. Skoba stops the stop watch. The norm is overfulfilled. The next combat engineer, young diver Pvt V. Vorob'yev, descends into the water. This is his first practical training under the ice.

7869
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OFFICERS' COMMAND TRAINING: METHODS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Maj Tatusov, Red Banner Kiev Military District: "In the New Job"]

[Text] Assignment to a higher position is a joyful event for every officer. Who is there that is not really moved by this, who is not proud when this occurs? The very fact itself says that the officer is rated highly, is highly trusted, and great hopes are placed on his creative capabilities.

However, a new, more responsible job also means more work and greater service responsibilities. An intense feeling of responsibility accompanies the pride the officer feels. Prior to the promotion he is well thought of by the command, but how will things go in the new job? It is quite natural that he wants to rapidly demonstrate his abilities in the new job, to achieve real success. The absolute majority of officers has this goal as they improve the organization of the training and indoctrinational process, of competition, as they concern themselves with following established procedures firmly. Success, stable and steadfast success, accrues thereto.

But, there are cases when a young commander artificially "forces" his development, strives at any cost to achieve notable results. Let them be of an unstable, temporary nature, it is important for the individual to be visible, to be a topic of discussion, to be noticed.

...During one exercise, the battery commanded by Capt V. Lobov achieved unexpectedly low results. This bothered the unit [chast'] commander, staff officers, the political workers. The fact was that Lobov was looked upon as an energetic officer, a knowledgeable specialist.

There was a need to look into the failure. Was this an anomaly? It turned out that it was not, there was a reason for it. They had not in time noticed Lobov's desire, as mentioned above, to achieve success at any cost, to be among the progressives. The battery commander tried to do a great deal himself, rather than consistently and productively train his subordinate officers and NCOs, rather than hold them strictly responsible for fulfilling their assigned tasks. This to him seemed the fastest road to positive results. And, only after the battery had won first place did he attempt to eliminate this short cut in his work style and place more attention on the methodological and command training of the officers and NCOs.

As we see, Lobov achieved initial success at the price of great effort on his part. But, the underlying foundation was weak. Lobov's subordinate officers and NCOs had already become accustomed to counting on the commander and they did not demonstrate the requisite initiative and aggressiveness. They awaited the battery commander's decision in cases where they should have operated independently. By the way, this serious deficiency full manifested itself also during the exercise when the battery earned the low rating.

It goes without saying that such a lesson is not cost free. Lobov understood everything; he had critically overestimated his own work style. Senior comrades helped him greatly. The errors were eliminated, but this was not achieved overnight.

One must also mention that assignment to a higher position creates in some officers the illusion of exclusiveness. They think they can cope easily with the new, more complex responsibilities by using their unusual capabilities. An officer taking this "simplified" approach to evaluation of his strengths and capabilities forgets to think about bringing himself up to snuff, about bringing the level of his ideological-political, special, and methodological training up to a level equating to that of the new job. And, such a delusion is costly.

That is exactly what happened to Sr Lt V. Kuleshov. Given a promotion, he thought he knew it all, thought he could do anything, and would put his best face forward immediately at his new duty assignment. But, the days and weeks went by and it became clear to everyone what Kuleshov lacked as an organizer, educationalist, and specialist. It came time to train and learn the required skills and leading know-how. But, Kuleshov decided to have his own unique "holiday."

Senior comrades pointed out his errors, gave him advice, warned him, but he did not take this to heart. Things came down to Kuleshov becoming negligent on the job and undisciplined. The senior chief decided to remove him from the job, demote him, and transfer him.

It goes without saying that such cases are not the norm. As a rule, an officer promoted to a new position puts forth his full efforts, his full passion to service, to mastery of the new tasks and responsibilities. I must tell you about one such officer--Capt V. Khirov.

I first met Khirov when he had just taken over a battalion. Prior to this he had successfully commanded a battery and had brought it to the forefront. We discussed how to begin his job in the battalion. Khirov is modest and soft spoken. He set to work without fanfare, confidently, exactingly. He steadfastly saw to it that each officer, warrant officer, and NCO fully and carefully accomplished his functional responsibilities. He taught, nurtured, and assisted those who were not completely successful. He skillfully employed the force of the party and Komsomol organization to solve problems of combat readiness and of improving the effectiveness and quality of the training and indoctrinational process.

integrated lessons soon were held in the battalion. The unit commander decided to personally check on how they were set up. Then the lessons began. You could sense that each lesson element had been carefully thought through and worked out. There were no hitches or breakdowns. Khirov guided his subordinates confidently and in a businesslike manner. It was apparent that they understood him implicitly.

Naturally, the unit commander had advice and comments for the battalion commander. But, he was clear on one thing. Khirov's development in his new job was going well.

A bit later I again had occasion to visit the battalion. I talked with the people and almost everyone had something nice to say about Khirov. This is what Lt Ozyumenko had to say:

"I was real fortunate to learn from a commander like Capt Khirov."

Ozyumenko had been called up from the reserve. He elected to remain on active duty. Capt Khirov helped him acquire command and methodological skills. The lieutenant is now a first-class specialist, leads an excellent crew, and was recently assigned a higher position. Ozyumenko proudly told me that communist Khirov had recommended him for party membership.

Now let's return to Sr Lt Kuleshov. When he was removed from his job, he requested assignment to Capt Khirov's battalion. He explained this desire by saying that he wanted to learn the mastery of command from Khirov.

We should mention that the two were students together in military school and took their first steps as commanders together. Now, critically evaluating his attitude towards service, Kuleshov regrets all the mistakes he has made.

Now things are going well for Kuleshov. He is diligently learning Capt Khirov's know-how and his work style. This again convinces us of the correctness of the decision made.

The first steps in a new job are both very difficult and very responsible. They remain in one's memory for a long time, if not for a lifetime. Naturally, the success of an officer's first steps to a great degree depends upon senior comrades, on their friendly support, advice, and assistance. Nonetheless, an officer's development in a new job also depends greatly on himself, on his zeal, diligence, developed sense of responsibility, ability to critically evaluate his actions, to seek and find the best ways to solve the most complex problems. Life and practice convince us of this.

7869
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NATO: SOVIET COMMENTS ON FIELD ARTILLERY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Apr 80 p 3

[Article by Engr-Lt Col V. Miryanin, candidate of technical sciences, and Engr-Lt Col V. Talanov, candidate of technical sciences: "In Infantry Combat Formations"]

[Text] Foreign military specialists look upon maximum employment of firepower as a basic condition for success in modern combat. In this connection, special attention is paid to improved field artillery mobility. Until recently, this problem overseas mainly was solved by creation of self-propelled guns possessing good roadability and relatively high speeds of movement. Such qualities permit them to move within troop combat formations. Self-propelled guns now are the basic artillery weapon in the NATO ground forces. It appears that towed guns have outlived their usefulness.

However, based upon generalized exercise experience and analysis of artillery employment in specific theaters of operations, foreign specialists have concluded that towed guns are irreplaceable when accomplishing certain missions, especially in broken, adverse terrain. Apparently, therefore, at the present time the development of new and the upgrading of TO&E 155mm towed guns are underway. Thus, the FH-70, FH-77, XM-198, and upgraded M114-A1 155mm guns have appeared. It should be stated that this is the same 155mm gun that has been selected as the basic means of artillery support for the NATO ground forces in the 1980's. What are these guns like?

The FH-70 155mm gun-howitzer (lower photo) [photo not reproduced] is often called the West European howitzer in the press. Specialists from England, the FRG, and Italy participated in its design. According to MILITARY REVIEW, development has been completed and 500-550 such howitzers are to enter the NATO inventory. The FH-77 (upper photo) [photo not reproduced] was ordered by the Swedish Defense Ministry. It began entering the Swedish Army inventory in 1978. The new American XM-198 howitzer also recently entered the U.S. Army inventory. All are the towed type of gun. Also, they are equipped with their own motors for increased maneuverability on the field of battle, thus converting them to self-powered rather than self-propelled guns.

Such guns, according to design concept, can independently move on the field of battle at a speed of 5-20 km/hr over broken terrain, surmount small obstacles, and even ford shallow rivers. In other words, they independently can change fire positions.

The auxiliary motors are mounted on the trails. A hydraulic or mechanical transmission transfers the torque from the engine to the drive wheels.

It is curious that experimental self-powered guns underwent development in England back in the 1950's-1960's. Anti-tank guns were mounted initially on special 4-wheel carriages. For example, a 76mm gun of this type could move at speeds up to 40 km/hr over dirt roads. However, these carriages did not work out and the English ceased further experiments.

In the very late 1960's, attempts were made in the U.S.A. to mount motors on howitzers. One 35 hp motor supplied speeds up to 15 km/hr. Total weight of the motor was about 500 kg for a howitzer weighing 6.4 tons. Experience from these tests was widely used in subsequent developments and was the foundation for modern self-powered models.

The West European FH-70 howitzer, for example, has an auxiliary 72 hp motor. Although the gun's overall weight is 9.3 tons, this motor is sufficient to provide speeds up to 10 km/hr. The motor is installed on the forward part of the carriage on the lower mount. Torque from the motor is transferred via a pair of shafts to the rear drive wheels. The front wheels, smaller in size, are used for steering. The lower mount, of hollow box design, serves as a unique gasoline tank.

An 80 hp motor is mounted on the Swedish FH-77 howitzer. It permits the 11-ton howitzer to move at speeds up to 8 km/hr. Drive for this howitzer is provided by a hydraulic transmission.

Usually, the motor is disengaged while the gun is being towed by a prime mover, but it can be engaged when passing through adverse terrain to "help" the prime mover overcome obstacles. Foreign military specialists make great demands on the chassis of self-powered guns. The large-diameter drive wheels must operate independently of one another. Therefore, a differential interlock mechanism and an auxiliary gear box are used. The high clearance, according to the foreign press, gives the guns good roadability and turning ability. This also facilitates the capability to rotate the barrel in order to position it above the trails. The length on the FH-70 howitzer in this case is decreased from 12.5 to 9.5 meters, greatly improving its maneuverability.

It [illegible]erstandable that supporting artillery subunits [podrazdeleniye] must ra[illegible]loy into firing position and be prepared to open fire in a minimum amo[illegible]time. At the same time, there is a requirement to change fire positions as rapidly as possible. The desire to rectify this contradiction impelled designers to think about using the gun's auxiliary motor also to simplify and speed up the process of preparing to fire. Here, the motor is used as a source of power for gun power systems. As a result, for example, raising the trails, elevating the wheels when placing the base plate on the ground, raising the front wheels when preparing to tow the gun, and so on are simplified as the gun is brought from the travel to the firing position and vice versa.

Recently, foreign military specialists have been placing especially great attention on the so-called "effect" of the first round, that is, the capability to open fire immediately upon detecting the target. This also fully applies to direct support guns, and specifically to self-powered guns. The decision was made to use their motors to reduce the time required to lay the gun. For example, this ensures that the FH-77 can be mechanically laid at a speed of up to 3° per second. Auxiliary motors also are equipped to increase the gun's rate of fire. Thus, an electric crane has been mounted on the FH-77 carriage. It is used to place shells directly from the ammunition trailer onto the loading tray. All this aids in increasing the gun's rate of fire.

Thus, overseas the consideration is that modern self-powered guns are capable of moving directly within subunit combat formations, of rapidly changing fire positions, and of maintaining high rates of fire. In this connection, foreign specialists think that creation of self-powered guns is one of the main trends in towed artillery development. Continuing to expand military preparations, the NATO leadership is sharply increasing the delivery of modern types of weapons and combat equipment to troop units. Here, judging from everything, special attention is being devoted to upgrading field artillery capabilities.

7869
CSO: 1801

ARTILLERY: BATTALION TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by Maj V. Saranchev, Red Banner Far East Military District: "Target--On the Surface"]

> [Text] The incandescence of the lessons in the concluding stage of winter training is high. Troops of the Army and Navy are putting forth all efforts to fulfill socialist pledges made in honor of V. I. Lenin's 110th birthday and the 35th anniversary of the Soviet peoples' Victory in the Great Patriotic War. Personnel of the Artillery Unit [chast'] "X" also are greeting these notable dates in a worthy manner. One mission which the gunners accomplished during the first days of the test was training in gunnery against surface targets.

No sooner than battery commander Sr Lt V. Manukyan had prepared the data for destruction of a specific moving surface target, than an input was received: "The commander has been wounded. The battery senior officer takes over his responsibilities."

The task that fell to young Lt S. Mityayev was not the simplest. Creeping barragefire in the sector of movement of "enemy" landing craft had not been preplanned. They considered that the shore in this sector was not conducive to landing an assault party. It turned out that they were wrong. Now, Lt Mityayev had to correct this error and literally in minutes prepare the firing data. An additional difficulty was that similar variations rarely had been worked out in practice. Would the young officer lose valuable time?

There were no delays. Upon command the gunners took several bearings on the lead landing craft. The target's course is plotted from these points. The lines of the creeping barrage fire were proficiently and accurately computed and plotted. All necessary firing data for the battery were ready when the landing craft approached the first line. They could open fire.

But, no volleys resounded, since this was simulated fire. The lesson was underway not on the shore, but in a training class.

success in the main resulted from the excellent training facilities. The classroom is equipped with mock-ups of the complex terrain relief with the shore sectors and with the sea's surface with islands. There also are miniature ships. This all makes creation of a very complex situation possible. The fire control procedure and destruction of the landing party's surface targets, personnel, and fire resources were clearly and instructively depicted on numerous displays and overlays.

While the lesson is underway, political worker Maj V. Kir'yanov says:

"The personnel of a battalion, including all specialists, can study simultaneously in the training building. Besides a fire control classroom, there is one for studying the guns themselves, for communications, and for other subjects. The small artillery range is well equipped. We simulate gun fire using air rifles."

Classroom lessons are combined with field lessons in the unit. Considering that there are few reference points at sea, personnel are taught to prepare data for firing against land-based targets on terrain devoid of reference points. Target range is determined using binocular reticules from the dimensions of silhouettes and from the linear dimensions of the probable enemy's ships. As experience showed, this significantly improved the effectiveness of firing against surface targets.

The training base has been created and upgraded over a period of several years. Many of those who made a large contribution to it have already left the unit. But, they are not forgotten--good things aren't forgotten. Maj S. Chernobay, for example, served in the unit. He vitalized rationalization efforts. With his assistance, a room was set aside where innovators could periodically meet, discuss plans, and do creative work. Maj Chernobay now is serving elsewhere, but his worthy heirs--Maj V. Sukhov, Sr Lt S. Yegorov--remain. Now they are guiding rationalization efforts.

...Battery commander Sr Lt Manukyan is one who has fully mastered firing at surface targets and who teaches this mastery to subordinates. With the first volley he struck a moving target--an "enemy" trawler--during gunnery at sea, which took place recently during the winter training period. Battery personnel switched the guns to direct fire when the landing craft and amphibious tanks succeeded in reaching the shoreline. The crews commanded by Sgt A. Doroshenko and Jr Sgt A. Orlov only needed one round each to destroy the targets.

Capt V. Kuleshov's subordinates barely take a back seat when compared to the mastery of the best battery. Gunners from other subunits in this unit also are reliably trained, as the concluding lessons demonstrated.

7869
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MOTOR VEHICLES: UNSAFE CONDITIONS CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by WO V. Porfenyuk, platoon commander, Red Banner Baltic Military District: "Annoying 'Trifles'"]

[Text] This happened recently. We were concluding a march to the exercise area. I was the senior occupant of the fuel truck driven by Pvt Kh. Dil'murov. A bus passed us and stopped suddenly. I got out of the truck, thinking that some sort of assistance was required. But, the bus driver complained bitterly to me.

It turned out that he had signalled to pass repeatedly, and we had not let him do so. The complaint was justified and I was embarrassed. This happened because the truck had not rear view mirror.

Unfortunately, our drivers go on trips often with similar "minor" deficiencies, as they seem to be looked upon by some chiefs. Just a few days later, our platoon was tasked to haul POL. Again, there were vehicles without mirrors and running lights, with inoperable windshield wipers and turn signals.

I often have talked to Capt N. Shakhoval, unit [chast'] vehicle service chief, and have asked him for help in replacing broken parts. The answer was "There are no spare parts and there won't be any."

The picture in the motor pool during equipment maintenance is the same. And, it is often the case where there is nothing available to maintain the vehicles or conduct inspections on maintenance days.

Many shortcomings also result from drivers assigned to vehicles being occupied with other tasks. Thus, Ural driver Pvt V. Bobich often works in the kitchen garden. Pvts S. Yermolik and E. Pronfkyavichus play in the orchestra. Pvt K. Orudzhuyev is a stockboy in the food warehouse, Pvt D. Mel'nichuk is a clerk in the supply service.

I understand, as the saying goes, that's life. Somebody has to work in the kitchen garden, in the food warehouse, and someone has to play in the orchestra. But, it is incorrect to "take revenge" on the TO&E drivers assigned to the vehicles.

There are instances when, in the morning, a senior occupant often begins his search for a driver, rather than departing on time for a trip. As a result, departure is delayed and sometimes even postponed until another day. This lack of organization is inexcusable.

As a communist, I raised these questions at a party meeting. They were discussed at a subsequent meeting as well. Measures again were to be taken to eliminate these deficiencies. But, there is no certainty that they will be accomplished. Moreover, similar errors have already been repeated.

7869
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NCO TRAINING: PROBLEMS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 May 80 p 2

[Article by Sr Lt G. Patrushev, Red Banner Kiev Military District: "The Right to Teach Others"]

[Text] I recently received a letter from one of the former students of our training subunit, presently a junior sergeant and a section commander. He writes: "When I traveled to my new place of service I was sure that I knew everything, that I knew how to do everything, but what I found in fact was different: It turned out that I was not able to even conduct physical training in the section. This was so in spite of the fact that my training had not been bad--I could perform all exercises expertly, and I was always ahead of the pack in cross country racing. In a word, it was only when I arrived at my unit that I became persuaded that it is not easy to be a sergeant, and that special qualities and capabilities are needed before one can train others."

Unfortunately not only I but also many of my comrades--young officers commanding training subunits--receive such letters. The following conclusion begs itself: Does this mean that we are missing something in the training of the students, that something important is lacking? A search for the causes of such failures and errors unwittingly causes me to recall my years in school, and my first steps as a platoon commander.

I did not become an officer by accident. Both of my grandfathers were soldiers in the infantry, and both died in battle for the motherland. Of course my father, Sergey Vasil'yevich, never did go to war--he spent his whole life working on the face of "Fashchevskaya" Mine. I dreamed of becoming an officer while still a schoolboy. Moreover I insisted on the motorized infantry, since I felt that things are always harder for a combined-arms commander, and that the motorized riflemen always have the last word in combat, which I became persuaded of later on. And it was no accident that I became a student at the Kiev Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni M. V. Frunze: Many of the graduates of my civilian school went there.

It was not easy to accustom myself to army discipline and to learn to organize my labor, but I always received great satisfaction from my lessons in the lecture halls, and from training in the field, at the practice range, and in the athletic areas. I gratefully recall my school and my commanders, captains G. Kirindas' and S. Suanov, my favorite tactics instructor Colonel V. Zhukov, and many other officers who generously shared their knowledge, experience, and life's wisdom with us. I studied well, I earned a Lenin scholarship, and following graduation from the school I was entitled to choose my place of future service. I selected a training unit where, it seemed to me, I could make the best practical use of all that I learned.

And so I arrived at my unit. I recall my first solo physical fitness lesson with the personnel of the platoon as if it occurred just yesterday. I had no doubt that the lesson would go well, but "the first pancake" turned out a mess: I spent too much time introducing the lesson, wasting a good half of the allotted time to explanations. Naturally the practical part of the lesson had to be conducted at an accelerated pace as a result. In a word, I failed.

A little later, after settling down a bit, I came to understand that I made several major errors on the day before the lesson. First of all I did not arrange the training places beforehand, and I lost all sense of control on being confronted by the athletic field with its bewildering array of athletic gear and trainers. Moreover I failed to brief my helpers--my sergeants--beforehand, and their preparedness was far from identical. To put it briefly, this was precisely the case that pushed me to devote persistent attention to work with NCO's in the future.

But there was another cause, perhaps the most serious, of the failures in the first and a few of the subsequent physical fitness lessons: a lack of teaching skills or, to put it more accurately, an acute lack of the habits of conducting lessons independently with the personnel. In school, experienced teachers conducted the drills with the students, ones able to make every lesson interesting. But unfortunately we, the students, did not have to learn anything more than to fulfill the instructions of the teachers correctly and efficiently. Despite the high physical load we experienced, our role was rather passive from the standpoint of mastering the teaching methods. Those rare cases when the students were allowed to independently conduct the preparatory, main, and concluding parts of a lesson were unable to correct this omission. As an example, in all my years of training I was never given the opportunity to conduct a drill from the beginning to the end.

But could this be typical of just the school from which I graduated? My present fellow servicemen, graduates of other military training institutions, also admit that on arriving at the unit, to put it mildly, they felt uneasy in their first physical fitness lessons. It would have been very nice for the training program in this subject at the school to be organized in such a way that students in their senior years could acquire and reinforce the necessary habits of independently conducting drills.

Turning the discussion to my years as a student, I immediately get the urge to say the following: It is about time to introduce a physical fitness examination in the graduating courses of the military schools. I believe that the assessment given to the graduate must be based on both a test of his personal physical preparedness, and his preparedness as a teacher. Moreover, I and many of my comrades would like to see an officers' all-around competition as the main form of sports in the combined-arms school, mandatory for each student.

We who must teach the future NCO's encounter many difficulties as well. We often think about how to improve the quality of their training. Now as well, after the latest graduates have departed to their places of service, we are agitated by the thought that not all of them will be successful in command positions. I am sure that shortcomings in our methods will show up here and there, but believe me, much of it does not depend on us alone.

Student A. Muzychenko came to our unit from Margilan with a second degree GTO badge. At first I wished that we could have more people like him. But I tested him out on the horizontal bar, and I found that he could barely complete two pull-ups. Nor was he able to keep up with his comrades in the 1-kilometer run. I asked the student how it was that he earned the badge, which should indicate his readiness for labor and defense, and I heard the following response: "They were given out to everyone, and so I got one too."

To our tremendous misfortune, young people with unearned sports ranks and GTO badges come to the training subunits not all that rarely. Are not our comrades in the physical culture collectives ashamed of the eyewash and of their knowing misuse of the authority of the all-union physical culture complex in their attempts at meeting the quantitative targets for badge-holders? In the end, they are also deceiving us, the officers, who must later spend a great deal of effort and precious training time to at least correct the situation a little. This is not to mention the serious moral harm done to the conscripts, who are essentially still quite young, by those who make it a habit of giving out "blanket" awards: In the very first lesson given by such graduates, when the lie is inevitably revealed, the holders of such unearned badges find themselves in an extremely ticklish position, and it takes them a very long to recover their authority in the eyes of their comrades.

It would be so much more pleasant to say good things about those doing the complex and important work of training conscripts with a full sense of responsibility, those who completely exclude showmanship and eyewash from their efforts. As an example the officers of our unit have now learned to expect that gradutes arriving for training from Voroshilovgradskaya Oblast are well prepared in all respects, including physical training.

Many of my comrades, lieutenants just like me, became persuaded in a very short period of their service as officers that people must be chosen very carefully to staff the training subunits. We are certain that an order enrolling a student must be preceded by practical testing of his preparedness in a number of specialized disciplines, and mandatorily in physical fitness.

There is, I think, one more thing that our practical work suggests. We would only come out ahead if the training subunits were to enroll only soldiers who had worked for 2 or 3 months in the units and displayed a predisposition and a capability for serving as junior commanders during this time. I realize that this is a more difficult way, and that the apprehension exists that following such training, such a sergeant would have little time left in his term to serve as a section commander. But the quality of training received by the junior commander must become the main criterion.

I have now trained several groups of NCO's on my own. The last completed its training successfully as well: Almost all the soldiers in the platoon received outstanding and good grades, and our subunit was once again named one of the best in the unit. I am impatiently awaiting the new complement, and naturally I am trying to critically analyze my work, so that there would be fewer omissions and unsolved problems in the future. Captain S. Suanov, our company commander at school, loved to repeat that before we have the moral right to teach others, we must learn double the amount ourselves. [254-11004]

11004
CSO: 1801

MILITARY ENGINEERS: TASKS AND TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 May 80 p 1

[Article: "The Military Engineer"]

[Text] Many thousands of military engineers are working in the army and navy. Highly skilled technical specialists are servicing the most sophisticated missile complexes and aviation equipment, surface ships and submarines, radar systems, and the combat vehicles of combined-arms units and subunits. The proportion of those representing engineering specialties in the units and aboard ship is growing with every year; this is a reflection of the fact that the troops are being outfitted with the most up-to-date weapons and combat equipment, and it is dictated by the interests of increasing the country's defensive power.

The military engineer is an active assistant commander, and a leader of a collective of specialists of a unit, ship, and subunit, a person having competency in the development of social life, science, and technology. He must possess a broad outlook, high culture, and the ability to effectively organize the work of the people, their training, and their indoctrination; he must possess the habits of party-political work. In order to successfully complete these multifaceted tasks, without a doubt the military engineer must be highly competent in a large number of areas of knowledge associated with his work.

The military engineer's basic activity is itself gaining new content constantly. This is connected with growth in the number of military-technical specialties, and with broadening of the range of tasks of the engineering personnel. Today, operations requiring deep knowledge of the design principles of complex functional systems, and of the physical essence of their operation are acquiring increasing significance. Without this, engineering analysis of complex system concepts, various adjustments of modern apparatus, the tuning of instruments, and prediction of the operational dependability of combat equipment would be impossible.

The forms and methods of the work have changed. As a rule, they are now collective in nature. And this means that the role of the organizing factor, of scientific organization of labor has risen. After all, the personnel of maintenance subunits not only prepare equipment for flying, for long marches, and for lengthy cruises, but they also participate directly in its combat application. The opinion engineers hold in relation to the most effective way of using combat equipment and weapons is one of the principal factors considered when making a decision concerning a particular training mission.

Military engineers are valued highly in the units and aboard ship for their contribution to the common effort of raising combat readiness, ideological maturity, professional knowledge, and skill. Thus many pleasant things can be heard about military engineer Communist Officer A. Anashechev in the Red Banner Belorussian Military District. A competent specialist and a person of high culture, he has been in charge of the air engineering services of various units for many years. He is typified by a scientific, creative approach to both technical and organizational problems. His authority is high in the eyes of the command and among subordinates. All of these qualities have helped him to achieve high coordination in the actions of his air engineering service subunit, and to introduce new methods of preparing for various combat training missions. He makes a broad practice of modeling the different variants of solutions to particular training problems, of conducting training sessions for the personnel, and of making competent use of mechanized resources.

While recognizing the competency of the large detachment of military engineers as a whole, we cannot ignore the fact that there still are specialists, especially the young ones, who believe that the theoretical baggage they received in the academies is by itself enough for successful performance of official responsibilities. They do not devote adequate attention to practical habits in work with equipment, or to expanding their range of knowledge. It is in this area that commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations, and senior comrades must help the young engineer to surmount this unique barrier, to acquire the experience he needs, and to do everything to make him an all-around specialist in short time.

Knowledge alone, no matter how deep and sound it may be, is not enough for this. What is important is not the theoretical baggage carried by the military engineer, but rather his ability to use it creatively in his practical activities. Behind every particular phenomenon, the engineer must be able to see a general law; he must have a good understanding of what is going on, he must see the mutual relationships between different processes, he must find the bottlenecks in work organization, he must seek ways to surmount them, and he must teach his subordinates to do the same. The military engineer must have knowledge in tactics, and he must study the rich combat experience accumulated during the Great Patriotic War, devoting special attention to organizing the work of engineering-technical services in conditions as close to those of real battle as possible.

There is a vital need for seriously studying pedagogics, psychology, and the methodology of political, military, and moral indoctrination. In these areas, the military engineer must constantly rely upon Marxist-Leninist doctrine, and upon the premises and conclusions of military science. This will help him to envision the future of military affairs, and to clearly and correctly define the mainpaths for improvement of indoctrination. Mastery of the methods of the modern science of control, and of the systems approach to problem solving is of doubtless benefit to the military engineer. A spirit of creativity is organically inherent to the mature, competent leader, and our armed forces provide a truly vast field for such creativity. They provide room for inventive and efficiency work, for improving the training material base, for creating new trainers, simulators, and visual aids, for working out new, effective ways to service and repair combat equipment, and so on.

Socialist competition,which is being especially spurred on this year by the active preparations for the 26th CPSU Congress, offers the executive engineer broad possibilities for displaying his creativity, his organizational capabilities, his ability to mobilize people to achieve higher indicators in military labor and to impart to them the deep knowledge and sound habits they need in work with the equipment, and his high technical culture.

Constant growth in the effectiveness of military engineers and their contribution to solving the problems facing the unit and the ship is the concern of all. There is no limit to perfection here. And the higher the level a specialist achieves in his professional improvement, the more effectively he would be able to complete the complex and responsible tasks facing him. [254-11004]

11004
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MORALE PROBLEM: GARRISON COMMANDER CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 May 80 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen Justice N. Bukharin, Military Procurator, Order of Lenin Transbaykal Military District: "But the Conflict Remained"]

[Text] The reader may perhaps find it strange that a worker of justice is tackling a topic atypical of him, that he is dealing with a case involving no violations of the law. Nevertheless it is precisely we who must often resolve situations where a case is closed due to the absence of a criminal, but conflicts remain. That is what happened in this remote garrison.

An anonymous letter to the procurator reported the improper acts of Colonel V. Dubchenko, ones outside the law. Workers of the Judge Advocate's Office were sent there to check out the facts. After some time, I was able to acquaint myself with the materials of the investigation. Everything seemed clear from a procurator's point of view: Comrades investigating at the garrison did not reveal gross violations of the law or use of official position for self-interested purposes on the part of Colonel Dubchenko.

Nevertheless the sense of dissatisfaction would not disappear, because the event, which would not fall into the realm of law *per se*, had importance in another area--morality.

This was a small military post at which friendship and kindness reigned, but now it recalls a small volcano. Incomprehensible forces rumble constantly within its depths, erupting outward from time to time in troubled flows.

No one can recall any longer how it all began. Colonel Dubchenko was demanding and strict. It was true that his stiffness went against some people's grain, and some people did not like the metallic ring of his voice. But this is inconsequential. No one could accuse him of lacking diligence or efficiency. In regard to many official issues he was effective, competent, and energetic.

But after a while, rumors began circulating through the post. It was whispered that the chief was hard on his assistants. That he would not tolerate criticism, and that his attitudes toward his subordinates depended on personal sympathies or antipathies and, to make matters worse, on his wife's opinions.

And in fact his wife--Lyudmila Potapovna--played more than a minor role in the initiation of these rumors. At first, shortly after moving to the post, she made it known to her neighbors (mainly the wives of Colonel Dubchenko's assistants) that her position in the garrison was special, and that she should be honored no less than her husband was honored. She prepared the soil for her self-assertion gradually and carefully: She readily shared news she heard from her husband with the other women. She promised to "put in a good word" for one of her "buddies," and she advised another as to the folly and rashness of her husband, who said something critical at a party meeting. Lyudmila Potapovna's omnipotence came to be regarded as an indisputable fact, all the more so because many personal problems could no longer be solved without her "sanction" as the chief of the garrison's communal services. This elicited natural bewilderment and even irritation in the people. And some of them made Lyudmila Potapovna aware of this. She in turn felt insulted. She complained to her husband that some of his subordinates were trying to compromise her (and, consequently, him!).

Colonel Dubchenko did not bother to find out what was actually going on, he did not ask for the opinion of the party committee members, and he could see nothing prejudicial in the behavior of his wife. However, judging from everything his pride was hurt, and this had an effect on his relationship to his subordinates.

From this moment on, many ceased to discern the fine line between the chief's exactingness and fault-finding. This muddied the waters even more. Business meetings transformed into hours-long tirades and verbal abuse. When the atmosphere in the garrison reached the critical point the party committee secretary decided to turn Colonel Dubchenko's attention to the problem. But he brushed him aside:

"Soul-searching discussions are not in my line. That's your business."

Here perhaps lie the roots of what happened in the garrison.

The CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination" states that an evaluation of the activities of executives "...must account not only for the production plan fulfillment indicators, but also the discipline and the moral-political climate in the collective...."

If we are to be realists, we would have to admit that conflicts may occur in any collective. Life is life. But what is important here is how to resolve these conflicts painlessly, to prevent them from being engulfed in flames of passion. In this case, the people demanded that their needs be attended to, and they maintained the faith that the communist leader and the party committee could resolve any conflict on the basis of justice, and that they would evaluate an individual's deeds on the basis of public interest. But this faith was superseded by disenchantment.

When people lose faith in justice, doubts and conjectures arise. The weeds of prejudice grow wherever there is no respect for the individual, where there are many deviations from the commonly accepted order in the organization of the military collective's life. In this case, many officers in the unit were ignorant of the conclusion of the promotion commission even by the time of the investigation. Changes were made late in personal files. Merits and demerits were not recorded. Many suffered delays in getting their regular promotions. And why, the officers did not know. This also disturbed the people.

Thus Colonel Dubchenko was himself responsible for creating an unhealthy moral atmosphere in the garrison. He literally had no intention of understanding that all of his acts, and all of his decisions have their effects upon indoctrination.

It is this incomprehension that is the most troubling. After all, it has been said so many times that today's leader cannot count on high respect if he does not rely in his work on the party, trade union, and Komsomol organization, on the public, if he does not personally participate in ideological indoctrination, and if he does not maintain extensive personal contact with his subordinates. Dubchenko gave the excuse that he was too busy, that he did not have enough time to analyze the spiritual problems suffered by his subordinates and the families of the servicemen. But he was obligated to do so, since it was the duty of a communist executive.

Nor did the party committee members stick to their principles. The secretary himself never went farther than that single conversation with Dubchenko. Rather than deeply analyzing the truly critical problems involving mutual relationships at the post, the members of the party committee simply buried their heads and issued written replies to complaints, limiting the depth of their investigation to questions such as why Mar'ya Ivanovna failed to pay her respects to Natal'ya Il'inichna the evening before.

Tip-offs that violations were being made in the distribution of scarce commodities and in observance of the rules of Soviet trade, and that official vehicles were being used for personal purposes were left unheeded by the party organization. Steps were not taken, and this served as a source of various rumors as well. These rumors even reached the political section. Its workers visited this garrison many times to look into the complaints. But, surprising as this may seem, on finding no "serious violations" in the actions of officials, they announced this with a clear conscience at the critique, and departed. But the conflict remained, tearing the collective apart into separate groups.

There is no criminal in this story. But it does contain the elements of negligence of the norms of socialist morality. And from here, it is not a long distance to violation of the law.
[254-11004]

11004
CSO: 1801

OFFICERS' TECHNICAL TRAINING: GENERAL PAVLOVSKIY'S COMMENTS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 May 80 pp 1-2

[Article by Arm Gen I. Pavlovskiy, Commander in Chief of the Ground Troops, USSR Deputy Minister of Defense: "On the Results of the Discussion of the Letter 'From Technology--the Maximum Possible'"]

[Text] Judging from the responses, the letter written by Major V. Shipitsin, commander of a motorized rifle battalion, elicited considerable interest from the readers. This can be explained by the urgency of the problems it touched upon. Mastery of equipment and armament and the means of its application on the battlefields is one of the central tasks of combat training. The quality with which this task is fulfilled depends in many ways on how deeply the officer in charge of training and indoctrination understands the equipment himself. Even sporadic cases in which a subunit commander fails gunnery exercises or driving tests--the letter describes such cases--elicit disappointment and concern. After all, the grade an officer receives is a special indicator. It is difficult to train and indoctrinate subordinates if he cannot rely on himself as an example.

Mastering modern combat equipment and armament is extremely important. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev put this fact quite well in one of his meetings with graduates of the military academies: "In the new conditions, requirements on military-technical and, we can boldly assert, on scientific training of the officer staff are rising immeasurably. If the officer is to make competent use of combat equipment and teach others how to do the same, he must have a good knowledge of the technical fundamentals of its operation, and possess extensive knowledge in various areas of science. Moreover, this scientific-technical knowledge must be constantly supplemented."

The special complexity of the task can be explained by the fact that the amount of engine life which an officer may devote to study of the equipment and to training with the materiel is limited. What is the best way to organize occupational training? What orientation should the military-technical training of officers at the command level have? Should a commander delve into purely technical details, or is this an area of concern of the appropriate services and officer-specialists? Paraphrased, these are questions in the letter which attracted the most attention from the readers, and upon which the debate came to be centered.

Some of the readers felt that simply by posing these issues, the battalion commander was somehow trying to excuse the failure of his subunit in the inspection. They say that the answer to these questions is simple: Every officer is obligated to have a perfect knowledge of the equipment. This, of course, is so. But it is also true that no matter what post he occupies, the military-technical training of an officer must be inseparably associated with tactics. But the nature of these associations, the orientation, if I may be permitted to use that term, of this technical knowledge is defined in many ways by the profile of the officer's official activity, by his functional responsibilities in combat and in day-to-day life. This is precisely why we cannot agree with those who feel that there is something wrong with the author's expression "mastering equipment from a commander's position." I think that it fits the bill perfectly.

To master equipment from a commander's position means to gain an understanding of its true potentials in combat, to learn how to use weapons in combat in the best fashion. This does not at all release the commander from deeply studying the layout of the vehicles and the weapon systems. Tactical and technical specifications are not enough for combat. If the officer is to control a subunit firmly and flexibly, and if he is to use a weapon in all forms of combat, in all weather and climatic conditions, and on various terrain, he must have that "feel" for a vehicle which was shown to be so important in a number of the replies, and he must have the ability to evaluate the physical and psychological loads experienced by subordinates at their battle stations, and predict how the equipment would behave itself in one situation or another. The efficiency of a commander's tactical thinking depends in many ways on his military-technical preparedness. An officer can make maximum use of the equipment's potential only when his calculations as a commander are precise, anticipating the development of events. Naturally, this also requires the knowledge of the characteristics of equipment possessed by the probable enemy, of his strong and weak sides, and of the way the enemy uses his equipment in combat.

Life itself demands that technical training in the unit and aboard ship be differentiated, with a consideration for the post occupied by the officers, the nature of their official activities, and their experience. This is a mandatory prerequisite of its high effectiveness.

Perfecting the military-technical training of officers at the command level, we must remember that the commander is the one who prepares subordinates for combat and arms them, relying on the help of his assistants, the staff, and the chiefs of the different arms and services; the commander must have the ability to utilize the fire, speed, maneuvering, and protective properties of the equipment. The commander, and no one else, defines the nature of the personnel's technical training, sets the schedule of work on particular subjects, leads demonstrations for the most difficult of them, and evaluates the proficiency level.

The quality with which equipment and armament is maintained and the correctness of its operation also depend on the commander's personal technical preparedness. A commander's incompetency in these issues has an effect upon the subunit's combat readiness, and it often has serious consequences. Here is one incident that occurred in a recent inspection during the winter training period. Company commander Senior Lieutenant B. Klimenko reported that the armament was ready to fire. However, it was soon revealed that this was not so. The errors were explained by the commander's superficial, unqualified control of the work of young specialists, and by his inability to brief them objectively.

The regulations impose special responsibilities upon the commander of a regiment and a ship associated with preserving, maintaining in operable condition, and correctly using armament, combat, and other equipment, ammunition, fuel, and other materiel. Need we say that a commander's inspection of equipment leaves a deep impression whenever such an inspection is conducted by an officer having facility with equipment management, with the weapon system as a whole, and with each device, machine, and mechanism taken separately? One who is capable of revealing shortcomings in their maintenance, and taking energetic steps to correct them. The work style of a commander in this highly important area must insure creation of a situation in which no one would permit himself to park an unserviced vehicle, or to deviate from the requirements of the instructions and regulations. Much depends here upon the personal qualities of the commander, upon his ability to direct the activities of his deputy for technical affairs, the chiefs of services, and the principal specialists.

Mastery of equipment and armament from a commander's positions presupposes not passive supplementation of knowledge, but active analysis of practical experience, an investigative approach to drills and exercises, a constant search for more-effective means of combat. This is what attention is turned to in responses to the letter by Lieutenant Colonel G. Zorin and Major V. Karanchev, Military Pilot Senior Lieutenant A. Lazarev, and other participants of the debate.

Progress in military affairs and continuous improvements in armament are having a tremendous influence on tactics and strategy. The more fully new weapons are in tune with battle organization, the more effectively their potentials are utilized. Equipment is created by engineering thought. Tactics are "designed" by commanders. An officer must be an experimenter, he must try out something new, something still untested in every drill and exercise. What is important in this case is not the scale of the exercise. It is important to avoid stereotypy, and to encourage creative thought and initiative.

A search of the same intensity must be conducted in equipment maintenance. New equipment always requires new methods of caring for it. Sometimes these methods remain unchanging, preventing good and timely repairs, adjustments, inspection of various devices, and control of their operability. Obviously we must make a more active effort at studying and publicizing experience accumulated in the best formations, units, and ships, and discuss these issues at technical conferences and commander rallies.

To be an innovator in the mastery of equipment, the individual must gain the knowledge that has been acquired in the given area, he must deeply study the combat regulations and manuals, and he must acquaint himself with the invaluable war experience. The need for creatively applying the experience of the Great Patriotic War in the present era was expressed effectively from my point of view by Colonel General of Tank Troops D. Dragunskiy. Mass assimilation of complex equipment in short time, continuous improvement of tactics to permit fullest use of the advantages of our tanks, ground-attack aircraft, and rocket artillery, and proficient resolution of the problems of logistical support to combat and to operations--these wartime lessons will never fade away.

Also instructive is the influence tactics have on technology. Industry got many of its "orders" for equipment modification from the battlefield: The caliber of the guns, their range of fire, and the speed of the vehicles grew, and their maneuverability increased. Mastering the rocket complexes, supersonic aircraft, atomic submarines, and electronic systems, officers can find the key to solving qualitatively new problems in war.

Discussing the letter, many readers emphasized the need for achieving a correct combination of theory and practice in the technical training of officers, and the importance of adhering to a system in training, of successively expanding and deepening knowledge. I share the opinion stated by Major General of Tank Troops V. Kurchavov, Engineer-Colonel N. Bal'shem, Engineer-Major A. Zolotarev, Captain-Lieutenant Ye. Vedrashko and other comrades that the military training institutions, the troops, and the fleets possess considerable reserves for raising the effectiveness of technical training.

The foundation of the future officer's technical training is created in the military school. The training course is long enough to shape sound gunnery and driving habits in the graduates, and the ability to prepare armament for combat and vehicles for marches, to inspect sighting devices and navigation and control resources well, and to correctly organize their maintenance. Obviously the military training institutions are still not doing everything to arm the young officers with a deep knowledge of modern equipment. And yet, the conditions for this do exist. Raising the proportion and the quality of practical drills with materiel is one of the reserves pointed out by the readers. At the same time, the importance of deep theoretical preparation of young officers is validly emphasized. The cares of today must not make us lose sight of the future. During his career, the officer will have to master new types of vehicles and weapons many times, and his basic theoretical knowledge will be a great support to him.

The officer can find many ways to improve his practical skills while serving in the troops. In this case the possibilities afforded to young officers--

platoon, company, and battery commanders--are especially broad: It is their job to lead most of the drills. The following rule should be adhered to in every drill: The commander must be the first to perform any exercise, standard, or particular operation. Even in the event that he is not ready to participate in a demonstration. He must grow, he must improve himself, and he must surmount his deficiencies, without feeling it shameful to learn something from his subordinates. An officer can inspire people not only through his high personal skill but also through his attitude toward training and his yearning for knowledge.

The responses published in the newspaper discussed concrete ways for improving the mastery of equipment and weapons. From my point of view the exchange of experience was extremely useful. I would like to make special mention of a particular form of training--rifle, tank gunnery, and artillery training exercises. The role of this form of drills is extremely great today. Practice shows that if a company strictly adheres to the schedule of day and night training and thoughtfully chooses the variants of fire missions, the officers, NCO's, and gunners would strike their targets in all situations.

The discussion of the letter "From Technology--the Maximum Possible" revealed the diversity of the problem. Questions associated with improving training methods, developing the training material base, and utilizing modern trainers were entertained. This is natural. Without training resources, it would be extremely difficult to master a large number of models of equipment and weapons. For example hundreds of simulated launchings must precede a single real launching of a guided antitank rocket. We can understand the concern with which readers discussed the fact that trainers are undervalued in some places, and that all emphasis is placed on use of the actual combat equipment. This not only makes the training process more expensive, but also reduces its effectiveness.

It is not without grounds that Guards Engineer-Colonel N. Sokhor and other officers said that concern for the authority of an officer's class rating is not displayed everywhere. Laxity and formalism are impermissible here. An officer's rating must objectively reflect his training level; it must mirror his technical proficiency. It stands to reason that an officer's rating should not be ignored when the time comes for recommending an officer for a new position, promoting him, or transferring him for training.

No matter how great the potentials of equipment are, it is people that bring these potentials out. Mastery of equipment is inseparably associated with the ideological maturity of the personnel, with indoctrination of a sense of duty in the soldiers, and with the unity of military collectives.

A number of statements (by Major General V. Arapov and other readers) substantially discussed the sort of help political organs and party and Komsomol organizations could give to commanders in their efforts to make military-technical training highly effective. The main things they could do would be to display high exactingness toward communists, see that they offer a personal example, generalize the advanced skills effectively, and develop useful and effective initiatives in socialist competition.

Without any doubt, the discussion in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of the problems associated with mastering equipment will be of practical help to the immediate organizers of the training process, and it will enrich the methods and techniques of their daily activities. It has doubtlessly already benefited the battalion commanded by the letter's author--Major V. Shipitsin. The battalion took first place in the regiment and division in the winter training period. The motorized riflemen worked well in the tactical exercise, making competent use of the combat equipment and armament. All young officers completed their tasks successfully.

Concerning itself with strengthening the country's defensive power, the Communist Party is doing everything necessary to outfit the Soviet Armed Forces with the most sophisticated forms of weapons and combat equipment. The material foundation of the army's and navy's constant combat readiness is dependable. But the skills of the personnel must also satisfy the high requirements of combat.

Soldiers of the army and navy are offered favorable possibilities in the summer training period for improving their combat proficiency. Summer is a time of intensive exercises, flights, and long sea cruises. The task of commanders, political organs, staff, and party and Komsomol organizations is to see that every lesson would proceed at a high methodological level. The socialist competition for proficient mastery of equipment and weapons, for striking targets at maximum range, with the first attack, with the first shot, round, and launching, and for sensible use of materiel must acquire even greater scope. Learning to use equipment and weapons to their full capacity is one of the main goals of combat training, and the high technical proficiency of the personnel is an important factor of the constant combat readiness of the units and ships.
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MOTORIZED RIFLE UNITS: TRAINING ACTIVITIES

Company Mountain Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 May 80 p 1

[Article by Lt Col G. Artemenko: "In a Flanking Detachment"]

> [Text] Lt Col Grigoriy Vladimirovich Artemenko has been appointed KRASNAYA ZVEZDA permanent correspondent for the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District. Here is his report.

Sr Lt E. Istrafilov turned around in the hatch and glanced back. The snaking road shone far below. He was there quite recently with the company. But now the infantry combat vehicles were climbing a steep rocky incline toward the pass.

The company had packed in the allotted time. But the senior lieutenant was hurrying on his subordinates. He had studied the area of the impending operations well--a high-mountainous region, difficult of access, with deep ravines and canyons and heights fit for eagles' nests. It was no accident that the "enemy" had organized pockets of resistance there.

Senior Lieutenant Istrafilov and his subordinates have had to operate in a flanking detachment before. They have always coped with their assignments. This evidently predetermined the regimental commander's choice when the question arose as to who to send. But now the situation was complicated by the fact that the company had sustained "losses" in previous engagements. In particular, two platoon commanders had become "casualties," according to the exercise leader's tactical setting. One of them was replaced by Lt S. Borzilo, second in command in charge of political affairs. He, of course, could be relied on. But would the third platoon, which would go into action headed by Sgt A. Goshko, be able to handle the assignment? He has a commander's grasp. But relatively little experience of operating in the mountains.... Taking this into consideration, Istrafilov decided to shape his order of battle such as to insure that the mortar platoon attached to the company could be rapidly switched to assist the third platoon.

Senior Lieutenant Istrafilov entrusted the most difficult assignment to the platoon commanded by Warrant Officer A. Gorbunov. He was to attack the "enemy" on the commanding height, having ascended it by a sheer cliff. The company commander considered this platoon the best prepared.

The mountains were suddenly shrouded in mist. On the one hand this was of assistance to the company and helped insure secrecy and, consequently, the surprise nature of its operations. At the same time up above there the mist could make accomplishment of the mission more difficult. Thought had to be given to additional control measures.... Istrafilov had not had time to do anything before a call came through in the earphones of his headset that an obstacle lay ahead. A deep canyon stretching many kilometers. A water crossing would have to be made.

Having sent the combat vehicles on a wide envelopment of the canyon, the motor riflemen headed by Lieutenant Borzilo were the first to set about the task. Having roped up, Jr Sgt S. Guseynov lowered himself into the canyon. He had been ordered to draw out the rope. Other soldiers began to move across soon after him.

It seemed that everything was proceeding as it should. But Col V. Korotkiy, senior officer of the district's Combat-Training Directorate, who was present at the exercise, was of a different opinion.

"High endurance and an ability to surmount obstacles are most important components of mountain training," he observed. "And, generally, the motor riflemen displayed pretty good rock-climbing and mountain river-, canyon- and ravine-crossing skills. But there were still shortcomings in their actions. Unfortunately, we still frequently conduct oversimplified mountain exercises. For example, certain subunits leave for mountain exercises without weapons and protective gear. This company was like this earlier. It is for precisely this reason that certain soldiers today feel very encumbered in full battle gear. But an ability to surmount mountain barriers is not in itself sufficient for victory. It is necessary to know how to conduct an engagement in the mountains. A situation could arise here, for example, when a soldier will have to effect aimed fire during a rope crossing. If a person has not been instructed in this, he becomes a target for the enemy. The more so if, as in this case, the commander does not assign forces and resources for providing the crossing with fire cover. This could prove costly in a combat situation...."

And the motor riflemen are back in their vehicles. The mist began to disperse, revealing mountain tops powdered with snow. That is where, with engines howling under the strain, the infantry combat vehicles are now inexorably heading. A grenade launcher suddenly struck from behind a rock overhanging a depression. The vehicles halted. The barrels of their guns swiftly turned toward the target. But their shells fell considerably short. Then the motor riflemen leaped out of the vehicles. They helped "take out" the dangerous target. But the infantry combat vehicles essentially took no part in this duel.

"This episode was instructive," Col Korotkiy said, "in that it showed how important it is to take account of the 'mountain' factor in the use of combat equipment and weapons. I am sure that if the squad commanders and the drivers had known how to act in this situation, everything would have been different. They could have silenced the 'enemy's' firing position with the first round. It would have been sufficient for this to drive the track of the combat vehicle onto a stone, say, and thereby increase the firing elevation. But no one did this. Consequently, the company's officers are still taking insufficiently fully into account the peculiar features of firing in the mountains in training the personnel. It is also necessary to improve the motor riflemen's skills in a fight against enemy snipers."

The weather in the mountains is capricious. The sun had just begun to shine when clouds sailed out from behind the cliffs, and rain came pouring down. It stopped just as suddenly as it had begun. However, the situation on the battlefield altered sharply even in this short time. The motor riflemen again had to hurry. But the company had reached the planned line. Having surmounted the rocky sector, the platoon commanded by Warrant Officer Gorbunov also reached the rear of the "enemy," who was dug in on a height adjacent to the pass.

Attacking the "enemy" from two directions, the company contributed to the success of the main forces. The exercise, which was held at the final stage of the winter training, provided the motor riflemen with many lessons which will have to be taken into consideration in the summer training period.

Regiment Shortcomings Analyzed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 May 80 p 2

[Report by Lt Col A. Yurkin: "Lessons Learned Following an Inspection"]

[Text] Red Banner Siberian Military District--The Sevastopol' Motorized Rifle Regiment was the first in the Red Banner Siberian Military District to support the enterprise of the initiators of socialist competition in its service of the armed forces. Its pledges adopted prior to the start of the training year at a meeting of the personnel record: "...To have earned the title of excellent regiment by the end of the training year." These pledges, which were approved by the district's Military Council, became a reference point for other units. It is natural that the course of affairs in this regiment was followed intently by the troops and that the results of an inspection were eagerly awaited.

And now the winter training is over. Half of the path toward the charted goal has been covered. What are the motor riflemen's achievements at this intermediate point?

An inspection showed that the regiment failed to fulfill socialist pledges adopted for the winter period of training. Many subunits obtained only satisfactory marks, although higher levels in competition had been outlined. And, furthermore, neither the unit headquarters nor higher headquarters, whose representatives were frequent visitors to the regiment, were disturbed by the state of affairs on the eve of the inspection.

Analyzing the reasons for having failed the inspection, the regimental headquarters reproached certain officers for failing to cope with their set assignments in a difficult tactical situation. They also gave the names of the culprits. These included, among others, Sr Lt V. Nikitenko and Maj K. Petrov. Yet there had been no mention of shortcomings in their personal training before. On the contrary, Major Petrov's subordinates were constantly praised and declared competition winners in the unit.

However, a fact remains a fact: during the inspection the above-mentioned officers did not show themselves to best advantage. While repulsing an "enemy" counterattack in a tactical exercise Senior Lieutenant Nikitenko, commander of a motorized rifle company, lost control of the company for a time. This was reflected in the results of the combat firing. Nor did the tankmen of the battalion commanded by Major Petrov appear any better during the inspection. The marks which they received for firing and driving were lower than those outlined in the pledges.

Some people talk about this being accidental. The actual training of the subunits' personnel, they say, enabled them to score higher marks, but they were hindered by undue excitement. A strange explanation. Indeed, the personnel really experienced a lack of confidence prior to the inspection and was excited about its outcome. And not without reason. During the winter training the same Senior Lieutenant Nikitenko had done far from everything required by the program for training drivers for operations on unfamiliar terrain and under bad road conditions. Questions of orientation had not been practiced in drills with platoon and squad commanders. All this was also reflected in the exercise results.

Nor can we speak of the accidental nature of the tankmen's failure. Drills with them were frequently conducted under simplified conditions, with lenient indulgencies, which made itself known during a check drill in the tank training area. Many tankmen, including the battalion commander himself, failed to overcome certain obstacles en route.

There were many instances in the course of the inspection of the soldiers being unable to corroborate the evaluations they had been given in the combat-training registers. Those performing the inspection created a situation closer to combat conditions than in customary exercises. Many of Capt V. Boykov's subordinates, for example, did not even know the terms of the norms and evaluation indicators. Surely this points to serious indulgences and simplifications in training?

The formal attitude of some commanders and political workers toward the organization of competition was reflected in the quality of the combat training of the unit's personnel. This work was reduced in a number of instances merely to adopting pledges. As far as a sense of contest in day-to-day training was concerned, far from all officers displayed any concern for this. Even now, when the results of the winter training have been summed up, the best specialists, "excellent" soldiers and laggards cannot be named.

A specific, purposeful struggle to improve the training process was not initiated in the unit after the regiment's pledges were published in the district newspaper. The serious oversights of the past, particularly in the organization of weapon training, were not rectified. Exercises are often held under simplified conditions owing to the poor operation of the equipment of the training center. Both divisional headquarters and district headquarters knew about this. Nevertheless, the unit was rendered no concrete assistance. A start was made on removing the shortcomings only immediately prior to the inspection itself. All the requests of Maj R. Khabibov, chief of the training center, were satisfied urgently, and essential equipment was supplied. Work buzzed on the range. But rush jobs are never successful. Nor were they on this occasion: the subunits were unable to make good what had been omitted.

And the combat training in the regiment could have been more efficient. Back at the start of the training year the district's Combat-Training Department officers revealed shortcomings in the firing skills of a number of subunits, including the battalion commanded by Major Petrov. But the matter ended with the ascertainment of the facts. At the end of the training period those performing the inspection pointed out precisely the same shortcomings. I believe this is also characteristic of the style of work of the district's Combat-Training Department. The following feature of this style has to be mentioned: during the inspection certain of the department's representatives essentially attempted to substitute for the subunit commanders. Thus, for example, Major Petrov was not a part of the proceedings during the nighttime firing. His duties had been assumed by Col N. Khorokhorin, senior officer of the district's Combat-Training Department. But nor was this enough to "salvage the situation."

From the first days of the summer combat training the regiment has aspired to insure the higher quality of each exercise. There is stricter supervision of the fulfillment of the combat-training plan and the use of training facilities, for the improvement of which much was done before and after the inspection. However, much will still depend on whether the essential lessons will be learned from the failures during the inspection. It is important that not a single planned measure and not one clause of the pledges remain just on paper but be underpinned by well-conceived, precise organizational measures. Here is where the party committee and all communists of the regiment should apply their efforts. What needs to be done where and by when, who is specifically responsible for a given area of work, who, again specifically, will check out fulfillment--this is what should now be at the center of attention. But it is precisely a specific approach in organizing the training process and socialist competition which many of the regiment's officers still lack. And references to any kind of fortuity which allegedly prevented the motor riflemen from being successful during the inspection which are heard in the headquarters only dampen people's ardor and distract their attention from urgent problems.

Helicopter Fire Support

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 May 80 p 1

[Report by Capt V. Sekhin: "Over the Battlefield--Helicopters"]

[Text] Red Banner Far East Military District--Pursuing the retreating "enemy," the motorized rifle subunits were encountering his well-organized resistance in the depth of his defenses. A tank column which had turned to counterattack represented a particular danger. A critical situation had been created for those on the offensive. It was then that the helicopter pilots of the Regiment imeni V. I. Lenin came to their assistance.

The decision had been made even earlier, when possible battle alternatives had been played out on the maps in headquarters, to employ a sudden helicopter strike to render the motor riflemen reliable fire support. Nevertheless, Lt Col V. Archegov, commander of the air regiment, was now clearly aware how difficult it was to implement the undoubtedly correct intention. Two circumstances favored the opposing side--the entirely open terrain entirely ruled out, it would seem, the mere possibility of sudden attacks from the air, and, furthermore, the airmen's operations over the battlefield were made more difficult by extremely awkward meteorological conditions. However, the commander had no doubts as to the ability of his subordinates, many of whom were pilots of the highest classification.

This regiment pays the most unremitting attention to studying the tactics of ground troops. Joint airmen and motor riflemen classes have become traditional on the eve of tactical flying exercises. The commander constantly keeps a study of the ground troops and their armaments at the center of his attention. For this planning classes are held in the commander-training system, and there are joint analyses of the classes and exercises. And the quality of the assimilation of the program material is comprehensively tested in training engagements. So it was on this occasion.

Captains V. Avdiyenko, H. Kharin and A. Tarasov, experienced air fighters, showed up at the sharp edge of the attack, when the "enemy" was counterattacking the forces on the offensive in open terrain. They were the group leaders. Taking the open terrain into account, the regimental commander decided to bring the helicopters to the line of missile launchers under a smoke cover. The area of the impending operations had been thoroughly studied the day before, navigational preparation had been performed in full, and communication by radio had been practiced. In a word, the airmen had considered all special angles of the combat operation.

The first to take off were two whose job it was to put down a smoke screen. After these came the group for taking out the air defense and then the main, strike group.

It could be seen from on board the rotary machines how the opposing sides were conducting the firing duel and how the "enemy" was attempting to outflank the motor riflemen and consolidate his success. And then the battlefield was shrouded by a whitish wall of smoke. This was the first group of helicopters doing its job. The reliable screen appeared so suddenly that the "enemy" became confused. He was deprived of his former possibility of conducting aimed fire. The airmen were not slow to take advantage of this.

The crews of the strike group operated expertly. While paying tribute to everybody I would like, nevertheless, to pick out Capt A. Zykov. The young pilots in the regiment are taught the combat use of missiles on the basis of his experience. It is emphasized here: everything is important for the successful performance of a set assignment in battle. How the airman prepares for each mission, how he studies the tactical situation and the drill training procedure. The procedure of the crews' actions in different conditions of the situation is practiced in stimulators until automatic.

The use of smoke in the battle was also extensively discussed in the regiment on the eve of the tactical flying exercise. This thorough preparation brought deserved success. Adroitly organized interaction with the ground troops enabled the strike group to reach the designated area at a precisely determined time. An instant later, and a whirlwind of fire was raining down on the "enemy" tanks. The opposing side's counterattack was broken up. The motor riflemen again advanced.

The senior officer attending this exercise evaluated highly the helicopter pilots' skill.

The airmen of the outstanding regiment are continuing to persistently improve their combat mastery. During summer training they are using the accumulated experience of the organization of socialist competition to the utmost and confidently building up their achievements in combat and political training.

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MILITARY UNIFORMS: DRESS REGULATIONS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 May 80 p 4

[Article by Lt Gen Intend Serv S. Petrov, Chief, Central Clothing Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "Wear It With Dignity"]

[Text] The Communist Party and Soviet Government display constant concern for the armed defenders of the homeland and for improving their conditions of daily living routine. In particular, a number of measures have been taken in recent years to provide military personnel with higher-quality and more attractive uniforms.

For example, an open-necked dress uniform with straight-cut trousers, shirt and tie, plus chrome leather boots were adopted for Soviet Army enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers and officer cadets. A jacket with high standup collar was adopted for all army personnel in place of the gimnasterka service pattern blouse. All compulsory-service personnel received fatigues. A woolen summer topcoat was added to the wardrobe of officers and warrant officers, and warrant officers received a dress overcoat....

Clothing quality is constantly improving for all categories of military personnel. An especially positive role in this regard was played by the adoption of new woolen-Dacron fabrics, which are more durable and wrinkle-resistant. Since 1975 there has been a substantial improvement in providing warm clothing to military personnel serving in cold-climate areas in the Far Eastern and Transbaikal military districts.

At the present time the military uniform basically meets modern requirements. At the same time, experience in utilization has shown the necessity of further improvement of the military uniform and its standardization. In view of this fact it has been decided to carry out a number of measures in 1980-1981, aimed at improving the outfitting of military personnel.

All officers will wear a shoulder board of gold color on the dress uniform; shoulder boards with a silver field are being abolished. Peaked service cap bands, gorget patches and piping (stripes) on uniforms, and central stripes on shoulder boards shall be changed to red for personnel for whom these uniform items were formerly crimson. Standardized black peaked service cap bands and gorget patches shall be worn by officers, warrant officers and extended-service enlisted personnel. They shall be of standardized fabric -- black velvet.

It has been decided to use the cotton uniform pattern for cotton khaki fatigues for compulsory-service enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers as well as Soviet Army officer cadets. This will make it possible better to control wear on everyday and fatigue dress and will help improve the appearance of military personnel.

A dress uniform consisting of flannel with a uniform collar and cloth trousers has been adopted for naval school cadets. This uniform will be issued to cadets beginning in 1980.

There will be standardization of the letters "CA" [Sovetskaya Armiya (Soviet Army)] on the shoulder boards of enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers (other than 1st sergeants and petty officers), which in the future will be of a single pattern, 25 mm high, of synthetic pellicular material of a gold color. Metallic letters "CA" will no longer be made. The letter "Ф" [Flot (Navy)] shall be worn on the shoulder boards of naval enlisted personnel and petty officers (other than master chief petty officers) and the shoulderpieces of enlisted personnel (other than senior seamen), for all fleets, in place of the initial letters designating the corresponding fleet (flotilla). The shoulder boards of personnel enrolled at Suvorov military academies shall carry only the letters "CBY" [Suvorovskoye Voyennoye Uchilishche (Suvorov Military Academy)] positioned 25 mm from the lower edge of the shoulder board. Letters designating the Suvorov school name shall henceforth not appear on shoulder boards.

All letter designations on the shoulder boards of army and navy enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers, personnel enrolled in military educational institutions of the Soviet Army, Suvorov and Nakhimov military academies ("CA," "Ф," "K" [Kursant (Cadet)], "CBY," and "H" [Nakhimovskoye Voyennoye Uchilishche (Nakhimov Military Academy)] will be applied to shoulder boards of synthetic pellicular material of gold color directly at the factories which manufacture them; chevrons on shoulder boards for all noncommissioned officers and braid along the border of shoulder boards of cadets at all military educational institutions shall be only of gold braid.

Regulations for wearing white waist belts have been changed. They are now to be worn only with the dress uniform for formation.

Certain changes have also been made in the general officer uniform. A single parade-model dress and parade peaked service cap has been established. The dark-blue dress trousers have been replaced by trousers of ocean wave hue (other than aviation). Gold embroidery is specified for the band of the everyday peaked service cap. During peacetime general officers are permitted to wear the everyday uniform for formation as field service uniform.

In order to control wear on clothing, taking account of the conditions of performance of military service, officers may be issued, at their request, everyday uniform items in place of dress and field service uniform -- within the cost of the replaced items. Such substitution, however, shall not have a negative effect on the external appearance of officers in dress and field service uniform. Inspection parades shall be periodically held in the troops for this purpose.

The changeover to supplying military personnel with uniforms taking into account the adopted changes and uniform supply standards shall be effected as follows: in the cities of Moscow, Leningrad, in the capitals of union republics and in hero-cities -- by 1 November 1980; in other garrisons -- by 1 January 1982. Military trading organizations shall, pursuant to the provisions of present laws, assist reserve and retired officers and general officers in purchasing, if they so desire, the requisite uniform items, and in changing piping and stripes as required.

Recently an ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet was published, entitled "Ratification of Regulations on Wearing USSR Decorations, Medals, Decoration and Medal Ribbons on Bars and Other Insignia." Pursuant to this Ukase changes have been made in the procedure of wearing USSR decorations, medals, decoration and medal ribbons on bars, and other insignia on the military uniform.

Placement of USSR Decorations and Medals, Decoration and Medal Ribbons on Bars, and Other Insignia on the Military Uniform



On the open-necked double-breasted dress uniform jacket



On the open-necked dress uniform for officers, warrant officers and Soviet Army extended-service personnel



On the open-necked single-breasted dress uniform for Soviet Army compulsory-service personnel



On the flannel and uniform shirt with the dress uniform

These changes consist chiefly in the fact that USSR decorations and medals should be positioned on dress uniforms (jackets) not along the lapels as in the past, but in a horizontal row. Decorations worn on ribbon-bar holders shall be positioned on the left side of the chest, while decorations worn without ribbon bar holders, with the exception of the Order of Victory, shall be worn on the right side of the chest. All medals shall be worn on the left side of the chest except for the "For Distinction in Military Service" medals, class I and II, which shall be worn on the right side of the chest. The Komsomol member's badge shall be worn on the left side of the chest.

Decorations and medals of foreign countries shall be worn below USSR decorations and medals. Decorations and medals attached to ribbons shall be worn on the left side, and those without ribbons -- on the right side of the chest.

Decoration and medal ribbons on bars shall be worn on the left side of the chest. Ribbons of foreign decorations and medals shall be worn on individual bars below the bars of USSR decoration and medal ribbons.

Individual variants of positioning of USSR decorations and medals are shown in the attached drawings.

These measures to improve and standardize the military uniform will promote further improvement in the appearance of military personnel. "On the basis of appearance..., the neatness and smartness of military personnel," stated USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "one can judge not only their attitude toward observing the rules and regulations pertaining to wearing the military uniform, but also the general state of military discipline and organization of units and naval ships. A serviceman's appearance is a reflection of his inner content, an indicator of his capability and willingness to perform his military duty to the homeland." Commanders are called upon continuously to monitor the appearance of military personnel and their observance of the rules and regulations pertaining to wearing the military uniform.

3024
CSO: 1801

COMMANDER CRITICISM: INVESTIGATION RESULTS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 May 80 p 2

[Article by Correspondent Lt Col A. Bedzhanyan: "More Than the Plan Alone"]

[Text] On learning who the author of the letter to the editor was, Captain N. Shpilenko immediately picked up the telephone receiver. "Bring me Senior Lieutenant Kopylov's personal file," he ordered.

At this moment Major I. Gasich, the railroad battalion commander, entered the office. Now all three of us counted up the number of merits and demerits entered in the senior lieutenant's record of service card. We came up with a clear advantage in favor of demerits.

Major Gasich leaned back on his chair and ventured the notion that perhaps there was no need to look into Kopylov's letter, since he himself was not such a great officer anyway.

True, platoon commander Senior Lieutenant Ye. Kopylov's work could not be termed exemplary. But is this an excuse for ignoring his criticism altogether? Apparently not. After all, his letter communicated accusations that the battalion commander's work style was faulty, that he exceeded his authority, and that labor was disorganized.

Let me make the following qualification right away: Major Gasich did not "inherit" the best. Due to the spinelessness and unpretentiousness of the former commander the battalion occasionally witnessed violations of military discipline, and the people did not work with any special zeal.

The new commander decided to establish firm discipline and an efficient work rhythm, and to make the battalion's work successful in short time. Some of his plans he was able to fulfill. But a tangible turn for the better had not occurred.

Major Gasich himself, and other communists in the battalion, give the appearance that they evaluate their work self-critically. This is the impression one gains on reading the party meeting minutes. But there is a gap of major proportions between word and deed.

For example, speaking at one of the meetings, battalion deputy commander for political affairs Captain N. Shpilenko made mention of the meagerness of visual agitation in the work areas, and the weakness some communists displayed in adherence to party principles. But wouldn't you agree that correcting such shortcomings is a direct responsibility of the battalion political worker?

There is also something else that makes one think twice. No matter what the agenda of the party meetings, the discussion invariably centers on work performance alone.

But what about the spiritual life of the soldiers, and their cultural needs? These are not little things that can be ignored. But no one in the battalion could remember whether or not any sort of memorable mass cultural functions had been conducted here in the last few months, what was discussed by the warrant officers' council and the wives' council, and whether or not meetings had been held with war veterans, outstanding workers or, for example, entertainers.

It is not unimportant to know how much time the officers and warrant officers have to spend with their families, whether or not they are afforded enough time to acquaint themselves with new books or simply go to a movie, and what their mood is when they come to work. But the rule in the battalion is that as long as the commander is working, the other officers, and even the warrant officers, cannot even entertain the notion of rest.

Major Gasich is not lacking in will, exactingness, ardor, and selfless concern for his work. We can believe him when he says that there is so much work that it takes 25 hours to call it a day. But how is it that everyone looks so busy but there seems to be no substantial payoff from all of the work?

It is obviously not enough to attack one's own work zealously. We must also see that this zeal is supported by other officers and by party and Komsomol officials. It is not enough to give orders; we must also work meticulously with people. When we know their merits and shortcomings, their moods, and their needs, it is much easier for us to guide the efforts of subordinates toward the main goal, to mobilize all forms of ideological indoctrination for this purpose, and to raise the competition for the honor, merit, and faultless behavior of the soldiers to its required level.

No, the modern military collective lives by more than the plan alone. Today, respect is shown for the leader who is well aware of the laws of production management, who senses the fine lines in communication with subordinates, and who has the capability for taking account of the psychological features of his people.

Unfortunately Major Gasich works excessively one-sidedly, placing all of his emphasis on strictness, on his authority as a commander alone. Almost all of the battalion's officers have received disciplinary reprimands. But few of them are working any better today. They have obviously become used to the reprimands, and they have ceased to feel their educational effect. The "crime-punishment" system adopted in the battalion is clearly spinning its wheels, because it is not reinforced by careful analysis of each violation and its causes, and consideration of the violator's individual features.

Even Senior Lieutenant Ye. Kopylov's work is not all bad, and it would be wrong to treat it so. There was a time when he served as acting company commander, and during this time the company was the best in the battalion. Had he been given support at this moment, who knows, perhaps all the rest of his career may have gone on brilliantly.

Company commander Senior Lieutenant N. Afanas'yev's file contains reprimands as well. His company suffers periodic eruptions of violations of military discipline. But Major Basich and his assistants never deeply analyzed the causes of these violations, and they never made suggestions to the senior lieutenant as to how to set things straight. There is not enough time for this, they say. It is much easier and simpler to add another reprimand to the company's record. Or to lengthen the work day of the officers and warrant officers in the company until such time that order and discipline are restored in the subunits. This tactic has been employed in the battalion.

A commander's exactingness must have its basis in the regulations, and not in arbitrary principles. Inattention toward people, toward their needs and demands, and substitution of military exactingness by naked bureaucracy have never done anyone any good.
[257-11004]

11004
CSO: 1801

FAR EAST M.D.: TRAINING PROBLEMS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 May 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen V. Novikov, Military Council Member, Political Directorate Chief, Red Banner Far East Military District: "It Depends on Each of Us"]

> [Text] The daily mail of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA contains many letters from units and subunits of the Far East Military District. They discuss the ways for improving combat skills, political training, and the cultural life of the personnel, and they also talk about the shortcomings slowing the work down. The editorial board asked Lieutenant General V. Novikov, the district's military council member and political directorate chief, to comment on some of these letters.

On acquainting myself with the mail, I was pleased to see once again that Far East soldiers have a good understanding of the social significance of their daily service, and that they display a truly state approach to raising the combat readiness of their units and subunits. They are happy with the country's successes in communist construction, and their attention is directed at a noteworthy event, the forthcoming 26th CPSU Congress. These are the main things that determine the morale of each of our military collectives. And its influence upon practical successes is tremendous, as we know. This is why I would like to dwell on this issue, especially on some of its aspects.

"Dear Editor," writes Lieutenant Colonel Ya. Koval'chuk to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. "Let me tell you about my collective. Each day of training is saturated to the limit here. Neither the whims of weather nor the difficulties of working in the field diminish the enthusiasm of the tank crewmen. They counter all difficulties with high organization and discipline, and a desire to use each minute of precious training time with maximum effectiveness."

I have had many occasions to visit the distant northern garrison from which tank battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel Ya. Koval'chuk sent his letter to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. I witnessed the tank crewmen at work: They shoot excellently, they drive their combat vehicles well, and they display competency and initiative in their complex practical missions. And the main result of their labor is a leading position in the competition.

But I can remember a time when the situation here was entirely the reverse. The regiment could boast only extremely modest results. Moreover even these results had to be achieved by crash campaigns, which disturbed the rhythm of the training and the order of the day. Let me say outright that these shortcomings were generated by the work style of some executive officers. They could not handle their job, and therefore crash campaigns, nervousness, and roughness began dominating their activity, while insincerity and whitewashing began to be typical of their superiors. This situation generated tension and indifference in the collective.

I find this to be a significant example. It confirms that the morale of every collective depends in many ways on its executives, on their ability to adhere to party principles and to maintain visible, daily contacts with party organizations and the personnel, always and in everything. And it is upon this that the district's military council centers its primary attention.

Our central newspaper has published many letters written by soldiers of the Red Banner Helicoptor Regiment imeni V. I. Lenin, in which Lieutenant Colonel V. Archegov is the commander and Lieutenant Colonel N. Bezborodov is the chief of the political section. I have before me one more letter from this unit at this moment. It was written by Major V. Petukhov. The author expressed good, warm words about his military family. Yes, the commanders, the political workers, and the party organization know how to organize the life and labor of the people here, they conduct party-political work actively, and they do not allow a gap to form between word and deed. Thus the personnel in the regiment acquire an elevated, efficient mood. And it is no accident that the regiment has retained the outstanding title for 10 years in a row, and that its successes in the socialist competition in honor of the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth earned an honorary Lenin certificate.

But unfortunately not all communists deeply understand that the mood of the people has a most direct bearing upon the effectiveness of military labor and its end results. There is only one conclusion that can be made here: Everyone must come to understand the importance of the approach to problems of the labor collective implied by decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination." Everyone must understand the importance of the notion that close unity must be achieved in organizational, administrative, and educational activity. Every administrative measure, the party teaches us, also had its moral and educational consequences. The efforts of an executive are evaluated not only on the basis of plan fulfillment; we must also consider the way indoctrination is organized, the moral-political climate in the collective, and the working and living conditions.

We made full application of these criteria when we summarized the results of combat and political training in the winter training period. The overall grades of some subunits exhibiting serious shortcomings in this regard were reduced even despite high results in special training. I believe that this approach is entirely valid and objective: Wherever ideological indoctrination is not at its required level, and where its effectiveness is low, we cannot expect stable successes, and failures would be unavoidable in all areas.

Going on, here is an eloquent letter. It was written to the editor by company deputy commander for political affairs Senior Lieutenant V. Atyashkin. The author mentions that in his unit, much is said at various meetings and conferences, and properly so, about the need for maintaining exemplary order, the rhythm of the training process, and a tactful and concerned attitute toward people. But what he finds in practice is often otherwise. As an example the role played by sergeants in the unit is low. They are often kept on the sideline of training and indoctrination. Even officers are appointed in their places as mess hall monitors. In the opinion of some comrades, this measure was to have improved the work of the food services. But such improvement was not observed, for understandable reasons. An inspection conducted by the political organ showed that the problem lay not at all with the sergeants, who were supposedly unable to handle their responsibilities as mess hall monitors, but rather in something entirely different--poor work by rear services headed by Officer A. Keller. For example the mess hall's food processing equipment was down for a long period of time, but no special concern was noted in this regard.

Here is something else that elicited concern: The problem, which was limited for the moment to particular cases, could have mushroomed into something bigger, since it was clearly a reflection of the overall work style of the unit command. I personally had to talk with the regiment commander and assume control over correction of the shortcomings. The situation did not change immediately in the regiment, and there is still much more to change, but a beginning has been created, and the letter to the editor has spurred the effort on.

Violations of official norms, mismanagement, administrative excesses, and managerial incompetency not only create tension in the work and in the combat training, but they also unavoidably reduce morale, engender unnecessary false rumors, and sometimes quench the enthusiasm of the people and hinder initiative.

How can we counteract such losses? Only through high responsibility displayed by the leader of the collective and by members of the party organization--the collective's political core--for the state of affairs in all areas, and only through deep concern for people of a real commander and a real party member.

Naturally, our district does have its unique features. Its size predetermines that "remoteness" which is so typical of many garrisons. It is so important in such conditions to create, in the garrison, a microclimate that would permit a full spiritual life. But how can we do this? We need spiritual mutual understanding, and a sincere concern for this aspect of our military life. This is the notion emphasized in letters written by Captain

S. Yakhontov, Senior Lieutenant V. Bylitskiy, junior sergeants V. Karpeka and A. Yermakov, and other Far East soldiers.

Unfortunately this concern is not always displayed. At such times one thinks with disappointment that it is not really that difficult to display it. On the other hand, in order to create a good mood, we need not only concern from above, but also creativity and initiative from below; it is also very important for the commander and party organization to know how to maintain and develop the latter. Imagine how much the combination of these two qualities could do that is good, useful, and necessary to the work!

In this connection we are devoting special attention to implementing the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee's 26 April 1979 decree: The primary party organization and party groups must serve as centers of daily ideological indoctrination, they must unify the collective, they must competently work with individuals, and they must stimulate their social activities and work. The issue was raised on the following practical plane at a district conference of party committee officials: The morale of the collective and the mood of the people are also components of combat readiness, and every party organization must assume the responsibility for solving all urgent problems of the collectives. This is how it can truly help the commander, and how its authority and influence among the masses could grow further.

I would like to emphasize that analysis of letters to the editor and investigation of the content of those forwarded for action to the district headquarters and political directorate help us to see the problems better, and to concentrate our attention on them. Concerning ourselves with implementing the proposals suggested in the letters and with the ways to correct shortcomings indicated in them, we do not limit ourselves to analyzing the particular problems only in the units from which the warning signals are sent. Issues raised in a letter from one unit often require resolution in other places as well. The ability to see a major problem troubling the people behind a particular fact, to understand the needs and demands of the people, and to respond to them effectively is what is most important in work with letters. This is what makes this work effective, especially in regard to reinforcing the morale of military collectives. This is a very important issue, and it must be dealt with daily, patiently, competently, and persistently. It must be handled as required by the party.
[257-11004]

11004
CSO: 1801

DOSAAF CHIEF COMMENTS ON TRAINING RESULTS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 May 80 p 4

[Article by Mar Avn A. Pokryshkin, Chairman, USSR DOSAAF Central Committee: "To Go Beyond Present Achievements"]

[Text] One of the main directions in the activity of the USSR DOSAAF is to actively promote the defense capabilities of our country and prepare laborers for defense of the socialist fatherland. Thousands upon thousands of young boys and girls are acquiring the necessary skills and improving their proficiency in organizations of the defense society. Military-technical forms of sports have assumed a firm foothold in the daily life of our young people, they are earning ever-greater popularity, and they are promoting preparation of skilled specialists for the army and navy, as well as the national economy. Twenty-nine million persons in our country are involved in military-technical forms of sports.

There is not a single republic, not a single kray, or a major industrial or rural region in which young people are not involved in motor sports, marksmanship, parachute jumping, and model building. Hundreds of various competitions conducted in the entire country not only encourage new participants but also promote the growth of the proficiency of the best athletes. It is extremely indicative in my point of view that just in the finals of the Seventh Summer Spartakiade of the Peoples of the USSR, 830 individuals attained their master of sports rating, and 289 USSR records were set.

In a word, military-technical forms of sports have now become a part of the life of the broad laboring masses in the country, and further universal initiation of such sports is one of the priority tasks of DOSAAF. Today I would like to turn the discussion not to the successes and achievements but rather to the problems and unutilized possibilities that we doubtlessly have. Unfortunately, shortcomings still exist in the work of some DOSAAF organizations.

All DOSAAF activities are typified by a desire to introduce military-technical forms of sports more broadly and purposefully into the complex of measures aimed at preparing young people for service in the armed forces, and to improve ideological, political, psychological, and physical preparation of future soldiers.

We have significant reserves in this area. As an example we could hold spartacades for conscripts in military-technical forms of sports, and especially applied all-around competitions. Organization of such mass competition is, in my opinion, the best test of the preparedness of the young people for service in the armed forces. After all, every young person must come to the army and navy as a ranked sportsman, and be a willful, physically fit person. We, people of the senior generation who had traveled the difficult roads of war, know quite well how necessary these qualities are to the private and seaman.

The following incident comes to mind. The commander of our air regiment ordered me and my wingman, Junior Lieutenant Semenov, to scout the situation around the Prut River and the Ungeny-Stefanesti sector. Avoiding the fire of antiaircraft guns, as we approached the river we noticed several Messerschmitts flying almost level with us. Two enemy airplanes took to my tail. The only way to avoid the lethal fire was to put my craft into a steep climb, which I did. As I performed the maneuver, it felt as if a tremendous force was literally crushing me into the seat. My body turned leaden, and I felt as if I could not move a muscle. But nevertheless I managed to complete the maneuver and extricate myself from a very difficult position.

It was later, back on the ground, when we were analyzing the situation that I came to understand that good physical fitness was what came to my rescue in that critical moment. And naturally, it was with kind thoughts that I recalled my first mentors at the aeroclub, who had advised me to take up gliding and other technical forms of sports. I was also told the same thing by many of my comrades in arms, famous pilots who began their career in aviation at aeroclubs sponsored by the defense society. It was in these clubs that the foundation of their future military skill and their physical and moral steadfeastness was laid, and a sense of devotion to the motherland, to the work of the party, and to duty was nurtured.

Today, the DOSAAF organizations and the technical sports, aviation sports, and sharpshooting clubs and sections of the society devote a great deal of attention to military-patriotic indoctrination of the young. The activities of war veterans, of people wisened by military and life experience play an inestimable role in this--heroes of the Soviet Union Georgian SSR DOSAAF Central Committee chairman Lieutenant-General (Reserve) V. Dzhandzhgav, Tul'skaya Oblast DOSAAF committee chairman Major General L. Tikhmyanov, USSR DOSAAF Central Committee colleagues colonels (reserve) M. Tyul'kin and N. Zabyrin, Volgogradskaya Oblast DOSAAF Committee chairman Colonel (Reserve) K. Plakunov, and many others. But we can and must do a great deal more in this direction. In our work with the young, we must not limit ourselves to concern for improving just the athletic indicators alone, which is unfortunately the emphasis in some places. We are obligated to nurture a harmoniously developed individual, a highly conscious patriot of the motherland.

Much significance is attached today to creating a broad network of technical sports schools for children and young adults, including specialized schools. Today, more than 10,000 students are attending 90 such schools. Just in 1979 alone about 7,000 masters of sports, candidate masters, and first-rank sportsmen graduated from these schools. Productive work is being done by the Moscow and Minsk specialized technical sports schools for children and young adults in motor sports, the Yerevan school in sharpshooting sports, the Kishinev and Novosibirsk schools in radio sports, and others. Here, thousands of young citizens not only become acquainted with sports but also find their places in future military and civilian professions.

For the sake of justice, however, we should mention that things are not entirely well in this work. There must be many more children's schools; they should be created in every major city, in every oblast, in every kray. We cannot condone superficial and unsystematic management of the work of the schools by some DOSAAF organizations, particularly in the Kazakh SSR, in Altayskiy and Krasnodarskiy krays, and in Voronezhskaya and Kemerovskaya oblasts. Is it really proper for such schools for children and young adults not to have their own bases, such that they are forced to lease buildings from others? Moreover in some places, such as in the Kirgiz and Turkmen SSR, no effort has yet been made to create such schools. Selection of trainers continues to be a weak point as well.

Schools for children and young adults require daily, persistent attention. But if such schools are the future of military-technical forms of sports, the technical sports clubs are their present. It is mainly in them that the best trainers are now working, and it is mainly in them that top-class sportsmen are being trained for the country. Today more than 560,000 DOSAAF members are presently involved in different forms of sports in the more than 2,500 official technical sports clubs.

However, in addition to this positive experience we unfortunately still suffer unsolved problems in this regard. This pertains mainly to the absence of adequate leadership of technical sports clubs on the part of individual DOSAAF committees. It is mainly owing to this that the clubs sometimes feel a shortage of the necessary equipment and the absence of a modern base; moreover the qualifications of the trainers sometimes leave something to be desired. All of this not only has a negative effect upon the performance of collectives representing a given republic, kray, or city, but it also hinders mass development of military-technical forms of sports. We must foresee an effective system for developing military-technical forms of sports in every city, oblast, kray, and republic, and we must determine which forms are to be developed by the DOSAAF organizations, and in what volume.

The successes of the best DOSAAF athletes in the international arena are universally known. It would be sufficient to point out that last year they won 784 medals in the largest competitions, to include 403 gold medals, and they established 86 world records. We are proud of the great victories enjoyed by our motorcyclists, parachutists, marksmen, motoball teams, and SCUBA divers. We have managed to achieve an integrated approach to the training of top-class masters in these forms of sports, and to insure unity in training and indoctrination.

The example of creating an ice motor racing team deserves attention as an example. The collective did not evolve right away. Years of meticulous work by trainers led by instructors of the all-USSR team made it possible to find and train brilliant masters such as S. Taraban'ko, A. Bondarenko, and others. Now they are not only distinguished racers, but also mature people capable of leading their comrades by their courage and their full devotion to sports. It is no accident that in recent years, Soviet athletes have been said to be the strongest in the world.

At the same time our motor and radio forms of sports are not developing at a sufficient rate. Nor is model building proceeding all that well. There are about 600,000 persons in the country involved today in aircraft, ship, and automobile modeling. This figure is impressive on its own, but can we be satisfied with present achievements on recalling that there are more than 50 million children and adolescents now studying in schools of general education and in vocational-technical schools? Of course not. Here lies a colossal reserve of mass public participation, which we still have to put into action.

We must devote unweakening attention to effectively utilizing the sports base. Today we can look with pride at the complexes in Kiev and Tbilisi, the car race tracks in Fergana and Baku, the cross-country motorcycle tracks in Kiev and Rovno, and the shooting ranges in Sverdlovsk and Tallin, at which competitions are truly festive occasions. But a recent inspection showed that many of our athletic facilities are not being used to their full potential for competitions and training. We cannot condone the fact that the sports complex in Poltava, thought to be one of the best in the country, sits practically empty, or that the sounds of engines have not been heard for a long time in the DOSAAF stadiums in Omsk and Maykop.

In a word, all organizations of the defense society must make an effort to systematically develop military-technical and applied forms of sports in the country, on the basis of a clearly organized system, and a scientific foundation. This is required by the main task of the USSR DOSAAF--preparing seasoned, technically knowledgeable, competent defenders of the motherland who are devoted to the ideals of communism.
[257-11004]

11004
CSO: 1801

MILITARY SERVICE: EDUCATIONAL ROLE DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 May 80 pp 2-3

[Article by Dr Phil Sci, Prof, Col A. Timorin: "Military Service and Personality Development"]

[Text] The army of any society, as the experience of history confirms, possesses the resources and machinery for influence upon servicemen, for imparting particular qualities, a fighting spirit, and morality to them. In the presocialist, class-antagonistic formations of both the past and present, this influence has been directed at making the army, as an organ of the state, a tool of the dominant class of exploitation, a dependable resource for implementation of its policy. The propertied classes have been and are still interested mainly in training the soldier precisely for this task, being not at all interested in his subsequent fate and in his future as a personality.

It is only in socialist society that the role of the army is becoming qualitatively new in this respect: It is not only preparing the soldier spiritually and physically for armed defense of the achievements of socialism, which is foremost in its activity, but it is also constantly achieving another task--developing the citizen, a conscious and active builder of socialism and communism. Our army objectively serves as a school of life, a school of development for the young, one permitting them not only to deeply assimilate military affairs but also assume a worthy place in the creative labor and sociopolitical activity of our people. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said the following in his report to the 25th CPSU Congress: "Young people come to the military family without life experience. But they return from the army as people who have undergone a school of endurance and discipline, as people who have obtained technical and occupational knowledge, and political training."

Development of the personality in Soviet society begins in the family, and it continues in the school and the labor collective. At a particular stage, both are superseded by the army--a special, military organization of the socialist state having its own specific purpose. Article 31 of the USSR Constitution states:

"It is in behalf of defending socialist achievements, the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state that the armed forces have been created and the universal military obligation has been established."

It is precisely the lofty mission of the Soviet Army and Navy, their historic purpose--dependably defending the socialist achievements of the Soviet people, their qualitatively new social nature, and the CPSU's guidance of Soviet military development that permits the USSR Armed Forces to successfully develop, in the young people, the traits and qualities of not only a soldier but also a citizen, a laborer, and a creator of the new society.

The army of the socialist state embodies the socialist social relations that have evolved in the country--economic, sociopolitical, and ideological. All of the life and activities, the internal order, the training and indoctrination of the personnel, the mutual relationships among servicemen, and their relations with the people are based on socialist principles. V. I. Lenin constantly emphasized the need for developing the army in the spirit of general Soviet development, and for reinforcing socialism within the army, seeing within this a source of its invincibility, and a new, progressive role in society, including in the indoctrination of the people. Lenin's requirements have been embodied in present activities.

The economic relations of socialism manifest themselves in the army mainly in the fact that it is being outfitted with everything it needs on the basis of socialist ownership; all of the army's material resources and all of its property are publicly owned. With socialist ownership at their basis, the relations exhibited between servicemen in their work are typified by real collectivism, cooperation, and mutual understanding, by positive mutual influence, in the fashion of the relations we see within the socialist national economy.

The sociopolitical relations of Soviet society, a society of developed socialism, manifest themselves deeply in our army, an army of the whole people's state. This is an army that expresses the will and interests of the laborers--workers, peasants, and intelligentsia. It is manned by laborers from bottom up. The socialist army is an army of the friendship of peoples and proletarian internationalism. Representatives of various nationalities serve in the military collectives, and their work on common tasks brings them together and makes them kindred spirits. Indoctrination of servicemen in the spirit of friendship and brotherhood of the peoples of their country is organically combined with their indoctrination in the spirit of fraternal solidarity with laborers of all countries, with all peoples, and in the spirit of intolerability of the enemies of peace, democracy, and socialism. Soviet soldiers dependably stand on guard over the security of countries in the socialist fraternity and universal peace, shoulder to shoulder with soldiers of the armies of the Warsaw Pact states.

Our army reflects the political structure of socialist society. Political organs and party organizations have been created within it and are functioning actively today, implementing party policy in the military collectives daily, firmly, and consistently; our army is represented by many mass social organizations--youth, sports, military-scientific, military-technical, creative, and others. Servicemen enjoy the full rights and liberties of citizens of socialist society foreseen by the Constitution, to include the right to vote and to run for positions in all organs of state power.

Socialist ideological relations manifest themselves clearly and fully in our army. This is expressed in the Marxist-Leninist philosophy of the personnel, in the socialist content of the entire system of their training and indoctrination, and in the operation and development of all forms of socialist social consciousness: political and legal ideals, morality, art, and science, in application to the tasks of armed defense of socialism.

Manifestation of all social relations of socialism in the army provides the objective grounds for implementing, within the specific conditions of military service, the goals of communism associated with full development of the personality.

The Soviet Armed Forces perform their educational role by the influence of two groups of factors upon the servicemen--objective and subjective. The objective factors include the specific features of the army itself as a military organization: its purpose and functions, the methods of its manning, the nature of the labor, and the collective nature of the life of servicemen. All military service, all of the strictness of its nature, and the intense process of combat training--training sessions, drills, exercises, flights, cruises, combat duty, maintenance and use of the most sophisticated equipment and weapons--nurture high combat and moral qualities in the individual. Working on the important national task of maintaining the unit or ship in constant combat readiness elevates the soldier's personality and promotes development of a noble feeling of personal participation in the historic actions of the party and people.

Subjective factors include the various directions of the purposeful, systematic activity of commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations of the army and navy aimed at shaping Marxist-Leninist viewpoints and convictions in the soldiers, and indoctrinating the personnel in the spirit of avid love for the socialist motherland and proletarian internationalism, and faithfulness to the requirements of the military oath and the regulations.

Both of these groups of factors exist in close unity and interaction, supplementing one another. It is important to note in this regard the greater role played in indoctrination of the soldiers by socialist competition in the army and navy, organized by commanders with the help of political organs and party and Komsomol organizations. Socialist competition forms and develops an active life position in the individual, strengthens his feeling of friendship and military comradeship, and promotes establishment of proper mutual relationships within the collective, as required by the regulations.

The educational influence of service in the Soviet Armed Forces is a constant influence, one inherent to the armed forces both in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, and in the period of construction of developed socialism, as well as in the stage of functioning society of developed socialism.

The entire history of the Soviet Armed Forces bears witness that they have been and continue to be a school of communist indoctrination in all of its directions. Introducing the ideals of socialism into the consciousness of the soldiers, developing a new attitude toward labor and public ownership, tempering their will and character, nurturing them as collectivists, developing their sociopolitical activity, and raising their level of education and culture, the army and navy have made a tremendous contribution to developing the new man, the socialist personality.

The Soviet Army deserves great credit for indoctrination of the people mainly in that military service develops the scientific philosophy of the personality. While the civilian school lays the foundation of the individual's knowledge and his philosophical fundamentals, the military collective continues the individual's further formation. Knowledge acquired prior to service is deepened and expanded. At the same time new knowledge about the surrounding world and about the laws governing its development are acquired. In this case in distinction from the civilian school, philosophy develops in the military collective not only through training and indoctrination, but also in organic unity with daily practical activities.

Development of the soldier's scientific philosophy is mainly the result of ideological work, which arms the personnel with Marxist-Leninst theory. Ideological-political indoctrination of the soldiers proceeds continuously, systematically, and purposefully, and it maintains an intensive, active nature.

Owing to this an individual in a military collective more quickly becomes a political warrior, one that is mature in ideological respects, and one who has a better understanding of events occurring in the country and in the international arena. Of the privates and sergeants questioned during a certain sociological survey, 93.3 percent indicated that during their time of service their outlook was broadened, their interest in political knowledge and events grew, and a major positive change occurred in their viewpoints on and their attitudes toward life, labor, and military service--that is, that which we can call deepening of philosophy occurred.

The successful service of the absolute majority of our soldiers and their fruitful activity following service in the army attests to the effectiveness of "philosophical" indoctrination in the army. We know from general knowledge and from concrete sociological studies that people who have undergone the school of army life and returned to peaceful professions as a rule lead the ranks of the laborers of the cities and towns, and take an active part in public life and in the work of party and Komsomol organizations.

The Soviet Armed Forces also have an educational influence upon the personnel in that they actively form its communist attitude toward labor. In the course of military service, young people acquire a deep understanding of the need for conscientious labor to permit development of communist society; the personnel are nurtured in the spirit of unwavering compliance with the requirements of discipline; they develop their initiative and creativity in labor, they achieve a desire to make it highly effective, and they develop a sense of thrift in relation to socialist property. Military labor and military discipline develop a sense of responsibility for work, conscientiousness, persistence, punctuality, and the ability to surmount difficulties. At the same time soldiers undergoing service learn an occupation which subsequently often becomes a vocation for the individual's entire life. Thus according to one survey 34 percent of the questioned soldiers who had been retired into the reserves had jobs in the national economy making use of the special training they acquired in the army.

Army service also influences the individual by improving his cultural-educational characteristics. Privates, seamen, sergeants, and petty officers all deepen their knowledge and acquire new knowledge through regular participation in all forms of combat training (predominantly technical and special) as well as through political training. The volume and depth of the knowledge of the soldiers are increased and their general cultural level is raised also through the most diverse forms of scientific and technical propaganda organized extensively in the troops, and through the great effort made by cultural and educational institutions to further the aesthetic education of the personnel. Formally speaking, the educational level of an individual completing his first term of active service is the same as when he first entered the military collective. But for practical purposes the level of his knowledge in the social, natural, and technical sciences as well as his general culture are significantly higher.

The entire nature of life and activity in the army and navy also promotes physical development of the personality. This is promoted by the strict schedule of combat training and rest, as well as by planned physical training. During their time of service, privates and sergeants become stronger, and their endurance, agility, and dexterity rise.

The educational role of the army, mainly in the aspect of the personality's spiritual development, is a phenomenon inherent only to a socialist army. In view of its class-antagonist nature, the bourgeois army cannot perform a similar role, since it cannot promote progressive development of the young. Without a doubt it has an influence upon the personality of the serviceman, but it is mainly the consequence of ideological processing of the personality--a consequence of a complex of measures aimed at direct political deceit of the servicemen. The bourgeoisie is forced to resort to such processing in order to force soldiers representing the laboring classes to defend its own interests, and to make them obedient servants.

Ideological processing in the armies of imperialist states has a clearly expressed class nature, and it is predetermined by the interest of the monopolist bourgeoisie, by the entire system of the social and state structure of imperialist states, by the reactionary domestic and foreign policy of their governments, and by the social nature and purpose of bourgeois armies. Its principal content is anticommunism, and mainly anti-Sovietism, apology of the bourgeois structure and the bourgeois way of life, and propaganda of militarism. And naturally an impression is made. The consciousness of servicemen in imperialist armies is significantly distorted and beclouded by false ideas. In the imperialist army, for practical purposes the individual is transformed into a cold-blooded murderer without honor or conscience, working for his pieces of silver.

The massive ideological and psychological influence experienced by the personality in the bourgeois army also makes itself known following service. Systematic in this regard are the cases quite often reported in the American press, where many criminals explain their acts of violence and murder by their "predeliction" for doing so, acquired during service in the army.

Under the conditions of developed socialism, in the course of communist construction, society imposes ever-higher requirements on indoctrination of the personality. These requirements also apply to soldiers in the army and navy. the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination" poses the very important task of strengthening the role of indoctrination in the Soviet Armed Forces. Implementation of this party requirement presupposes more-effective use of all possibilities and reserves in indoctrination, constant and persistent introduction of an integrated approach, further enrichment of the content of ideological work with a consideration for the interests and needs of the young, improvement of the quality of combat and political training, and further reinforcement of the unity of the army and people.
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MILITARY SCHOOLS: COMBAT TRAINING RESULTS REVIEWED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 May 80 p 2

[Article by Col Gen V. Makarov, Chief, USSR Ministry of Defense Main Directorate of Military Training Institutions: "Using the Integrated Control Method"]

[Text] A busy time is coming on for the military educational institutions: Another training year is ending, the examination period is forthcoming, and students in their final year await the state examinations and defense of their diploma projects. While maintaining their attention on fundamental theoretical training, the instructors and professors of the military educataional institutions are persistently continuing to pursue their course of intensifying the practical orientation of training and raising the level of field, aerial, and naval skills of the graduates--future commanders, indoctrinators, and combat organizers.

Departments offering strategic and specialized tactical disciplines have intensified their attention to practical forms of growth, to their material-technical support, and to improvement of training methods. Specialized tactical drills and exercises have become broader, and more missions are now being executed in integration, out in the field, in the air, and at sea. Following the principle of teaching that which modern combat would require, the instructors are trying to create an instructive situation in every practical drill, one as close to that of real combat as possible, saturated with complex situations. Such drills, which require exertion of will, swift actions, and initiative from the students, promote development of high military occupational qualities, initiative, and creative thinking.

Much has also been done to create and fully outfit the material-technical base intended for practical training, especially the field training base of the military educational institutions. As an example the military academies have assumed the course of creating training complexes and systems of mobile and permanent command and control posts. Field training centers have been set up with great expertise and inventiveness at the Leningrad Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni S. M. Kirov, the Kamenets-Podol'sk Higher Military Engineering Command School imeni Marshal of Engineering Troops V. K. Kharchenko, the Ryazan' Higher Airborne Command School imeni Leninskiy Komsomol, and many other higher command schools.

Extensive introduction of trainers and modern technical resources is making it possible to develop practical habits and skills with high effectiveness while preserving the life of combat equipment and weapons to the maximum.

The creative search for ways to intensify practical training has produced many valuable initiatives. One of the promising directions in this search was improving the organization of student training and the methods of its quality control, and elevating the role of quality control as a factor stimulating training.

The need for effective control of the cognitive activities of the students requires a constant, correct awareness of its results. However, the testing system that has evolved in the military educational institutions, which is limited to course and state examinations, is oriented mostly on testing theoretical knowledge, and it does not lay enough emphasis on checking the practical habits and skills acquired during training. This pertains especially to strategic and specialized tactical training, which are the basis of field, aerial, and naval skills.

Many military educational institutions have accumulated favorable experience in testing the practical habits of organizing and conducting combat and in using combat equipment and weapons. The skills of controlling units and subunits are tested in the Military Academy of Armored Troops imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy, the higher combined-arms schools, and some other command schools, in the course of specialized tactical drills conducted in the field with real combat equipment and communication and control resources. A number of educational institutions give examinations in tactics and combat applications during tactical drills in the field or at the command and control posts.

At the same time the organizational forms and methods of such control require further improvement. The main emphasis should be laid on determining the sensible volume and content of practical material to be tested, on developing a single approach to giving overall grades for theoretical knowledge and practical habits, and so on. Positive solution of these problems could significantly raise the objectivity of grades and insure comparability of the results achieved by the students.

Considering the importance of this problem, the Teaching Methods Council of the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Directorate of Military Training Institutions thoroughly analyzed the existing experience in April of this year and produced concrete recommendations on intensifying quality control of practical training. It was recognized suitable to meticulously test, in examinations concerning strategic disciplines, the acquired habits and skills in accordance with the requirements of the particular goals of the training programs, in addition to testing theoretical knowledge. Such testing would make it possible to evaluate the quality of the military-professional training of the students more fully, and to evaluate their real preparedness for official responsibilities in the troops and fleets.

The best experience of the military academies and schools shows that effective control is achieved when examinations are conducted in two stages, where theoretical knowledge is tested in the first and practical abilities and habits are tested in the second. A high level of practical training must be based on a sound foundation of theoretical knowledge, which permits the officer to display his creative potentials more fully in combat missions, to use combat equipment and weapons to their maximum effectiveness, and to successfully assimilate all innovations appearing in military affairs. This is why the highest requirements must be imposed in the examinations on the theoretical knowledge acquired and on the ability to discuss the problems at hand, understand them deeply, and make creative use of the obtained knowledge.

As a rule, practical preparedness in strategic and specialized tactical disciplines should be tested right in the field, in the training centers, and at the training command posts. Such testing may be done during special tactical exercises or during work on tactical and specialized tactical problems. The effectiveness of such control can be raised by using real control and communication resources in the tasks, and by using the appropriate supporting subunits and combat equipment in the field. As they perform their concrete official responsibilities, as determined by the examination assignment, the students should also undergo testing in command and training skills.

Testing in the state examinations should be conducted not in just one training discipline but in integration, in the basic divisions of all strategic disciplines. This form of testing, based on an integrated approach to training results, is being introduced more and more persistently into the practice of the higher school. The overall grade for the examinations should be derived on the basis of the principle of equal significance of particular grades for theory and for practice.

The party and government demand that the higher schools prepare specialists of a broad profile, ones having both fundamental theoretical knowledge and the ability to solve practical problems. The most important reserve for completing this task is persistent dissemination of advanced skills in instruction, in organization, and in the practical aspect. There is no doubt that introduction of the methods of integrated control, combined with exactingness at the examinations, would promote intensification of the practical orientation of training at military training institutions, and further growth in the quality of officer preparation.
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PROPAGANDA UNIT: AFGHANISTAN LEAFLET DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 May 80 p 4

[Unattributed news item: "In a Mobile Print Shop"]

[Text] "Soviet serviceman! While on Afghanistan's soil, remember that you are a representative of an army which has extended a helping hand to the peoples of this country in defense of the revolution. Always remember, soldier, that you are an internationalist fighting man, that the Afghan people will judge the entire Soviet Army and our great homeland from how you conduct yourself!"

These lines are from a leaflet which was printed up in the mobile print shop of a newspaper during the first days of the contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. This newspaper is small in physical format and in number of copies printed. But it accompanies the soldier at all times: in the field training area, on the firing range, and during a march halt. This newspaper has been awarded an Honorary Certificate of the Komsomol Central Committee.

In the photograph: In the mobile print shop of the newspaper of an airborne unit, Gds Capt G. Sokolovskiy (center), Gds Lt N. Dolmatov and Gds Pfc S. Radchenko work on the next issue. Photo by A. Sergeyev.

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